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 Introduction  
 
 Again I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the 
strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the intelligent, nor favor to the skilful; but 
time and chance happen to them all. 
Ecclesiastes 9:11 
 
 When it comes to moral political endeavors, the good eventually achieved is 
never identical to the good initially pursued. This is true if for no other reason than 
the fact that time passes with every new political moment. We move from goods 
intended to goods achieved. At the same time such movement is not simply a product 
of the temporal character of our lives. Occupying a middle ground between accounts 
of human agency as wholly determined or wholly ambiguous there is a sense in 
which any exercise of the will is fundamentally indeterminate. Said more simply, we 
are contingent beings. Thus, while it may be possible to speak conceptually of a 
determinate or atemporal political good, the possibility of a moral political endeavor 
– that is, a purposive movement toward some political good – rests upon the 
inescapably contingent and temporal character of our lives.   
 If political endeavors are never entirely under (or out of) our control and 
always take shape temporally then it is important to insist that the discrepancy 
between intended goods and actual goods need not be interpreted negatively. That is 
to say, the indeterminate character of our moral lives need not be seen as a tragic 
disruption to what would otherwise be seamless political existence. Rather, the 
indeterminacy is a deliberate (read: good) feature of created existence in time. This 
 2 
allows for recognition of a structure to political morality. Agents seize the 
opportunity afforded by contingency to pursue identified political goods with 
purpose and direction. At the same time moral pursuits are always highly 
conditioned by contingencies of delimited authority, responsibilities of 
representation, demands of process, etc. The constantly changing political landscape 
perpetually requires both reactive and anticipatory adjustments of the political good 
in sight.   
 If contingency and temporality shape and limit any political pursuit of the 
good, then a chief task of political theology is to illuminate the theological 
significance of those features of created existence. Political theology bears the 
burden of articulating the divine origin and purpose of the structures which make 
political morality possible. In this way contingency comes into view not as an 
incidental feature of humanity but as the gift of a good creator making possible 
faithful creaturely response. Similarly, political goods take shape not merely in time 
but in a particular time between creation and eschaton.  
 This thesis is a study in the theological significance of indeterminacy and 
temporality in the pursuit of political goods by way of an analysis of the political 
writings of 20
th
 century moral theologian Paul Ramsey. His reflections on the unique 
moral structure of political actions provide the theological and analytical resources to 
animate such a study. Close attention to his work pursues an understanding of how 
theological language describes, interprets and accounts for the nature of political 
morality and the function that such descriptions have in defining and shaping 
concepts of the political good.  
 3 
 One of the two most significant obstacles to probing Ramsey’s writings for a 
theological analysis of the nature of political morality is that he frequently failed in 
his published work to articulate explicitly the theological assumptions underlying his 
ethics. He was well aware of his own tendency to attend to particular moral issues 
rather than wider doctrinal matters, at one point calling himself ‘an author who has 
been diverted from this task of urgent and central theoretical and theological 
importance for ethics by a need felt to write on special problems in Christian 
ethics’.
1
 To address this obstacle this study will supplement his published works with 
reference to personal correspondence and unpublished papers in the Paul Ramsey 
Papers at Duke University’s Perkins-Bostock Library.
2
 His theological 
presuppositions are quite frequently more thinly veiled in unpublished materials and 
personal letters and they offer unique insight into his development as a moral 
theologian.  
 The second obstacle is that Ramsey is more frequently treated by 
interlocutors and interpreters as a theologically informed political casuist than as a 
constructive political theologian. While this point may appear more semantic than 
interpretive, my preference for attending to his distinctive theological contributions 
will be apparent in the fact that over the course of this study I dedicate minimal 
space to the most prominent and immediately recognizable features of his political 
ethics such as issues of nuclear deterrence, noncombatant immunity, etc. This is not 
only because much has already been written on these issues, but also because I am 
                                                
1
 Paul Ramsey, Nine Modern Moralists (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 2. As Oliver 
O’Donovan observes, Ramsey ‘saw the Christian moralist more as a travelling apostle than as a 
resident bishop’. See ‘Obituary: Paul Ramsey (1913-1988)’, Studies in Christian Ethics 1, no. 1 
(1988): 86. 
2
 The Paul Ramsey Papers, Special Collections and Manuscripts, Perkins-Bostock Library, Duke 
University. I will hereafter and throughout this study refer to this collection as ‘Ramsey Papers’. 
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attempting to capture Ramsey less as a casuist and more as a theologian reflecting on 
the shape and definition of the political good more widely considered. I will say 
more about the consequences of reading him principally as a political theologian 
later. For now I want to turn more squarely to the substance of the discussion in the 
forthcoming pages.  
 
Theological Concepts of Covenant and Repentance: A Chapter Summary  
 I have proposed that Paul Ramsey’s work offers unique insight into 
contingency and temporality as theologically significant features of political 
morality. The subsequent task is to address the question of why covenant and 
repentance come into such sharp focus as the most appropriate points of entry into 
his political theology. Even scholars familiar with his political writings are unlikely 
to remember him having said anything about repentance. It suffers from 
marginalization and underdevelopment in his writings, not to mention 
misinterpretation in secondary literature.
3
 His most significant usage of the concept 
comes by way of his suggestion that politics is a realm of ‘deferred repentance’.
4
 
However, criticism of the term both in print and in personal correspondence drives 
him initially into an awkward defensive position before the phrase disappears 
altogether from his later work. Additionally, his essay ‘Political Repentance Now’ is 
                                                
3
 Very little is written on the function of repentance in Ramsey’s political theology in secondary 
literature. The lone exception is David Little, ‘The Structure of Justification in the Political Ethics of 
Paul Ramsey’, in Love and Society, ed. James T. Johnson and David H. Smith (Missoula, MT: 
Scholars Press, 1974), 139-162. 
4
 The term appears in Christian Ethics and the Sit-In (New York: Association Press, 1961) and is 
developed more substantially in War and the Christian Conscience: How Shall Modern War Be 
Conducted Justly? (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1961). 
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a wry and biting criticism of liberal perspectives on politics but offers no substantive 
theological insight into his understanding of the titular phrase.
5
 
 By contrast, covenant is as ubiquitous in Ramsey’s political ethics as 
repentance is absent. In an interview late in his career he calls covenant the Leitmotif 
of his work.
6
 This may make it the more obvious choice for theological examination, 
but the concept functions more comfortably in his medical and sexual ethics than in 
his political ethics; it is underdeveloped in his most explicit writings on war and 
politics. Ramsey consistently emphasized the centrality of covenant for his thinking 
while at the same time leaving inarticulate its role in the determination of central 
political concepts such as the esse and the bene esse of politics. This leads 
commentator William Werpehowski to observe that ‘the virtual absence of talk of 




 Despite these limitations – indeed, perhaps because of them – I believe that 
covenant and repentance are ripe for investigation. I also believe that both concepts 
offer uniquely illuminating glimpses into Ramsey’s contributions to political 
theology. Let me elaborate, then, on the selection of repentance, followed by 
covenant, as central elements of this study by succinctly summarizing the chapters 
that follow.  
 Section I identifies repentance as a theological window into his 
understanding of the indeterminate and temporal nature of political morality. I lay 
                                                
5
 Paul Ramsey, ‘Political Repentance Now’, Christianity in Crisis 28, no. 18 (October 1968): 247-
252. 
6
 Kenneth L. Vaux, Sara Vaux, and Mark Stenberg, eds., Covenants of Life: Contemporary Medical 
Ethics in Light of the Thought of Paul Ramsey, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 256. 
7
 William Werpehowski, American Protestant Ethics and the Legacy of H. Richard Niebuhr 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 51. Part of what I argue in the second 
section of this study is that Christian Ethics and the Sit-In, which uses the concept of covenant 
heavily, should be properly considered part of Ramsey’s “political ethics”. 
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the foundation for this claim in chapter one by examining his use of ‘deferred 
repentance’ to characterize the unique limitations on the actions and responsibilities 
of those in political office in War and the Christian Conscience and Christian Ethics 
and the Sit-In.
8
 I also consider extensive criticisms from David Little and Ramsey’s 
later attempt to clarify his meaning of the term. Through these discussions it 
becomes clear that although “deferred repentance” is a troubled and misleading 
concept, it remains essentially a call for purposive political action in accordance with 
just war principles.  
 Chapter two begins to develop a more sympathetic reading of his attraction to 
repentance as a political concept by tracing his theological debts to H. Richard 
Niebuhr’s ‘war articles’.
9
 These often-overlooked political writings from the 1930s 
and 40s develop an alternative set of images and concepts to reorient Christian 
discourse on war such as judgment, crucifixion and the kingdom of God. The most 
prevalent of these is his insistence on repentance as the determinative motif for a 
Christian response to war. I argue that Ramsey inherits this impulse while 
simultaneously trying to drive Christian reflection on war from contrition to political 
action. It is this drive which produces the most misleading aspects of his account of 
“deferred repentance”.  
                                                
8
 Ramsey, War and the Christian Conscience, 13. A few words are in order about the style and 
language of Ramsey’s writing. Although the use of gender-neutral language is standard for 
contemporary writing, his ubiquitous use of terms such as statesman, statesmanship, etc. make it 
impossible to alter his concepts and quotations in a manner conforming to this standard. I make the 
effort wherever possible to replace terms such as “statesmen” with more neutral (but equally 
Ramseyian) language such as “magistrates”, but I ask the reader’s pardon where gender-exclusive 
references are unavoidable. 
9
 Richard B. Miller limits the selection of Niebuhr’s “war articles” to those published in The Christian 
Century. I am willing to expand the use of the term to include selected articles published elsewhere on 
similar themes from the same period. See Interpretations of Conflict: Ethics, Pacifism, and the Just-
War Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 126. 
 7 
 Chapter three proceeds from Ramsey’s unique account of politics as deferred 
repentance to a series of observations on a theology of repentance and call for 
constructive political action. To do this I consult his discussion of guilt and 
repentance in Nine Modern Moralists, as well as a number of letters from his 
professional correspondence over the issue of the Vietnam War. Most significantly, 
however, I explain his early distinction between repentance for unrighteousness and 
repentance for righteousness in ‘The Manger, the Cross and the Resurrection’.
10
 This 
affords a unique perspective on the role of repentance in his theological perspective 
on politics. I also suggest on the basis of these miscellaneous writings that his vision 
for political repentance can be captured by the phrase: ‘the least unavoidable evil is 
simply the greatest possible good; no tears please’.
11
   
 While repentance plays a relatively minor role in Ramsey’s more systematic 
political arguments, in the first section of this study I assign to it a significant 
interpretive function in understanding his foundational theological commitments for 
political ethics. My analysis makes clear that he considers constructive action to be 
the principal Christian response to indeterminate political structures. It also reveals 
that he employs a theology of repentance to call attention to the varying levels of 
contingency and temporality plaguing any political endeavor.  
 Section II turns to the concept of covenant. Chapter four examines his use of 
Jean Jacques Rousseau’s social contract as a heuristic device for understanding 
distinctive features of Israel’s covenant in Basic Christian Ethics.
12
 The 
covenant/contract analogy allows him to highlight Yahweh’s transcendent will as the 
                                                
10
 Paul Ramsey, ‘The Manger, the Cross, and the Resurrection’ Christianity in Crisis 3, no. 4 (1943): 
4. As I will show, he replicates the distinction in ‘Natural Law and the Nature of Man’, Christendom 
9, no. 3 (1944): 369-381. 
11
 Vaux, et. al., eds., Covenants of Life, 165. 
12
 Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1950).  
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source of moral obligation, as well as Israel’s responsibility for faithful obedience to 
the covenant relationship. I argue, however, that the analogy distracts Ramsey from 
exploring his suggestion that the work of Hugo Grotius offers a ‘closer parallel’ to 
Israel’s covenant than the social contract.
13
 It also keeps him from developing a 
doctrine of creation robust enough to sustain his transition from Israel’s moral 
obligations to a political ethic built on a theology of covenant.  
 Chapter five links covenant and creation to Ramsey’s understanding of the 
structure of political morality. In Christian Ethics and the Sit-In he reconstructs his 
political theology of covenant on the foundation of Karl Barth’s formula, ‘creation is 
the external basis of covenant’ and ‘covenant is the internal basis of creation’.
14
 I 
argue that his principal formula for interpreting political ethics – the esse and the 
bene esse of politics – reinterprets Barth’s doctrine of creation while pushing away 
from his special ethics of war and political justice. Of crucial importance for 
establishing the distinctiveness of his theological perspective is Oliver 
O’Dononvan’s reading of the role of power in both Ramsey and Barth. I use his 
analysis to bring into focus Ramsey’s embrace of the ‘ambiguity of all political right’ 
and theological commentary on the structure of political judgment.
15
    
 Chapter six suggests that an emphasis on decision-making in his anti-
situationist moral theory derives from an allegiance to the moral bonds of covenant 
theology. This produces a political account of “choice” that is properly informed and 
governed by the just war criteria without being subsumed into them. Ramsey also 
                                                
13
 Ibid., 381.  
14
 See Karl Barth, The Doctrine of Creation, vol. III, 1 of Church Dogmatics, ed. G.W. Bromiley and 
T.F. Torrance and trans. J.W. Edwards, O. Bussey, and Harold Knight (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 
1958), 94, 228. 
15
 Oliver O’Donovan, ‘Karl Barth and Ramsey’s “Uses of Power”’, Journal of Religious Ethics 19, 
no. 2 (1991): 5. This essay is reprinted as Oliver O’Donovan, ‘Karl Barth and Paul Ramsey’s “Uses of 
Power”’, in Bonds of Imperfection, ed. Oliver O’Donovan and Joan Lockwood O’Donovan (Grand 
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2004), 246-275. 
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uses temporal and interpersonal bonds to explain the limitations placed upon 
Christians engaged in political ethics – the church as ‘theoretician’.
16
 Both his 
appreciation for prudential judgments and his commitment to structures of political 
authority reveal the distinct sensitivity to contingency and temporality inherent in his 
political theology of covenant.  
 Section III brings together the discussions of covenant and repentance. This 
begins in chapter seven with the recognition of three shifts in his perspective on 
political theology: from eschatology to Christology as the foundational theological 
doctrine for political ethics; from repentance to responsibility as the critical political 
concept to be appropriated from H. Richard Niebuhr’s ethics; and from Karl Barth to 
Helmut Thielicke as the source of covenantal theology for the political realm.  
 These shifts drive an examination in chapter eight of two focal points in 
Ramsey’s later writings which exhibit the convergence of covenant and repentance. 
The first of these is his turn to the covenant of Noah and the Tower of Babel as 
significant narratives for political realism. The second is the introduction of two new 
terms: the concept of ‘moral anguish’ and an emphasis on moral evils to be 
considered ‘no moment more’.
17
 I draw together the essential features of his theology 
of covenant and repentance to illuminate his unique contributions to a theological 
interpretation of political morality. I display these contributions using his often-
                                                
16
 Paul Ramsey, Who Speaks for the Church? A Critique of the 1966 Geneva Conference on Church 
and Society (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1967), 152; The Just War: Force and Political 
Responsibility (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1968; reprint, Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1983), 190. 
17
 Paul Ramsey, Speak Up for Just War or Pacifism (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1998), 52, 72. 
 10 
repeated interpretation of Luke 14 and the distinction between ‘taking counsel’ and 




Paul Ramsey as Political Theologian 
 Having set down the basic features of the forthcoming chapters, I want to 
preface them by considering the location of this study on the map of existing 
scholarship on Ramsey. These are still the early days of such scholarship – after all, 
we only recently passed the twentieth anniversary of his death. Yet, it was once 
suggested to me that not every book on Saint Augustine must begin, “Augustine was 
born to modest parents in North Africa”, and while the literature on Ramsey is 
merely a fraction of that on Augustine, I believe studies of his work have moved 
beyond the point of needing to begin, “Paul Ramsey was born the son of a Methodist 
minister in Mississippi in 1913”.
19
 Among the benefits of examining his work at this 
stage in the development of secondary literature is a release from the burden of 
adhering to analysis of the elementary details of his life or most immediately 
accessible concepts in his theological ethics.  
 To say it another way, there is freedom in knowing that several introductory 
volumes on Ramsey have already been written. David Attwood’s Paul Ramsey’s 
Political Ethics provides a foundational account of his basic perspectives on political 
issues of resistance, deterrence and justified war.
20
 D.S. Long’s Tragedy, Tradition, 
Transformism: The Ethics of Paul Ramsey assesses the early years of his life and 
                                                
18
 The most accessible version of the interpretation is ‘Counting the Costs’ in The Just War, 523-536. 
19
 For an excellent introductory biography see William Werpehowski and Stephen D. Crocco. 
Introduction to The Essential Paul Ramsey: A Collection, edited by William Werpehowski and 
Stephen D. Crocco (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), vii-xxv. 
20
 David Attwood, Paul Ramsey’s Political Ethics (Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield Publishers, 
1992). 
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work chronologically, including a detailed account of Ramsey’s pacifist writings 
from the 1930s.
21
 Michael C. McKenzie presents his use of agape as a resource for 
ethics in a postmodern cultural context.
22
  
 Added to these are two Festschriften which include critical commentary on 
developments in his political ethics. The first, Love and Society: Essays in the Ethics 
of Paul Ramsey, was published during his lifetime and elicited a lengthy response 
from Ramsey in 1976.
23
 The second, a collection of essays in the Journal of 
Religious Ethics in 1991, commemorates his contributions to the field of theological 
ethics.
24
 This still-growing collection of secondary literature means that the reader 
hoping to understand Ramsey’s most explicitly fundamental terms and concepts in 
political ethics – e.g., the centrality of principles of proportion and discrimination for 
jus in bello, critical modern thought on the morality of nuclear deterrence and war, 
etc. – will find no shortage of resources.  
 One trend among this proliferation of secondary literature is the tendency to 
interpret him predominantly as a casuist thinker (and therein overlook his distinctive 
theological contributions). My treatment of him as a political theologian is an 
attempt to offer a fresh perspective on his work which will both complement and, to 
some extent, correct those readings. While no single interpretation is the foil of this 
project, it is nonetheless helpful to begin this new study by suggesting that Ramsey’s 
interpreters tend to obscure his contributions to political theology by making one of 
two basic assumptions.   
                                                
21
 D. Stephen Long, Tragedy, Tradition, Transformism: The Ethics of Paul Ramsey (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1993). 
22
 Michael C. McKenzie, Paul Ramsey's Ethics: The Power of 'Agape' in a Postmodern World 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001). 
23
 James T. Johnson and David H. Smith, eds., Love and Society: Essays in the Ethics of Paul Ramsey 
(Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1974); Paul Ramsey, ‘Some Rejoinders’, Journal of Religious Ethics 
4, no. 2 (1976): 185-237. 
24
 James T. Johnson and Jeffrey Stout, eds., special issue, Journal of Religious Ethics 19, no. 2 (1991).  
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 The first is the assumption that his thought is best appreciated when 
organized and interpreted according to the particular ethical questions or issues that 
occupied his mind. Charles Curran’s Politics, Medicine, and Christian Ethics: A 
Dialogue with Paul Ramsey is one example of this approach. He sets out to ‘consider 
questions of political and medical ethics in dialogue with the writings of Paul 
Ramsey’.
25
 Other examples include Love and Society and the Festschrift dedicated to 
his medical ethics: Covenants of Life: Contemporary Medical Ethics in Light of the 
Thought of Paul Ramsey.
26
  
 Two studies which follow this line of thinking, though less directly, are the 
aforementioned volumes by Attwood and McKenzie. Both writers do an admirable 
job taking seriously the theological foundations of his work, but they tend to 
examine his relationship with influential thinkers rather than his distinctive 
theological contributions. This is most evident in the fact that both studies present 
their commentary on his theological foundations in order to inform subsequent 
chapters on the finer points of his medical and political ethics. While it is certainly 
helpful to examine Ramsey’s theological influences as a way of providing context 
and content for the interpretation of his casuist ethics, I want here to consider more 
explicitly what he can offer to political theology as such.    
 The second interpretive assumption shaping studies of his work is one which 
subjects his value as a theological thinker to devastating critique on the assumption 
that he either neglects specific theological perspectives or presents a shallow 
theology more heavily determined by non-theological resources. This perspective is 
most apparent in early doctoral studies on Ramsey’s ethics by a number of young 
                                                
25
 Charles E. Curran, Politics, Medicine, and Christian Ethics (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 
1973), 2.  
26
 Johnson and Smith, eds., Love and Society; Vaux, et. al., eds., Covenants of Life.   
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Catholic scholars whose primary critique of him is, in one way or another, simply 
that he is not Catholic.
27
 Ramsey was aware of several of these attempts and 
commented on it late in his career to an inquiring Ph.D. student writing her 
dissertation on his work. He wrote, ‘you may like to know that some dissertations on 
me done in Rome have seemed to me to be, by comparison, uninteresting, even 
pedantic (which, at least, I am not)’.
28
  
 Another instance of this second assumption can be found in D.S. Long’s 
Tragedy, Tradition, Transformism. Long argues that his theological development is 
restricted by an early allegiance to philosophical idealism and an inherited 
(Reinhold) Niebuhrian realism which is ‘not indebted to Christian notions of sin, but 
to pagan notions of tragedy’.
29
 His presentation of Ramsey’s ethics as shallow and 
ultimately non-theological obscures the recognition of potential contributions to a 
theological interpretation of politics.
30
  
 The present study tries to avoid falling into either of these two interpretive 
categories, first, by taking seriously both Ramsey’s theological influences and his 
theological contributions. This is evident in the first section outlining his adoption 
                                                
27
 For two examples, see John Carville, ‘Love Transforming Justice in the Christian Ethics of Paul 
Ramsey’, S.T.D. diss., Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1974; Edwin F. O’Brien, 
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Gregorium, Rome, 1984; David Fulton, ‘Preservation of Human Life in the Medical Ethics of Paul 
Ramsey’, S.T.D. diss., Angelicum, Rome, 1988. 
28
 Paul Ramsey to Deborah Streeter, July 7, 1978, Box 24, Ramsey Papers. He opens the letter warmly 
and jokingly, noting, ‘As you know, I am a man of principle. One of those principles is that no one 
should be allowed to write a thesis or dissertation on a still living theologian. Therefore in writing you 
I violate one of my deeply intrenched (sic) principles – unless perhaps I am already dead’. 
29
 Long, Tradition, 40, n. 40. The investigation into the theological roots of his political realism which 
follows will help clarify the difference between Long’s suggested meaning of tragedy in Ramsey’s 
ethics and his use of the term. I will return to this point specifically in chapter eight.   
30
 I take Kevin Carnahan’s dissertation to avoid many of Long’s pitfalls, though his tendency to 
undervalue Ramsey’s later development as a theological interpreter of politics may stem from the 
emphasis he places (like Long) on Ramsey’s doctoral research on philosophical idealism. See ‘Sin, 
Guilt, Justice and War: Paul Ramsey and Reinhold Niebuhr on the Moral Framework for Just War 
Thought’, Ph.D. diss., Southern Methodist University, 2007, 81. 
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and unique adaptation of repentance as a political motif from his teacher at Yale 
University, H. Richard Niebuhr. His movement from contrition to action is a 
constructive turn offered in an attempt to supply a more adequate theological 
description of the unique features of political acts. In chapters five and six I also 
demonstrate his distinctive use of the esse/bene esse construction (developed within 
a theology of covenant) to drive his emphasis on the theological significance of the 
contingency and temporality of politics. Finally, I conclude by using his phrase 
“politics as a kind of doing” to highlight several of the contributions which stem 
from his development of covenant and repentance as political concepts. I ground 
each of these interpretive moves in my attempt to read Ramsey as a political 
theologian. 
 I also deliberately avoid limiting his theological developments to a lesser role 
as platform for his casuistry, be it political, medical or sexual. Readers looking for a 
concluding chapter on the way in which his particular views on deterrence or 
counter-city warfare are informed by his view of covenant and repentance will be left 
wanting. So, too, will readers looking for a “crossover” chapter where I attempt to 
capture the underlying casuist techniques or interpretive themes uniting his political 
and medical or sexual writings. Instead, this study marks a conscious effort to hold 
up his contributions to political theology in their own light without tying their 
significance to the casuistry of a particular issue or situation. It is a fresh approach to 
his work that I believe, as mentioned above, takes advantage of and moves beyond 
the body of secondary literature currently available.   
 Finally, while I engage a number of Ramsey’s influences and interlocutors, 
the material of this thesis is largely an internal dialogue within his political writings 
 15 
in an attempt to tease out the substance of his theological foundations. This is in part 
because repentance and covenant go through substantial changes across his body of 
work. It is also due to the significant role unpublished materials and items from his 
personal correspondence in the Ramsey Papers will play in my analysis. Most 
importantly, however, it marks an attempt to distil the abiding value of the 
perspective on political morality developed out of his theology of covenant and 
repentance.   
  I believe Ramsey’s political writings offer a constructive set of themes for 
understanding how theological descriptions define and shape the political good. They 
also offer unique insight into the theological significance of contingency and 
temporality as features of moral political endeavors. These introductory comments 




Repentance and Political Action 
 
 The first section of this study examines the concept of repentance in 
Ramsey’s political theology. I present his use of the term “deferred repentance” to 
describe the political realm, as well as David Little’s suggestion that it licenses the 
magistrate to employ immoral practices in war. I argue that this troubled and 
misleading concept draws heavily upon interpretive theological themes established in 
H. Richard Niebuhr’s war articles. At the same time, Ramsey charts an alternative 
path from Niebuhr’s emphasis on contrition by establishing a theology of repentance 
characterized by constructive political action. His reflections on repentance 
demonstrate his insistence on the inseparability of all moral political judgments from 
a prior theological account of certain features of human interaction, namely, the 
contingency and temporality of created existence. 
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Chapter One 
‘If Injustice is as American as Apple Pie’: Politics as Deferred Repentance 
 
The statesman responsible for policy decisions lives in a realm where ‘the 
science of the possible’ is definitive for all actions and in a realm of ‘deferred 
repentance’ so long as he remains convinced that politics is his vocation.
1
 
 – Paul Ramsey, War and the Christian Conscience 
 
In both Christian Ethics and the Sit-In and War and the Christian Conscience 
Ramsey describes politics as ‘an area of deferred repentance’.
2
 The first of several 
troubling aspects of this claim is simply its face value. It sounds as if politicians are 
being given license to do whatever they want – at least for a time. Add to this the fact 
that one can hardly imagine John the Baptist of Matthew chapter three adding any 
qualifiers to the command ‘Repent’, much less one that suggests postponement of the 
commanded act, and its suitability for the field of moral theology is already in 
question. The aim of this chapter, then, is to identify what he means by deferred 
repentance and to establish a clear view of the misleading and troubling features of 
his account.  
First, however, I want to preface this section on repentance with a brief turn 
to Ramsey’s early engagements with the philosophy of “absolute idealism”.
3
 His 
doctoral dissertation at Yale University is an arduous and lengthy work, about which 
                                                
1
 Paul Ramsey, War and the Christian Conscience: How Shall Modern War Be Conducted Justly? 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1961), 309. 
2
 Ibid., 12; Christian Ethics and the Sit-In (New York: Association Press, 1961), 116.  
3
 Paul Ramsey, ‘The Nature of Man in the Philosophy of Josiah Royce and Bernard Bosanquet’, Box 
53, The Paul Ramsey Papers, Special Collections and Manuscripts, Perkins Bostock Library, Duke 
University. 
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he later observes, ‘Pretty terrible composition it is’.
4
 Nonetheless, while it will not 
occupy a substantial place in this study, I believe there are a few basic observations 
of that work which will prove helpful for the forthcoming examination of his 
theology of repentance.
5
   
 
1.1 Absolute Idealism and the Pursuit of the Finite 
 The dissertation discusses “absolute idealism” in the philosophy of Josiah 
Royce and Bernard Bosanquet. Royce worked at Harvard University alongside 
William James in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Englishman 
Bosanquet wrote in London around the same time. Both delivered the prestigious 
Gifford lectures in natural theology, Royce from 1898 – 1900 in Aberdeen and 
Bosanquet from 1911 – 1912 in Edinburgh. Ramsey picked the topic and his subjects 
because of their influence – particularly that of Royce – on his supervisor, H. 
Richard Niebuhr. He reports much later that Niebuhr called him after reading the 
chapter that was eventually published as ‘The Idealistic View of Moral Evil’ to 
exclaim, ‘So, that’s where I learned what I believe’.
6
  
 One of the difficulties in grasping the argument of the piece is that Ramsey 
will occasionally paraphrase Bosanquet or Royce for pages at a time; the reader can 
be confident that he is asserting his own voice only in the concluding sections of 
each discussion which employ the pronoun “we”. Additionally, the work exhibits the 
steady influence of its advisor and in such cases lines are difficult to draw between 
                                                
4
 Paul Ramsey to David Attwood, August 12, 1984, Oliver O’Donovan personal collection. 
5
 Readers seeking a systematic interpretation of Ramsey’s later writings through the lens of his 
dissertation should consult D. Stephen Long, Tragedy, Tradition, Transformism: The Ethics of Paul 
Ramsey (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993) or Kevin Carnahan, ‘Sin, Guilt, Justice and War: Paul 
Ramsey and Reinhold Niebuhr on the Moral Framework for Just War Thought’, Ph.D. diss., Southern 
Methodist University, 2007.   
6
 Ramsey to Attwood. See also Paul Ramsey, ‘The Idealistic View of Moral Evil: Josiah Royce and 
Bernard Bosanquet’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 6, no. 4 (1946), 554-589. 
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those claims clearly attempting to establish foundations for a lifetime of theological 
reflection and those more subtly inserted in anticipation of the examination 
committee members. In spite of these limitations, I want to offer for those readers 
who do not swim frequently in the waters of “absolute idealism” a few basic 
comments to assist with my later interpretation of repentance in his political 
theology.  
 Ramsey takes “absolute idealism” to be a philosophical way of describing 
human nature as both finite yet related to the infinite. Each human is an individual 
self, yet also in the presence of an Other. The “idealism” half of this construction 
attempts to protect the idea that individuality is finite (and not lost in infinity). 
“Idealism”, as he says, grants ‘moral significance to the finite in the sphere of the 
infinite without also giving it world-wrecking power’.
7
 But he is also concerned that 
an unchecked idealist emphasis on the finite will produce limited individuals so 
isolated as to be beyond ethics. Said another way, ‘selves cannot be endowed with 
such isolation and caprice as to be able to make anarchy out of the “City of God”’.
8
 
 If unchecked “idealism” is a recipe for moral chaos, then he introduces the 
“Absolute” element to stem this tide. A concept of the “Absolute” tempers idealist 
isolationism with a ‘moral demand that human action be important to the universe as 
a whole’.
9
 The balance of “absolute idealism” is then one where finite individual 
action gains significance only when the transcendent “Absolute” is held properly in 
                                                
7
 Ramsey, ‘Nature of Man’. 182-183. 
8
 Ibid., 24. 
9
 Ibid., 182. He learns from Royce that ‘the individual is not merely this, but such a this that its place 
can be taken by “no other”’ (9). Bosanquet speaks of finiteness as ‘essential to true infinity’ (38). 
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view. The “Absolute” does not overwhelm the individual; neither does the individual 
stand alone. Rather, individual action finds its place in relation to the “Absolute”.
10
  
 He observes on the basis of these claims that ‘the Absolute is not chosen as 
one goal among many, but indirectly as the one goal which the finite individual seeks 
in all his finite goals’.
11
 What this means for ethics is that moral agents ‘serve the 
Absolute only by serving other finite individuals in the light of the Eternal’.
12
 
Ramsey keeps his philosophical guard up through most of the dissertation, including 
these passages, but the implications for an explicitly theological ethic are not hard to 
see. God is not a finite good in competition with other finite goods; human agents 
faithfully serve the infinite God through finite acts of service.  
 He revisits several of these themes in his chapter on Dostoevsky in Nine 
Modern Moralists.
13
 There he observes that the Christian tries ‘to realize in a finite 
way some likeness to the infinite perfections of God, striving only for a creaturely 
sharing in eternal life’.
14
 This is a theological restatement of his earlier philosophical 
claim that ‘only finites are pursued directly’.
15
 According to “absolute idealism” the 
isolated acts of finite individuals, though limited, should nonetheless remain in 
pursuit of the infinite.   
                                                
10
 An anthropological restatement of this claim comes in an early article from 1944: ‘Man is the 
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15
 Ramsey, ‘Nature of Man’, 261. 
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 What absolute idealist philosophy gives Ramsey as he goes forward into the 
realm of political ethics is a sense of the moral significance of individual agency. The 
fact that ‘one is self-determined and committed “in act”’ makes the ‘finite creature 
the object of moral endeavor’.
16
 This has ramifications for his understanding of 
judgment as the locus of political morality, as well as his appreciation for structures 
of political representation and authority. For now, though, further comments on his 
doctoral research will have to be set aside. What has been noted here provides 
sufficient insight into the shape and content of his thought on “absolute idealism” for 
an approach to his political ethics through the concept of repentance. I only ask that 
the reader take note of these initial observations in anticipation of their reintroduction 
later in the argument. 
 
1.2 ‘Judgmental Criteria’ and the Public/Private Distinction 
One of the principal aims of his investigations into questions of political 
ethics in War and the Christian Conscience is an urge to understand the relationship 
between private morality and public morality. He inherits the tendency to divide 
moral issues along this line from Reinhold Niebuhr, but he is also uncomfortable 
with some of the conclusions that might be drawn from the distinction. Thus, in the 
introduction he justifies his study of the historical tradition of just war thinking by 
positioning himself against ‘the modern period’ where  
Pragmatic politics, a complete distinction between personal and political 
morality, and the analysis of political and military decision wholly in 
situational terms (not only by secular political realists but also by too many 
                                                
16
 Ibid., 97, 422. He contrasts “idealism” and “absolute idealism” on precisely this point, saying, ‘It 
has been affirmed that idealism is self-condemned by being unable to find room for the certainty of 
our authorship and of responsibility for our own actions, which is the “inmost meaning of our 
freedom”. Against this it is counterposed the assertion by absolute idealism … that only self-
determination can give a tenable account of moral responsibility’ (86-87). 
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Protestant statements and all too many writers on Christian ethics and 
politics) have only exhibited or accomplished the return of mankind to 




While Niebuhr is not his only target in view, it is significant that here and throughout 
the book he suggests a number of ways of combating the dangers of an overwrought 
public/private distinction.  
 One of those ways, as witnessed in the above passage, is to test the distinction 
against Augustine’s Two Cities doctrine. Ramsey wrestles in chapter three with 
Ernest Barker’s interpretation of Augustine and takes the opportunity to call attention 
to the fact that the Heavenly City is not “private”, nor the Earthly City “political”. 
Rather, ‘as with justice as a personal virtue, so with social justice’.
18
 
 Another way he defends against a rigid distinction is by insisting that there 
cannot be a double standard for morality inside of politics and out. He insists that ‘no 
case can be made for the view that what is wrong for a man may be right for a 
government’.
19
 He also says that there is ‘no essential difference between private 
morality and public morality’ and gives the example that ‘murder … means the same 
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 Ramsey, War and the Christian Conscience, xxii. His doctoral research was heavily influenced by 
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 Ibid., 12.  
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whether this is done by individuals or states’.
20
 This undivided moral fabric is a 
result of the same ‘judgmental criteria’ governing all aspects of human life.
21
  
 But Ramsey cannot entirely abandon the public/private distinction. He 
believes there is a unique moral context to the political realm where ‘“the science of 
the possible” is definitive for all actions’.
22
 Later, in The Just War, he calls this the 
‘structural difference between personal moral agency and political agency’.
23
 And it 
is in his attempt to capture this structural difference that the term “deferred 
repentance” appears.  
 
1.2.1 Politics as Deferred Repentance 
Ramsey says that ‘politics is also, for the Christian, a realm of “deferred 
repentance”’.
24
 He explains this by first observing that ‘whatever is immoral an 
individual, in his private capacity, should cease doing at once’.
25
 By contrast, 
political morality may not be so immediately within reach. That is to say, political 
officials may not be able to set right all of the political wrongs before them with the 
expediency of an individual ceasing a personal action or habit. He calls politics the 
“science of the possible” to articulate these unique limitations on political agency. 
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He does not revoke his claim that private and public morality are subject to 
the same “judgmental criteria”. Instead, he uses deferred repentance to emphasize 
that ‘the important thing is to make clear and keep clear in the public conscience the 
moral context of political action’.
27
 He cites James Dougherty approvingly, saying, 
‘although persons and states are subjected to the same fundamental code of justice … 
they are not subjected to them in exactly the same mode’.
28
 This modal difference 




 Two examples will help clarify what Ramsey means when he calls politics a 
realm of deferred repentance. The first has to do with the magistrate’s inability to 
immediately rectify the moral evil of disproportionate weaponry. He writes, 
There should be statesmen who themselves are quite clear as to the 
immorality of obliteration warfare (and as well as to the wrong of deterring 
evil by readiness to do the same thing) who are still willing to engage in 
negotiation directed to the end of limiting war to justifiable means and ends 





The catch, of course, is that the security which safeguards continued negotiations is 
to some degree assured by the deterrent effect of the immoral weapons. It is worth 
keeping in mind that when he speaks of the distinctive context of political endeavors, 
he also speaks of the magistrate who ‘remains convinced that politics is his 
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 To withdraw from office at each moment of deterrent-ensured freedom 
would be to abandon altogether the pursuit of right policy and proportionate 
weaponry. Yet the political official also cannot compromise the verdict that the 
deterrent effects of disproportionate weaponry are plainly and unavoidably immoral. 
Thus, he speaks of deferred repentance as that period of time purchased by immoral 
weapons but harnessed for the removal those weapons.  
 The second example comes by way of his discussions of race relations in 
Christian Ethics and the Sit-In. Speaking of the US government’s moral 
responsibilities to apartheid South Africa, he says,  
 [Politics] is an area of deferred repentance – but not forever. If there has been 
no propitious moment yet in recent history for the United States to take action 
… that moment may soon come when … our country can no longer defer 
making effective repentance for its complicity in injustice. Then we will face 
questions as to the use of strong and definite economic pressures with the 
purpose of radically assisting in the transformation of the whole structure of 
race relations in a country abroad. … the fact is that … we are inexorably 





In this case he roots the idea of deferred repentance in the search for the politically 
prudent moment for effective moral action. He knows that each passing moment is 
another instance of the government’s ongoing complicity with actions of South 
African political leaders. Yet, he also appreciates that such complicity will not be 
easily or quietly erased. Deferred repentance is an attempt to grant political officials 
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the freedom to seek the most prudent and properly effective action rather than simply 
the most immediate.  
 The example of US dealings with South Africa reveals his sensitivity to the 
sheer contingency of purposive political manoeuvres. Michael McKenzie nicely 
captures his approach, saying, ‘in the political realm, with all its ambiguities, we 
must consider that political prudence has an important role to play, especially in 
matters of timing’.
33
 Ramsey seeks in deferred repentance a way to appreciate those 
ambiguities without abandoning the significance of immoral political evils.  
 
1.2.2 Three Further Observations 
 I want to make three further observations of the account of deferred 
repentance. The first is that he compromises neither the rigidity of the just war 
principles nor the ambiguity of political endeavors. He prefaces his claim that the 
nation’s repentance may need to be deferred by saying, ‘no ethics – least of all 
Christian ethics – gives us leave to kill another man’s children directly as a means of 
weakening his murderous intent. Preparation to do so – if that is the real object of our 
weapons – is intrinsically a grave moral evil’.
34
 This refusal to collapse moral 
judgments in politics stems from the fact that ‘even the politics of deferred 
repentance is made quite impossible, where there is nothing in violation of 
fundamental principle to repent of, and to negotiate out of the realm of possibility’.
35
 
Whatever deferred repentance may mean, it cannot include a suspension of moral 
norms in the political realm. 
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 Meanwhile, ‘the just war theory did not suppose that men possess the ability 
to discriminate between social orders at large by means of clear and certain 
principles of justice so as to declare one side or social system to be just and the other 
unjust in universal terms’.
36
 In other words, simply having clear and certain 
principles of justice does not ensure that the outcomes of all political judgments are 
clear and certain. Neither do they allow for discriminations “in universal terms”. I 
will discuss his insistence that all political judgments are relative in chapter three. 
For the moment it is sufficient to note that he balances the indeterminacy of political 
endeavors with the rigidity of moral principles.
37
 
 My second observation is that deferred repentance is rooted in the temporal 
nature of political morality. In other words, political endeavors take time. This 
feature of his ethics leads David Attwood to say,  
 A statesman who is convinced that his nation is pursuing wrong policies may 
nevertheless stay in office and support those preparations while working over 
a period of time toward justifiable policies. A nation may have to take time to 
await the right political moment to put its repentance into effect, all the while 




Along this line of thinking Ramsey emphasizes that deferred repentance occupies the 
‘meantime’ but is ‘not forever’.
39
 He says, ‘only the statesman who knows [that what 
is wrong for man is wrong for the government] may be trusted not to defer his 
nation’s repentance forever’.
40
 Until repentance can be enacted in the form of right 
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policy and political practice, the posture of the Christian magistrate is one of 
persistent negotiation. That is, for Ramsey, a temporal pursuit and one that requires 
prudence of the highest order.  
Finally, it is noteworthy that his account lacks clarity over the relationship 
between the repentance of the magistrate and the repentance of the nation. He speaks 
explicitly of deferring the ‘nation’s repentance’.
41
 Yet, elsewhere he implies a sense 
of individual responsibility on the part of the magistrate when he says, ‘this may be 
better than keeping personal conscience clean and getting out of office’.
42
 A survey 
of other writings offers no further clarity. On one hand, in a letter to Dean Kelley 
discussing race relations he rejects ‘the plainly anti-Christian notions of collective 
guilt … that beguile so many today’.
43
 On the other hand, in ‘The Politics of Fear’ he 
says with regard to immoral practices in war that ‘grave guiltiness may be imputed to 
the military action of any nation’.
44
 While I will return to this issue later, for now it is 
sufficient to note that Ramsey fails to provide a clear account of who or what is 
having its repentance deferred. 
 
1.3 David Little’s Criticisms of Deferred Repentance 
With this basic impression of deferred repentance in place, I want to turn to 
David Little’s criticisms in his essay ‘The Structure of Justification in the Political 
                                                                                                                                     
even to the historically realizable criteria of a very earthy politics and into conformity to principles 
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Ethics of Paul Ramsey’.
45
 Little is the only commentator to take up the concept of 
deferred repentance at any significant length; however, his criticisms are exaggerated 
in their attempt to catch Ramsey violating his own account of the principle of 
discrimination. For example, Little begins his discussion by saying that he ‘allows 
that a magistrate … may find himself unable to “escape from the evil necessities” of 
intending and preparing “to kill another man’s children directly as a means of 
weakening his murderous intent”’.
46
 This takes out of context the “evil necessities” 
claim by pairing it with an action Ramsey clearly judges to be ‘intrinsically a grave 
moral evil’ – killing another man’s children directly.
47
  
Furthermore, the original claim reads: ‘the Christian statesman has no escape 
from his evil necessities in the assertion that his nation’s power to retaliate against 
whole peoples is for the purpose of deterrence’.
48
 Little misquotes Ramsey, 
substituting the “his” before “evil necessities” with “the”. The “no escape” of which 
Ramsey speaks is from the statesman’s accountability for his immoral use of 
disproportionate weaponry for national (and therein personal) security. Little’s 
reasoning cannot function in Ramsey’s account because it implies that the statesman 
may maintain clean personal conscience amid the inescapable and overbearing 
immorality of the state. While the state may indeed be inescapably immoral, Ramsey 
would neither (a) allow for clean personal conscience of the statesman, for whom he 
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thinks leaving office is the only way to having a clean conscience (even though that 
has its own set of problems) nor (b) justify the use of indiscriminate killing and/or 
disproportionate deterrence on any grounds. 
Despite a propensity for such conceptual moves, it is important to establish a 
few basic features of Little’s criticism. I begin with his belief that deferred 
repentance buys into the idea that in the realm of politics the ends justify the means. 
He says,  
[Ramsey] goes on to admit that the magistrate … perhaps ought to stay in 
office and continue taking part in grave moral evil in order ‘to engage in 
negotiation directed to the end [sic!] of limiting war to justifiable means and 
ends through a period of time in which [he] may have to defer [his] nation’s 
repentance.’ We have here, from Ramsey’s own pen, an example of its being 
in some sense reasonable or tolerable for a magistrate to make a decision by 
disregarding, temporarily, the application of the principle of discrimination to 





Ramsey makes it clear that he does not believe that certain and determinate universal 
political ends (i.e., perpetual peace, the abolition of war, etc.) are possible this side of 
the eschaton.
50
 One feature of our creaturely existence is that ‘the highest we can 
actually aim at is the limited use of limited force; and God knows that is utopian 
enough’.
51
 In the case of deferred repentance, however, Little argues that the 
principle of discrimination is being applied to the ends of political action in such as 
way as to justify any means.  
 Little thus believes that deferred repentance endorses ‘an action in which a 
magistrate waived the principle of discrimination in the present in order to extend the 
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jurisdiction of that principle in the future’.
52
 The magistrate ‘may knowingly, if 
regretfully, intend to use indiscriminate means’.
53
 He is playing upon the face value 
of the phrase. “Deferred repentance” sounds as if the magistrate is licensed to 
postpone taking the morally right course of action. He says, ‘Ramsey contends that 
magistrates … should be fully conscious of the grave moral evil implicit in the 
course of action he permits. They ought not in any way to minimize the gravity of the 
matter, but they simply ought to postpone doing something to rectify it’.
54
 He 
interprets deferred repentance as a conceptual manoeuvre intended to liberate 
political officials from the burden of moral limitations.  
 If Little is right that under the terms of deferred repentance anything is 
legitimate which creates ‘conditions in the future in which the principle of 
discrimination will be more widely observed’, this leaves the magistrate without a 
clear sense of moral direction for present action.
55
 By that I simply mean that if 
future political ends can be used to justify any present political means then 
judgments (in the present) are not governed by any moral limitations. Instead, in this 
scenario they would be governed by what Little calls ‘the discretionary side of 
political reasoning’ or ‘teleological or prudential’ reasoning.
56
 Under normal 
circumstances the magistrate’s discretion would be buffered by rigid moral 
principles. But according to Little in the case of deferred repentance those now only 
regulate the ends of action in the future.   
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 What are the hallmarks of discretion at work in isolation from moral 
principles? It has ‘no rationally determinate standards of assessment’ and excludes 
‘rational certitude’.
57
 For political activity this means that ‘calculating and predicting 
consequences is invariably uncertain and therefore indeterminate, because 
consequences are, to an important degree, uncontrollable and unforseeable’.
58
 
Although his interpretive logic tends to twist and turn in difficult directions, we can 
translate his reading as follows: Little believes that deferred repentance describes a 
political realm so plagued by systemic indeterminacy that the magistrate is asked to 
produce a sense of moral direction simply on the basis of “discretion”. And that is 
not an entirely unwelcome conclusion for him. For Ramsey, it is. I now want to turn 
to his extended response to these claims in a later essay titled ‘Some Rejoinders’. 
  
1.4 Ramsey’s Response to David Little’s Criticisms 
 The response to Little can be separated into three essential elements. The first 
is his insistence that deferred repentance does not suspend the principles of 
discrimination and proportion, nor does it endorse immoral actions as means to 
certain ends. He expresses this by arguing that ‘the sole point under discussion was 
the morality of deterrence – not actualizing indiscriminate warfare or subsuming 
under “deferred repentance” the killing of hostages as “an excusable, if repulsive 
act,” to which Little swiftly moves’.
59
 He continues, saying, ‘by “deferred 
repentance” in official actions I simply meant the use of the time granted by 
deterrence to “ransom the time” by a creative political reconstruction of deterrence 
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 Paul Ramsey, ‘Some Rejoinders’, Journal of Religious Ethics 4, no. 2 (1976): 209. He also says that 




 By limiting the applicability of the term to deterrence he eliminates the 
suggestion that it can be used to license patently immoral acts, such as the execution 
of children.   
 This qualification was not present in the original account. Ramsey spoke 
there of magistrates who ‘are quite clear as to the immorality of obliteration warfare 
(and as well as the wrong of deterring evil by readiness to do the same thing) who are 
still willing to engage in negotiation’.
61
 By restricting the discussion to deterrence he 
aims both to focus our attention on the moral demand for negotiation and to insist 
that ‘surely it could not be supposed that I meant the meanwhile to include on 
occasion executing city-hostages or actually using a fight-the-unjust-war policy’.
62
 
This comes across clearly when he says,  
 When I spoke about the statesman ‘negotiating [something] out of the realm 
of possibility’ no doubt I meant unjust fight-the-war policies as well as 
counter-people deterrence…. But although I spoke of living with unjust war 
policies while effecting the reformation of such policies no less than 
transforming our deterrence system, both were policies and policy-initiatives 




I take his shift into the domain of deterrence to be an attempt to emphasize that the 
magistrate always remains firmly under the limitations of just war principles.   
 This also comes to bear upon Little’s suggestion that he legitimizes ‘an action 
in which a magistrate waived the principle of discrimination … in order to extend the 
jurisdiction of the principle in the future’. 
64
 Ramsey resists this by saying, ‘if 
something is wrong to do, it is also wrong … to make oneself “conditionally willing” 
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 Little, ‘The Structure of Justification’, 157. 
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to do that, for some good end’.
65
 Deferred repentance cannot mean ‘that statesmen 
ought simply to sin bravely and ever more bravely repent’.
66
 Rather, it means that 
magistrates pursue discriminate means (and ends) in a political realm where the 
rectification of immoral policy may not be immediately available (or prudent). 
 Mention of prudence brings me to the second essential element of his 
response: an objection to the concept of discretion. He says, ‘I would say prudence or 
practical wisdom is needed … not “discretion” – which, as Little reads me, seems to 
mean arbitrary, baseless choice’.
67
 He later objects to the conclusion that deferred 
repentance means that ‘judgments concerning ends or consequences in ethics and 
politics are arbitrarily discretionary’.
68
 The contrast to arbitrary discretion is 
purposive action in accordance with moral principles. He intends the account of 
deferred repentance to highlight that ‘it is required of statesmanship to fashion policy 
in the right direction and to step without delay toward more purposive and feasible 
weapons systems’.
69
 The question is how to interpret the immediacy of his demand 
for moral action alongside his sensitivity to the role of timing in right political action. 
 He saw a shining example of such action in the announcement by US 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in June, 1962 that the US would no longer 
prepare to target civilian populations with nuclear weapons in the event of an 
attack.
70
 The lack of support for the policy change from churches and ethicists 
frustrated Ramsey. He complained, ‘I remain amazed that anyone can … fail to see a 
signal and inherent moral difference between a policy of prompt massive retaliation 
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and McNamara’s policy of greater discrimination, greater flexibility, greater control, 
allowing for graduation up or down in our military response if war comes’.
71
 
McNamara’s appreciation for the need for more technical precision and strategic 
targeting in the realm of nuclear weaponry appealed to Ramsey’s fervent insistence 
on discrimination between non-combatants and combatants in war.  
 Jeffrey Stout observes of this occasion, ‘the more Ramsey thought about the 
McNamara statement, the less inclined he was to condemn U.S. policy as wicked…. 
McNamara’s statement satisfied Ramsey… that non-combatant immunity had begun 
to inform his government’s strategic thinking’.
72
 Stout is right that he was 
enthusiastic about the policy change. But he was more pleased with McNamara than 
with US policy as a whole (which continued to employ indiscriminate weaponry with 
deterrent effects in other ways). McNamara’s announcement was for him a purposive 
movement of policy more in alignment with the just war principles, a great moral 
achievement and an example of repentance no longer being deferred. In other words, 
it was the opposite of Little’s description of arbitrary discretion. 
  This brings me to the final essential element of his response: an argument 
over indeterminacy. Ramsey feels that Little overstates his sensitivity to the 
uncertainty of moral endeavors, saying,  
I am supposed to believe [on Little’s interpretation] that decision-making in 
regard to consequences is ‘systematically indeterminate’, ‘immeasureable’, a 
‘new creation’; that ‘there are no rationally determinate standards of 
assessment according to which agape can finally be measured’; that 
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Politically speaking, this chaotic unpredictability strips the office of the magistrate of 
the ability to make any purposive moral judgments.  
 I mentioned above that one key ingredient of deferred repentance was a sense 
of the contingency inherent in any pursuit of the good. Ramsey acknowledges this 
and takes (some) responsibility for the misreading. He says,  
 I accept a degree of fault for describing political futures as systematically 
indeterminate and rationally incalculable and uncertain, without qualification. 
Still I may insinuate that there is some flaw in an interpretation of these 
writings that does not take account of the context of those expressions or of 





He is right to say that he should have qualified his comments on indeterminacy. This 
is especially true in light of his tendency elsewhere to criticize the ‘ethics of 
ambiguity’ for being morally relativist.
75
 But he is also right that “indeterminacy” 
which overwhelms any possibility of distinguishing between right and wrong is not 
identical to “indeterminacy” as an observation of the fact that in politics events do 
not always unfold exactly as we would like them to unfold, or even as we envision 
them unfolding. And Ramsey clearly has the latter in mind when speaking of 
deferred repentance. It is an admission that we do not control every element of our 
political lives and that this fundamental contingency must be accounted for in a 
theological perspective on political ethics.  
 
1.5 Assessing Politics as Deferred Repentance 
His comments in ‘Some Rejoinders’ mark the last mention of deferred 
repentance in his published works. And while the next two chapters will try to add 
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context and content to his political theology of repentance, it is important to have a 
clear view of this fundamental account before moving forward. What should shine 
through most clearly is that however awkwardly the phrase may fit its intended 
function, it is essentially a call for purposive political action in accordance with just 
war principles. His answer to the question of how to understand the difference 
between private and public morality is to paint a picture of the magistrate acting 
rightly and prudently even in a realm wrought with tension between unbreakable 
moral principles and an order built on immoral weaponry. Accordingly, I want to 
make several concluding observations about this troubled and misleading concept.   
It is important not to miss in the language of deferred repentance his refusal 
to abandon determinations of justice and morality in the political realm. In the 
insistence on “judgmental criteria” lies the call for negotiation and policy change. 
Ramsey sees that to pursue right policy and to move in the direction of political 
goods requires engagement with a realm that is plagued by layers of immoral policy 
and practice. Little’s criticism is inadequate precisely because it fails to appreciate 
the difference between embracing indiscriminate weaponry (by waiving the principle 
of discrimination in the present) and the altogether different enterprise of persistently 
negotiating for discriminate policies in a time made safe by immoral weaponry. 
Acknowledging our complicity with and responsibility for that immoral safety is not 
something that Ramsey thinks can be avoided. But neither is he willing to eliminate 
the possibility of moving toward the political good.    
One example of this comes by way of a discussion he has in personal 
correspondence with Dean Kelley over the witness of political protests. He observes 
that Christians ‘better make up our minds’ about whether the sinful character of 
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human nature will be taken as ‘a permanent part of our historical analysis’.
76
 By 
“permanent” he means consistently applied. He is criticizing those who invoke the 
depths of human sinfulness in the condemnation of political authority but neglect to 
account for it as an influence over, say, protests against that authority. Thus, he says, 
‘we should know that if injustice and/or violence is as American as apple pie, it is 
also as human as cereal foods, and that the cry of the human heart in the Psalms is 
not soon going to be avoided. Then, a great deal of the self-denigration on American 
violence should be stricken out, or set in Christian perspective’.
77
 I take Ramsey’s 
point here to be that if the context and character of institutional political actions are 
shaped by the weight of human sin, then Christians must also keep in mind that it is 
not limited to the institutional realm. This is to address the issue of the relationship 
between private/public morality that led him into the discussion of deferred 
repentance. There may be unique limitations that plague moral political agency, but 
the task of the Christian is to work for political good in a violent world – a world 
where injustice is both as American as apple pie and as human as cereal foods. 
This recognition should not fuel a sense of resignation or a relinquishing of 
moral judgments in politics. Rather, he is making a more basic claim about the 
limitations of any pursuit of political good. As he says in The Just War, ‘even a great 
actor on the world stage has to acknowledge that not all of what ought to be can be 
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politically done; and that not all that politically ought to be done can be done by 
us’.
78
 Deferred repentance is not an attempt to diminish, ignore or justify the amount 
of injustice that ought to be set right. It is an attempt to take seriously the systemic 
political limitations on any attempt to rectify that injustice.  
It is also worth bringing back into view my earlier observation that he is not 
clear about who or what is having its repentance deferred. On one hand, it appears 
that the magistrate is deferring repentance for participation in, and benefit from, the 
unjust practices of the nation, as well as for the failure to enact just policies through 
negotiation. This view reflects sentiments that he expresses elsewhere with the 
observation that ‘there is no such thing as “the mind and heart of collective man”, but 
only individual men and women engaged in collective action by means of a gradation 
of leaders who are also individuals with a mixture of motives in what they do in 
public and private life’.
79
 The magistrate is responsible for the policy-formation of 
the nation and therefore partakes in the immorality of unjust deterrent weapons. 
 On the other hand, he also explicitly says that magistrates defer ‘their nation’s 
repentance’, and he seems to attribute agency to the nation as a whole when he says 
‘there is a difference between the actions of individuals and state acts’.
80
 This would 
seem to accommodate the idea that the magistrate’s negotiations operate in 
opposition to the nation’s immoral policies rather than in collusion with them. In this 
way he impresses a distance between immoral policies and actions of magistrates to 
correct those policies.  
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 At this point the observations on his doctoral research with which I began this 
chapter may be of use. He learned from “absolute idealism” the idea that finite 
individual action gains moral significance in proper relation to the infinite 
“Absolute”. It also called for an account of moral obligation to be rooted in the 
pursuit of finite goods with zeal for the infinite. The result is a robust sense of the 
importance of moral self-determination through act and the pursuit of finite goods.  
 The way that Ramsey applies the moral responsibility of the nation to the 
magistrate draws upon this philosophical idea that a finite agent gets not only its 
identity but also its moral obligation from the “Absolute”. At the same time, the 
distinctive location of the finite and the significance of self-determination resembles 
his insistence that the magistrate works independently against the grain of political 
structures which are not easily changed for the better. This is certainly not a perfect 
comparison, but what it reveals is that the question of whether deferred repentance 
concerns the conscience of the magistrate or the conscience of the nation does not 
impact the resulting account of political obligation. Both concepts point to the moral 
significance of the political act of judgment and the pursuit of limited goods. This is 
nowhere clearer than in his claim in The Just War that ‘all action that has in view the 




 Finally, I want to address his response to Little’s criticism with the suggestion 
that deferred repentance concerns the ‘single issue of deterrence’.
82
 As I mentioned 
above, this repositions his claim and emphasizes more strongly the time for 
negotiation purchased by immoral deterrent effects of disproportionate weaponry. 
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Yet, I do not believe this qualification frees him from several of the lingering 
questions surrounding his account of deferred repentance. For instance, what 
becomes of his use of the term to describe the political situation with South Africa? 
What of the charge that the phrase itself is misleading given the argumentative 
function he assigns to it? And most significantly, how does an idea of “deferred 
repentance” connect to more explicitly theological accounts of repentance as an 
integral practice within the church? 
Ramsey fails to explore the answers to these questions. Rather, the 
engagement with Little leads him instead to say ‘I have often regretted the 
expression’.
 83
 In spite of his abandonment of the concept, the next two chapters of 
this thesis aim to show how he inherits this use of repentance from H.R. Niebuhr and 
repackages the concept to uphold the theological importance of constructive political 
action in Christian ethics. This takes us into discussions of the role of repentance in 
determination of political norms in his lesser-known writings, unpublished papers 
and letters. 
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From Contrition to Action: H. Richard Niebuhr’s War Articles and Ramsey’s 
Politics as Deferred Repentance 
 
I guess to many people I would seem like an out and out Niebuhrian in my thinking.
1
 
– Paul Ramsey to C.F. Rall, May 28, 1942 
 
Much has been written on the influence of Reinhold and H. Richard Niebuhr 
on the work of Paul Ramsey. The majority of this literature follows one of two 
patterns. The first argues that despite having studied under H. Richard during his 
formative years at Yale, Ramsey ultimately adopts a framework for political thinking 
more determinatively shaped by Reinhold’s political realism. An example of this 
approach can be found in the work of Stanley Hauerwas, who wrote during his early 
years as a scholar, ‘I am coming to the conclusion that Reinhold Niebuhr is more of 
an influence on Ramsey than Richard’.
2
 This stems from the belief that he, like 
Reinhold, ‘is content with a few basic principles which he assumes are sufficient to 
give an account of every moral issue’.
3
 Ramsey’s own pen appears to support this 
interpretive pattern when, for instance, he observes that ‘in all that I have written on 
the morality of war I have been quite consciously drawing upon a wider theory of 
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statecraft and of political justice to propose an extension within the Christian realism 
of Reinhold Niebuhr’.
4
   
The second pattern believes that despite settling on political arguments which 
draw upon Reinhold’s realism, Ramsey develops his ethics out of a transformationist 
motif taken explicitly from H. Richard’s fifth type of Christ transforming culture. 
This view is most prominent in D. Stephen Long’s Tragedy, Tradition, 
Transformism: The Ethics of Paul Ramsey. He observes that ‘Niebuhr’s 
transformationist motif provided Ramsey’s primary impulse in Christian ethics. All 
of his work was an extension of Niebuhr’s “Christ transforming culture”’.
5
 William 
Werpehowski’s American Protestant Ethics and the Legacy of H. Richard Niebuhr 
also reflects this notion when describing Ramsey’s “love transforming justice” 
theme. He notes that his ‘career in writing on specific moral topics was an effort to 
mediate dynamism, transformation, or conversion’.
6
 As with the first pattern, 
Ramsey’s own pen appears to confirm this view when he says in a 1953 letter to 
Joseph Fletcher, ‘I would phrase my present point of view as “love transforming 
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 Let me be clear at the outset that these two patterns of interpretation concern 
matters of emphasis rather than distinct schools of thought in scholarship assessing 
the relationship between Ramsey and the Niebuhrs. None of the authors mentioned 
above would claim that he attends to one at the exclusion of the other – his debts to 
both are unavoidable. Nonetheless, there is something to the fact that a glance at the 
opening quotation of this chapter – ‘I guess to many people I would seem like an out 
and out Niebuhrian in my thinking’ – will invoke thoughts of Reinhold in some 
interpreters and H. Richard in others.
8
 This is reflective of a tendency in secondary 
literature to read his work through the lens of either Reinhold’s political realism or 
H. Richard’s transformationist motif.  
 It sometimes proves helpful to break established patterns of interpretation by 
pursuing an alternative line of inquiry. I want to attempt such an exercise by here 
calling attention to a common theme in both patterns, namely, they overlook the 
significance of H. Richard Niebuhr’s political writings and their impact on Ramsey’s 
political ethics. Said another way, Reinhold may not have been the only Niebuhr 
who concretely influenced Ramsey’s politics and H. Richard may have offered him 
more than the transformationist motif. The argument of this chapter is that H. 
Richard’s description of repentance as the determinative motif for Christian thought 
on war shapes and informs Ramsey’s concept of politics as deferred repentance. 
Thus, it begins with the assumption that to read Niebuhr’s legacy in Ramsey’s 
political ethics in patterns which either subordinate that legacy to Reinhold’s 
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influence or limit it to the transformationist theme is to underestimate both Ramsey’s 
complexity as a political thinker and Niebuhr’s contributions to the field of political 
ethics.
9
 This is not to supplant or diminish the hold Reinhold’s realism has on 
Ramsey. Rather, it highlights his previously unrecognized inheritance of a distinctly 
H.R. Niebuhrian interpretive theme. It also furthers the task of explaining and 
interpreting his use of repentance as a motif for political ethics. 
 
2.1 Framing the Inquiry 
I aim to demonstrate (a) the significance of H. Richard Niebuhr’s war articles 
as an influence on Ramsey’s political ethics and (b) his explicit engagement with the 
Niebuhrian theme of repentance in his comments on the nature of the political realm 
and the shape of right magisterial action. Fortunately, the burden of the first task has 
been lightened by the treatment of both thinkers in Richard B. Miller’s 
Interpretations of Conflict. There he insists on reading the series of war articles 
published in the 1930s and 40s as serious contributions to political theology.
10
 He 
helps readers see that Niebuhr offers an ‘alternative metaphor for interpreting and 
evaluating war’ because his ‘overall purpose in the war articles is not to undermine 
ethical discourse about war and peace but to repoeticize war’.
11
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Additionally helpful is Miller’s recognition that Ramsey’s political ethics 
operate within this attempt to repoeticize war. He observes that several of the 
emphases in the war articles – e.g., innocent suffering in war, neighbor-love or other-
regard, nonexceptionalism in political ethics – are developed more explicitly (and 
with more technical attention) by Ramsey.
12
 The only complaint to be lodged against 
Miller’s observations is that somewhere in the transition from Niebuhrian themes to 
Ramseyian ethics the motif of repentance disappears. The reader is given no reason 
to think that it holds any place in Ramsey’s writings on politics. But, as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, repentance is part of his basic understanding of 
the political realm in War and the Christian Conscience.
13
   
With this in mind I will attend initially (and with Miller’s help) to Niebuhr’s 
war articles and his use of repentance as the defining motif for a Christian response 
to war. Once this account is in place I will trace Ramsey’s appropriation of the motif 
and its incorporation into his perspective on purposive political action. In doing so I 
aim to demonstrate the significance of repentance in his theological interpretation of 
politics as captured by the movement from contrition to action.  
 
2.2 Repentance and the Christian Response to War 
In the 1930s and 40s Niebuhr published a series of short and unsystematic 
essays voicing his dissatisfaction with theological interpretations of war and political 
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conflict. He sought an alternative set of images and concepts such as judgment, 
repentance and crucifixion to reorient Christian discourse on war. The most famous 
of these pieces – ‘The Grace of Doing Nothing’ in The Christian Century – was part 
of his only published exchange with his brother, Reinhold.
14
 
His disappointment stems from what he sees as a false choice being forced 
upon Christians between two ‘misconceptions’ in thinking on war.
15
 The first 
misconception wrongly believes that Christianity ‘calls for specific sorts of domestic, 
economic, or political action’.
16
 Both a non-pacifist calling for a specific military 
initiative and a pacifist calling all Christians to register as conscientious objectors 
would fall under this category. The second misconception calls for the opposite 
response, claiming that Christianity turns away from demands for specific political 
action because faithful obedience takes shape ‘only in peculiarly religious actions, 
such as prayer and worship’.
17
 Again, both a pacifist withdrawing support for all 
military action and a nonpacifist relinquishing moral influence on war by arguing 
that “might is right” would fall under this category. What cuts across the 
pacifist/nonpacifist divide is the way the two misconceptions force Christians to 
choose sides ‘in some confused political struggle’ or to retire ‘from the political and 
social life, at least insofar as they are Christians’.
18
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I want to establish a clear picture of each misconception before moving 
forward. The first justifies political action with religious sentiment. This most 
frequently takes the form of a Christian endorsement of retribution in war. In ‘War as 
Crucifixion’ Niebuhr calls this the ‘moral theory’ of war and observes that it 
‘interprets [war] as an event in a universe in which the laws of retribution hold sway. 
… According to this theory, war begins with a transgression of international, or 
natural, or divine law and continues in the effort of the law’s upholders to bring the 
offenders to justice’.
19
 His acute sensitivity to the hubris behind certain judgments of 
justice and injustice leads him to insist on the ambiguity of any attempt to prosecute 
war as retribution – he argues that ‘no scheme of vindictive justice fits the 
experiences of war’.
20
 He also frequently repeats the claim that ‘the greatest 
difficulty of all which the moral theory faces is the fact that in war the burden of 
suffering does not fall on the guilty, even when guilt is relatively determinable, but 
on the innocent’.
21
 It is here that he calls for ‘a total revolution of our minds and 
hearts’.
22
 The inescapability of undeserved suffering of the innocent in war – even in 
wars prosecuted by those with claims to justice – calls for repentance.  
The second misconception wrongly considers politics to be merely (and 
hopelessly) a realm of self-assertion and power. Christians are thus wrongly 
encouraged to withdraw from politics altogether on the grounds that there is no place 
for the moral claims of religious faith. He expresses this sentiment in his 
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commentary on inactivity in ‘The Grace of Doing Nothing’. He speaks of the 
‘conservative believer’ who ‘does nothing in the international crisis because he 
believes that the way of Japan is the way of all nations, that self-interest is the first 
and only law of life’.
23
 This is later called ‘the amoral theory’ in ‘War as 
Crucifixion’. It interprets war as ‘a conflict of powers in which victory with its fruits 
belongs to the stronger and in which moral words or phrases are nothing but 
instruments of power by means of which emotions are aroused and men are 
unified’.
24
 As mentioned above, ‘this view is held both by certain balance-of-power 
advocates of unlimited participation in war, and by certain pacifists who wash their 
hands of war because it makes no moral difference which side wins in a conflict of 
pure power’.
25
 The hubris of the amoral theory takes both pacifist and nonpacifist 
forms.  
Niebuhr subverts both misconceptions with a series of alternative images and 
concepts for interpreting war. One of these is the stark contrast between the guilty 
thieves crucified on each side of the cross of innocent Jesus. In ‘War as the Judgment 
of God’ he says, ‘one cannot then speak of God acting in war as judge of the nations 
without understanding that it is through the cross of Christ more than through the 
cross of thieves that he is acting upon mankind’.
26
 He again invokes this image in 
‘War as Crucifixion’, saying,  
Three men were crucified on Calvary, all, it appears, on more or less the 
same charges of insurrection. Two of them were malefactors who actually 
desired to overturn the established order, whether for patriotic or personal 
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motives; yet they were not alike since one recognized the at least relative 
justice of his punishment while the other remained unrepentant. The third 
cross carried one who was innocent of the charge made against him; yet 
ambiguously so, since he was establishing a kingdom of a strange sort which 




Two thieves maintain their innocence, one justly and the other unjustly. Two thieves 
accept their punishment, one deservedly and the other undeservedly. These layers of 
ambiguity show the power of political violence to obfuscate moral goodness. 
Calvary also highlights the universality of moral failure and the way that innocent 
suffering relativizes all claims to justice in war. This demonstrates ‘the sublime 
character of real goodness’ by subjecting both activity and inactivity in response to 
war to the judgment of God.
28
  
Niebuhr weaves themes of judgment, suffering and crucifixion across the war 
articles. Yet the one theme which appears, in Miller’s turn of the phrase, ‘from the 
first to the last of the war articles’, is that of repentance.
29
 Whether arguing against 
utilitarianism, situationism or idealism; whether using the language of judgment, the 
kingdom of God or crucifixion; whether addressing pacifism, coercionism or the 
false alternatives of the moral and amoral theory – he consistently settles on 
repentance as the primary motif for a Christian response to war. 
Miller describes the way in which ‘Niebuhr’s dissatisfaction with Christian 
discourse about war … led him to chart an alternative course, on which repentance to 
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divine judgment, not moral action, is axiomatic’.
30
 The juxtaposition of repentance 
and moral action is a common theme in his response to war; it stems from his 
‘suggestion that we are misled not only by conventional canons of morality, but by 
morality itself’.
31
 Because repentance draws attention to ‘the hubris behind every 
moral endeavor’, it is an act which must be undertaken altogether separately from 
any ‘social fruits’ that may follow from it.
32
 As Niebuhr says, ‘all this does not mean 
that Christian faith has no social applications or a relevance to the crisis of our days. 
… It does not mean that repentance does not bear social fruits; it does mean that 
repentance practiced for the sake of such fruits is a bad kind of magic’.
33
 
Miller is quick to observe that Niebuhr’s attempt to avoid such bad magic 
does not intend to mitigate ethical scrutiny.
34
 He helps readers to see that Niebuhr’s 
goal ‘is not to address directly the ethics of war, but to outflank prior approaches by 
providing an alternative image’.
35
 Yet, the outflanking Niebuhr seeks is stunted by 
the fact that his ‘insistence on contrition is not followed by a clear set of 
directives’.
36
 His call for repentance lacks a corresponding account of what to do 
once we have left the altar – it ‘threatens to undermine any ethical approach to war, 
leaving Christians in the limbo of quietism’.
37
 More simply put, Niebuhr offers no 
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specific ethical instruction for Christian participation in or abstention from war. 
Repentance is the determinative motif for a Christian response to war but it lacks a 
constructive political ethic. 
 
2.3 Niebuhr’s Theme of Repentance in Theological Perspective 
Before turning to Ramsey’s appropriation and adaptation of the themes in 
Niebuhr’s war articles, it may prove helpful to frame our interpretive gains thus far 
by introducing a reference to the role of repentance in the Christian theological 
tradition. That is to say, if both Niebuhr and Ramsey incorporate the theme into their 
political writings, taking stock of a functional account of repentance in the Christian 
life may supply an interpretively significant point of comparison.  
There is, however, a certain risk of appearing arbitrary or leading with the 
introduction of such a point of reference. Ramsey himself rules out the possibility of 
turning to a dictionary. In response to an audacious and biting letter from the student 
secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation who offered Webster’s definition of 
pacifism as something to which he might be more attentive, Ramsey replied, ‘I know 
of no area of human endeavor and intellectual reflection in which dictionary 
definitions are sufficient, or exact enough to be illuminating or useful’.
38
 Similarly, it 
would be difficult at this juncture to draw too heavily upon the ecclesiological or 
liturgical traditions of either thinker.  
I suggest instead that we turn to Martin Luther. As a seminal Protestant 
reformer and a thinker with clear theological influences on both Niebuhr and 
Ramsey, his description of the meaning of repentance in ‘Explanations of the Ninety-
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Five Theses’ is sufficiently normative to justify use here.
39
 We need not have certain 
knowledge that either thinker was familiar with this text to use it pragmatically as a 
device for drawing out the differences between their understandings of repentance.  
Luther observes that Christ ‘willed the entire life of believers to be one of 
repentance’.
40
 Following upon this claim there are two passages worth examining. 
First, he observes that  
I shall prove the thesis for the sake of those who are uninformed, first from 
the Greek word metanoeite itself, which means ‘repent’ and could be 
translated more exactly by the Latin transmentamini, which means ‘assume 
another mind and feeling, recover one’s senses, make a transition from one 
state of mind to another, have a change of spirit’; so that those who hitherto 




Later he says,  
 And then there is John the Baptist, who was sent according to the plan and 
decree of God for the purpose of preaching repentance. He also said ‘Repent’ 
[Matt 3:2], and again, ‘Bear fruits that befit repentance’ [Luke 3:8]. John 
himself explained these words; for after the crowd had asked him what they 
should do, he answered, “He who has two coats, let him share with him who 
has none; and he who has food, let him do likewise” [Luke 3:11]. Do you not 
see that he imposes no penance except that of observing the commands of 
God, and that he therefore desires that penance be understood as nothing 
except conversion and the change to a new life? But this is seen even more 
clearly in the passage where the tax collectors came to him and said, 
‘Teacher, what shall we do?’ And he said, ‘Nothing more than you have been 
commanded to do’ [Cf. Luke 3:12-13]. … Has he in any way imposed 




We see in these two passages, on the one hand, a turning away from sin by way of a 
new spirit and a change of mind. This involves a transition from the earthly to the 
spiritual. At the same time, Luther reinforces repentance as something that draws us 
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into service of the neighbor. There is a sense in which repentance involves physical 
renewal in the form of being obedient to the commands of God.    
 While we will have to postpone our evaluation of Ramsey, Miller’s 
commentary on Niebuhr reveals his emphasis on the aspects of repentance 
characterized by a turn from the earthly to the spiritual. He says that repentance, 
‘may lead to that situation in which men are able to think the new thoughts which the 
crisis of the times requires and which they cannot think so long as they remain bound 
by the passion of this-worldliness.
43
 His chief description of repentance is ‘a 
complete change of mind’.
44
 He occasionally speaks of sorrow as an inadequate 
description of the whole character of repentance, and on one occasion reprimands 
‘emotional debauches in the feeling of guilt’.
45
 Nonetheless, his use of contrition 
synonymously with repentance and his insistence that it is the path to self-analysis 
sustains an emphasis on repentance as an affective response to sin.  
 Further, as mentioned above, he fails to articulate the shape of right action in 
the context of repentance. Niebuhr lacks an account of the sort of concrete demands 
reflected in John the Baptist’s order to share our clothing and food with those in 
need. Thus, his hesitation to prescribe ethical norms leaves somewhat bare his 
account of repentance as obedience to the commands of God. In light of Luther’s 
descriptions it becomes clear that repentance for Niebuhr functions more as a 
recognition of sin than as concrete account of the new fruits that are born out of 
contrition. With this basic observation in place, it is necessary now to turn from 
Niebuhr to Ramsey’s account of politics as deferred repentance and consider how it 
inherits and redirects these Niebuhrian themes.  
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2.4 Ramsey’s Appropriation of Niebuhr’s Repentance Motif 
A legitimate question may arise in the reader’s mind at this point concerning 
the argument of this chapter. Given my aim to demonstrate Ramsey’s inheritance of 
repentance as a political theme from Niebuhr, is there evidence that he actually read 
the war articles? A few words about their relationship and his interaction with 
Niebuhr’s political writings are appropriate.  
‘The Grace of Doing Nothing’, appeared in 1932, just after Niebuhr began 
teaching at Yale. Ramsey arrived at Yale in 1935 to pursue a Bachelor of Divinity 
after completing his B.A. at Millsapps College in Mississippi. He suspended his 
studies and returned to Millsapps to be an instructor of history and social science for 
two years from 1937-1939, but he eventually returned to Yale and completed his 
degree in 1940. He then began studying for his Ph.D. under Niebuhr’s supervision. 
The forties were hard on Niebuhr. While he was treating issues of war as late 
as 1946 in ‘Utilitarian Christianity’, the topic was clearly exhausting for him. Under 
the chairmanship of Robert Lowry Calhoun, the Federal Council of Churches of 
Christ in America commissioned a study on the church during wartime and Niebuhr 
was asked to address the theological dimensions of the issue. The report bears his 
imprint, but he had to withdraw from the commission before its completion and 
eventually checked himself into the hospital for treatment of depression.
46
 As for 
Ramsey, he was awarded a post at Garrett Biblical Institute in Evanston, Illinois in 
1942 and received his Ph.D. from Yale in 1943. In Fall of 1944, after two years at 
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Garrett, he accepted a position at Princeton University and remained in the 
Department of Religion there until his retirement in 1982.   
During the years of the war articles both men remained in close contact. 
Ramsey enrolled in and audited several courses with Niebuhr during his time at Yale 
and they corresponded while he was away. It is curious, then, that late in his career 
when conducting an interview with Ken Vaux for a conference recognizing his 
contributions to the field of medical ethics, Ramsey remarks,  
Well, of the two Niebuhrs, Richard was the theologian. He had very little of 
the developed public philosophy of his brother Reinhold, who struggled with 
pacifism and the war. In fact, when I edited the Festschrift for H. Richard 
Niebuhr entitled Faith and Ethics, I came upon the only public exchange 
between him and his brother, which was in the Christian Century, in which 





Here Ramsey indicates that he did not encounter The Christian Century exchange 
while studying at Yale and seems to exhibit a lack of awareness of Richard’s own 
struggle with pacifism and war. At the same time, he edited Faith and Ethics several 
years before penning his first use of deferred repentance in Christian Ethics and the 
Sit-In.
48
 Furthermore, later in the same interview he adds, ‘with specific regard to the 
war, for [H. Richard] Niebuhr, responding to the enemy was responding to the 
judgment of God. In historical events such as the war, we were to respond to God as 
creator, judge and redeemer’.
49
 Here is a clear indication of familiarity with one of 
the distinctive themes of the articles: war as the judgment of God.   
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 In a letter from 1976 to a young graduate student preparing his masters 
dissertation on scripture in Ramsey’s ethics, he reflects on how he ‘came to see the 
fitness of Christian non-pacifism’ in the mid 1940s.
50
 He says,  
Two things were at work, I suppose, or happened to me. One was my gradual 
growth out of Millsaps liberalism into a more orthodox theological outlook at 
Yale – where the influence of the Niebuhrs had its steady effect long before 
any change of position on my part. The second was the ‘culture shock’ of 
going to teach for two years at Garrett where I found myself in the midst of a 
hotbed of that same Methodist liberal-pacifist background of mine. That 
accomplished the overturning of my position, more than when I was 




Here he speaks of an influence of both Niebuhrs on his transition away from 
pacifism. Somewhat against the earlier comment indicating that he was late in 
finding The Christian Century exchange, Ramsey also notes in the letter that he was 
influenced by Reinhold’s introduction of Christianity and Crisis as a response to The 
Christian Century. Both journals contain articles from H. Richard addressing topics 
of war and politics.   
 The final piece of evidence is perhaps the most persuasive, and it certainly 
arrives closest to a glimpse at Ramsey’s interaction with Niebuhr during the years 
when the war articles were composed. Contained in the Paul Ramsey Papers are a 
series of notes, undated, from a course with Niebuhr on Christian ethics.
52
 They are a 
fascinating glimpse into Ramsey’s scholarly youth; notes on war and politics reflect 
his tumultuous transition from an ardent pacifist in the late thirties and early forties 
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to an equally ardent just-war advocate in 1944 and beyond.
53
 They are riddled with 
question marks (and other signs of interpretive angst) in the margins. Included in 
these lecture notes are discussions of pacifism, just-war and conscientious objection 
viewed through the traditionally Niebuhrian ethic of response, observations on the 
structure of the political moment and comments insisting that the judgment of God 
subjects politics to the same moral criteria as the individual (one highlight of politics 
as deferred repentance).  
 Most importantly for the purposes of this argument, however, are notes 
reflecting themes in the war articles: attention to the coercive limitations of the 
political realm, insistence that ‘restraint must be mated with (1) love and (2) 
repentance, all this done with hope (3) (response to redemption)’ and explicit 
reference to the moral relativism that stems from the cross on Calvary.
54
 These notes, 
when taken in conjunction with his discovery of the Christian Century exchange in 
the 1950s, give me adequate reason to believe that Ramsey was shaped by the 
themes driving the war articles. Whether or not he consulted the published versions 
in the preparation of War and the Christian Conscience and Christian Ethics and the 
Sit-In, he clearly engaged with similar themes and motifs in the years leading up to 
those works.  
 
2.4.1 Four Points of Congruence between Niebuhr and Ramsey 
I want now to suggest four ways that the account of deferred repentance 
appropriates Niebuhr’s use of repentance as the determinative motif for a Christian 
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response to war. Each is premised by the basic claim in ‘War as the Judgment of 
God’ that ‘it is impossible so to separate response to the judgment of God from 
politically necessary action as to make religious life an affair of repentance while 
political action remains essentially unrepentant’.
55
 This refusal to exclude the 
judgment of God from any area of life yields a concern for a concept of political 
repentance that funds the following four points.  
  
1. The task of political ethics is to illuminate the context of political decision-
making, not to assume responsibility for supplying specific directives for each 
particular political decision.  
 
Niebuhr’s sensitivity to the ambiguity of moral judgments leads him to 
emphasize the significance of the context of political actions. He says, ‘a single 
action … derives significance only from the context in which it stands; and the 
context which carries the action along, which makes it part of a total pattern, is 
determined by religion’.
56
 The entry-point for theological contributions to ethics is 
via the maintenance of proper context for moral action. He says, ‘religion enters into 
every specific action but does not determine the rough material of the action … 
Religious interest is directed more toward preceding and succeeding acts than toward 
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the particular act of the moment’.
57
 This leads him away from specific moral 
directives. 
This emphasis appears in two principal forms in his discussion of repentance. 
First, he uses repentance as a force for galvanizing the individual self for right 
action. ‘Repentance enables one to act as a single, integrated agent, one who holds 
together a plurality of roles and perspectives in a coherent unity’.
58
 This highlights 
the importance of individual conscience and volition in political decision-making 
while retaining an integral role for the church in urging repentance and sustaining the 
appropriate moral context. Second, his emphasis on context over action produces 
hesitancy in making specific moral judgments or prescriptive ethical 
recommendations. He concludes ‘War as the Judgment of God’ by saying, ‘these are 
but general reflections which do not presume to say to anyone what his particular 
duty in response to God’s judgment must be. They seek however to describe in what 
spirit and context Christians in varying vocations … may meet the divine judgment 
and maintain fellowship with each other’.
59
 Thus an abstention from specific 
political recommendations stems from an ecumenical impulse and attention to the 
significance of divine judgment.  
Ramsey inherits Niebuhr’s sensitivity to the ambiguity of moral judgments – 
his disagreement with David Little was precisely an attempt to pinpoint its effects on 
political morality. He translates this into an emphasis on the proper role of political 
decision-making. Here a quote which closely resembles his account of deferred 
                                                
57
 Niebuhr, ‘The Christian Church’, 11-12. Later in this article he attempts to explain the relationship 
between an act and its context with a metaphor of that between a word and a sentence. He says, ‘Apart 
from the question of the rare, excluded act, it is evident that an act placed in a particular context is 
molded and given distinctive form, even as a word in a sentence is subject – according to it position – 
to variations of case, tense, mood, inflection, accent’. (13) See also Werpehowski, American 
Protestant Ethics, 68. 
58
 Miller, Interpretations, 139-140.  
59




repentance will help demonstrate the similarities with Niebuhr. In ‘Turn Toward Just 
War’ he says,  
It ought to be impossible for Christians to suppose that the political life of 
mankind is anything other than a realm of ‘patient endurance’ … This puts 
politics in its place, and frees men for clear-sighted participation in it. … 
Then politics can be best conducted; decision and action can be what they are 
worth. This only de-mythologizes the role of politics, and men are free to 





While it may seem strange that I am linking his call to de-mythologize politics with 
Niebuhr’s attempt to re-poeticize war, their shared perspective on the contextual 
character of moral agency drives a similar attention to the need for new language to 
describe purposive political action.   
 Ramsey also inherits Niebuhr’s reticence to issue specific political directives. 
As Joseph Allen notes, he understands his task as an advocate of political realism to 
be ‘primarily an effort to perceive those characteristics always and everywhere 
present in politics, including possibilities for good and for evil’.
61
 As he says in War 
and the Christian Conscience, ‘the important thing is to make clear and keep clear in 
the public conscience the moral context of political action that should surround every 
specific political decision and should be the aim of political practice’.
62
 While I will 
deal with his interpretation of the church’s relationship with the magistrate in chapter 
six, it is sufficient to note here that he, like Niebuhr, discourages the church from 
usurping the proper office of political authority with moral instructions for specific 
action.  
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2. Working for good in the political realm may require patience or calculated 
inactivity.  
 
Niebuhr’s stance in ‘The Grace of Doing Nothing’ brought heavy criticism 
from those (including his brother) who thought he was advocating an escapist 
Christian political ethic. Consider, though, these comments:   
An inactivity then is demanded which will be profoundly active in rigid self-
analysis. Such analysis is likely to reveal that there is an approach to the 
situation, indirect but far more effective than direct interference, for it is able 
to create the conditions under which a real reconstruction of habits is 
possible. It is the opposite approach from that of the irate father who believes 
that every false reaction on the part of his child may be cured by a verbal, 




Niebuhr doesn’t rule out the possibility of direct political action in the form of a 
“verbal, physical or economic spanking”. Rather, he believes that calculated 
inactivity can “create conditions” for calculated activity. This demonstrates that his 
understanding of “inactivity” in ‘The Grace of Doing Nothing’ is not permanent but 
prepared and calculated. His position might equally be expressed as ‘The Grace of 
Doing Nothing, Yet’. Political action must be encased in a posture of restraint, 
purposeful inactivity and self-analysis.  
Ramsey’s emphasis on negotiation as the hallmark of deferred repentance 
mirrors this approach to political action. The “not forever” on the end of deferred 
repentance is the implicit “yet” on the end of the grace of doing nothing. The pursuit 
of the political good requires constant negotiation and renegotiation of personal and 
collective motives through self-analysis and restraint from a constant rush to hasty 
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and uncalculated political action. He is as wary of the “irate father” approach to 
political ethics as his teacher is.  
Ramsey absorbs Niebuhr’s pursuit of a political ethic that is ‘able to create 
the conditions under which a real reconstruction of habits is possible’.
64
 In the 
discussion of deferred repentance he observes that ‘just conduct must often first be 
made possible by prior acts, and by the patient play of moral reflection upon actual 
political conventions’.
65
 This impulse also came into view in the discussion of how 
long the U.S. could continue its inactive stance toward apartheid South Africa in 
Christian Ethics and the Sit-In.
66
 Both thinkers locate a unique place for calculated 
patience in Christian political ethics.   
 
3. The politician works for good in a broken system because practices in war 
must be reformed just as the individual self must be reformed.  
 
 Both thinkers also connect the reformation of political structures with the 
reformation of the self because of the inability to permanently separate public and 
private morality. Niebuhr rejects as wholly unacceptable the construction of ‘a 
twofold set of actions for the individual: repentance toward the infinite, and self-
confidence in the realm of finite, concrete action’.
67
 This creates the possibility of 
moral goodness in the political realm – ‘Nothing is regarded as beyond the scope of 
redemption – not the political life of men, nor the economic, nor the spiritual’.
68
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 As early as his lecture notes from Niebuhr’s ethics course Ramsey had in 
mind that ‘as with the individual, so with the state’.
69
 He bases his theory of deferred 
repentance on the claim that there is ‘not an essential difference between private 
morality and public morality’ and adopts James Dougherty’s observation that 
‘persons and states are subjected to the same fundamental code of justice’.
70
 Niebuhr 
observes that, ‘it is the duty of the church to show Pilate how to be just, and 
malefactors how to be repentant in the presence of Jesus’.
71
 Here Niebuhr links just 
rulings of political officials with the repentance of malefactors of their sin.  
Ramsey’s account of deferred repentance makes this connection explicit by calling 
those just rulings political repentance.  
 
4. All political judgments are under the judgment of God – they are the prelude 
to a greater judgment and a new era.   
 
 Niebuhr observes at the outset of World War II that ‘the history of the world 
is the judgment of the world and also its redemption, and such a conflict as the 
present one is … only the prelude both to greater judgment and to a new era’.
72
 Both 
Ramsey and Niebuhr reinforce this idea that the final redemption lies beyond, rather 
than on this side of political judgments. Ramsey’s frequent reminders that political 
endeavors take place on this side of the eschatological kingdom of God is a reminder 
not to mistakenly assume that the final judgment and new era have already arrived.  
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 One principal consequence of locating political conflicts under the judgment 
of God is that, as Niebuhr says, war ‘cannot be interpreted as hell; if it were hell we 
could not even be aware that God is judging us for we would be without God in 
war’.
73
 Furthermore, ‘if God were not in the war … it would mean that the cosmos 
had no concern with justice’.
74
 Ramsey adopts a similar posture by arguing that war 
cannot be hell and must be governed by moral norms of justice. He does not, 
however, appropriate Niebuhr’s description of God as “in” the war. I will say more 
about this later. For now it is important to take note of the way deferred repentance is 
rooted in the Niebuhrian insistence that political judgments are a prelude to a greater 
judgment and a new era in the kingdom of God.    
 
2.5 Reflections on the Legacy of the War Articles in Ramsey’s Political 
Theology 
 At this point the extent to which Ramsey’s concept of deferred repentance 
draws upon and extends Niebuhr’s use of repentance as the determinative motif for a 
Christian response to war should be clear. What appears to be an obscure and 
disconnected concept in War and the Christian Conscience receives more 
theological and structural shape in light of the arguments in the war articles. The 
final task of this chapter, then, is to consider the extent to which Ramey takes the 
political significance of the concept of repentance in a new theological direction. 
Here the title of this chapter – ‘From Contrition to Action’ – comes squarely into 
view.  
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 Ramsey does not appropriate wholesale Niebuhr’s concept of repentance. For 
instance, he abandons the account of God’s action in war.
75
 He also lacks the strong 
Niebuhrian sense that, as Miller notes, ‘God is present in the secondary causes of 
nature and history’.
76
 It may prove helpful, then, to compare Niebuhr and Ramsey on 
the matter of repentance by turning back to the comments from Luther’s 
‘Explanations of the Ninety-Five Theses’ introduced earlier. How does Ramsey’s 
account of deferred repentance fit with Luther’s theological description? 
 The most immediate discordance is his overwhelming lack of emphasis on 
repentance as an act of piety or spirituality. He corrects – perhaps, overcorrects – 
Niebuhr’s insufficient emphasis on right action as a hallmark of repentance by 
leaving behind the role of contrition. For this reason, William Werpehowski notes 
that ‘Niebuhr’s “permanent revolution of the mind and of the heart” may also have a 
more critical edge than Ramsey’s position includes’.
77
 Deferred repentance lacks 
direct reference to God or to a turn from the earthly to the spiritual. It therein omits 
what Luther describes as a new spirit and a change of mind. 
 The avoidance of such language is a common theme in Ramsey’s political 
writings. His distaste for the emotional swell of political protests is one example of 
an insensitivity to this more affective side of the repentant political self. He is wary 
of overly emotional responses to sin for their ability to overwhelm careful moral 
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distinctions. For this reason he speaks very rarely about emotions associated with 
repentance – his soldier is not one who ‘blubbers over his gunpowder’.
78
 
 His tendency to avoid the language of contrition comes more clearly into 
view in his chapter on guilt in Nine Modern Moralists. He offers there two comments 
worth quoting at length. First, he describes guilt, saying,  
Guilt is what the gospel lives by disabusing; where the word of God speaks, 
guilt can have no standing. ‘Where God speaks man must be present without 
considering his own merit’ (Barth); where God speaks, man must be present 
without considering his own guilt or demerit. … In the strict sense there is 
also no knowledge of guilt except in the light of Christ’s cross. For he alone 




Later he extends and formalizes this description, saying,  
 From the point of view of forgiveness, what, then, is guilt? … (1) Guilt is a 
forensic term for the difficulty of repentance; (2) guilt is a forensic term for 
unwillingness to receive forgiveness; (3) guilt is a forensic term for 
continuation in sin in the teeth of proffered forgiveness; (4) guilt is a forensic 




The juxtaposition of repentance with guilt, as well as the notion that guilt is marked 
by the continuation of sin demonstrates his preference for a theological account of 
repentance marked by constructive action. Just as the Gospel disabuses guilt, so also 
does it foster faithful obedience in the form of right action.  
 In this light his account reflects Luther’s description of repentance as 
something which draws us into service of the neighbor. It is a kind of political 
outworking of the explanation given in Luke 3: ‘He who has two coats, let him share 
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with him who has none; and he who has food, let him do likewise’.
81
 Deferred 
repentance as constructive political action involves physical renewal in the form of 
being obedient to the commands of God – or, in Ramsey’s case, the moral principles 
informed by Christian love that define and govern political conflict.  
 The moral upshot of this is his insistence that specific principles of justified 
war can be established as foundations for political morality. He follows his account 
of deferred repentance with an exploration of the tradition of just war thinking and 
an explication of discrimination and proportion as the hallmarks of adequate moral 
reasoning in politics – this is the principal purpose of War and the Christian 
Conscience. The fact that I do not here elaborate on the constructive political ethic 
put forth – others have written at length on proportion, discrimination, non-
combatant immunity, etc. and my purposes here lie elsewhere – should not obscure 
the fact that his just war norms are explicit articulations of how the political life is to 
be transformed in accordance with Christian love. Deferred repentance attempts to 
capture the theological context of such purposive political action upholding those 
moral norms. 
 The contrast between both thinkers on the issue of repentance should not 
obscure the fact that Ramsey’s use of the concept as a key theme for a Christian 
response to war and a Christian account of participation in politics is developed 
clearly on the foundation of Niebuhrian ideas. Yet, the comparative exercise 
demonstrates that Ramsey takes a view of political judgment that Niebuhr never 
could: ‘An ethics grounded in justification in Christ has no … urgent need to avoid 
making judgments of right and wrong in politics.
82
 Or, as he says in unpublished 
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notes from early in his career, ‘since the God of the covenant transcends nature and 
acts in history, man is … freed for moral decision’.
83
 Whereas for Niebuhr 
repentance is a complete change of mind, for Ramsey it is to ‘guide the thrust of 
political action into ways that are right’.
84
 This is what I have called the movement 
from contrition to action.  
 That movement, however, begs an additional set of questions regarding the 
way in which Ramsey uses repentance to inform and determine the constructive 
moral and political self. Understanding repentance as constructive political action 
requires a turn to several lesser-known essays, pieces of correspondence and 
unpublished materials from the Ramsey Papers where he confronts more directly the 
significance of repentance. These particular writings illuminate his understanding of 
the role of the magistrate and his insistence that without knowledge of justice and 
injustice – that is, without knowledge of the sort of right action demanded of 
Christians under the judgment of God and awareness of how Christians can fail to 
act according to standards of justice – repentance remains a hollow concept.  The 
final chapter of this section on repentance in Ramsey’s thought examines these 
writings in order to understand more fully his theology of repentance as constructive 
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Chapter Three 
‘No Tears Please’: Repentance as Constructive Political Action  
 
More fundamental than sorrow for our past sins is a repentant faith which in acting 
nevertheless waits for the Lord to complete by His Divine Providence the goodness 
of our finite actions, and which still trusts Him when in His Divine Judgment our 
action is thwarted and rejected.
1
 
– Paul Ramsey, ‘The Manger, the Cross, and the Resurrection’ 
 
 Shortly after the publication of War and the Christian Conscience in 1961 
Ramsey received a letter from John Hick, then of Princeton Theological Seminary. 
In that letter Hick takes issue with what he calls ‘the sinister notion of deferred 
repentance’, saying that it ‘sounds suspiciously as though it simply means not doing 
what one sees to be right, or doing what one sees to be wrong’.
2
 Ramsey’s response 
is illuminating. He says,  
This is not sinister, but is rather of relating moral principles to political action 
acknowledged to be ‘the art of the possible’ in such fashion as to prevent this 
‘art of the possible’ from becoming a realm of either technical performance 
or power politics wholly unrelated to morality. ‘Deferred repentance’ means 
primarily, not doing what one sees to be wrong (though this may in some 
sense still be true) but doing from among the possible collective acts the one 
that is most right among the possibles and the one best calculated to make 
more of what is right a possibility for future political choice. It is, therefore, 
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This emphasizes the move from contrition to right political action detailed in the 
previous chapter. Imbedded in the term “deferred repentance” is a distinct call for 
purposive movement toward the political good.   
 His response also calls attention to the belief that the political good cannot 
simply be one of resignation to evil. That would be to relinquish the possibility of 
Christian love and faithfulness at work even in the political realm. This is driven by a 
concern that the logic of choosing between “lesser evils” will erode into a kind of 
excuse-giving rather than moral justification.
4
 His insistence to Hick that deferred 
repentance involves the selection of the ‘most right among the possibles’ indicates 
that even if “least possible evil” and “greatest possible good” could be used to 
describe the same political act, the interpretive difference is of great theological 
significance. He says this another way late in his career: ‘The least unavoidable evil 
simply is the greatest possible good; no tears please’.
5
 
 Ramsey sustains this attention to the greatest possible political good 
throughout his writings on politics. For instance, he observes in ‘Politics as Science, 
Not Prophecy’ that the just war theory ‘defines right doing that good may come of it, 
not wrong doing quixotically alleged to be warranted solely by consequences 
expected to follow’.
6
 This refusal to embrace moral evil as a means to desirable 
political ends helps us to see his principal response to Hick. He aims to provide an 
interpretation of political action that identifies and encourages a constructive sense of 
moral purpose even in the limited context of the political realm.  
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 The aim of this chapter is to proceed from his unique and limited account of 
politics as deferred repentance to wider observations about his theology of 
repentance and call for constructive political action. This involves a transition away 
from War and the Christian Conscience and Christian Ethics and the Sit-In into a 
series of disparate discussions of repentance drawn from throughout his lifetime. I 
will consult his discussion of guilt and repentance in Nine Modern Moralists, as well 
as a number of letters from his professional correspondence over the issue of the 
Vietnam War. This will highlight his use of repentance to call attention to the 
contingent and temporal character of our moral political existence. We begin, 
however, with his comments on repentance in an early essay published in 
Christianity and Crisis, ‘The Manger, the Cross, and the Resurrection’.
7
   
 
3.1 Repentance for Unrighteousness, Repentance for Righteousness 
 The Paul Ramsey Papers contain a folder titled, ‘Other Publications – the 
1940s’.
8
 In it are several early essays exploring various Christian theological 
concepts with a view to their ethical relevance. The titles include ‘The Christian 
Faith in the Midst of Despair’, ‘A Christian Vocation’, and ‘The Fullness of Time’. 
One essay, ‘The Indefensibility of Defensive Nations’, has scrawled on its title page 
‘Submitted to one of Reinhold Niebuhr’s quarterlies – rejected’. The essay of 
greatest interest for this discussion is titled ‘Sin, Repentance, and History’. It does 
not give any indication of having been published and Ramsey’s movement from 
Yale Divinity School to Garrett Biblical Seminary to Princeton University in the 
1940s makes the draft difficult to date.   
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 As it turns out, the essay did find its way into print in 1943. D. Stephen Long 
tells the story of Reinhold Niebuhr supplying the title for an essay published as ‘The 
Manger, the Cross and the Resurrection’. That essay is a reworked version of ‘Sin, 
Repentance, and History’.
9
 The significance of the essay for this discussion concerns 
Ramsey’s suggestion of an important distinction between two forms of repentance. 
He says, ‘repentance in which we suffer remorse for an action the evil character of 
which has thrust itself or has somehow been hauled into our consciousness, is clearly 
different from that repentance which is appropriate for our deeper, unconscious 
sin’.
10
 He calls the first of these ‘repentance for unrighteousness’ and the second 
‘repentance for righteousness’.  
 Contrition is the appropriate character of repentance for unrighteousness 
because of the delayed nature of the act. He says, ‘Sorrow or remorseful repentance 
for things we have done in the past, the sinfulness of which we now see, is 
something which must always be subsequent to the sin itself’.
11
 He explains this in 
an essay published the following year, saying, ‘one becomes aware of having sinned 
against what he knew before the act and knows after the act to be the moral law; and 
remorseful repentance leading to self-improvement are then in order’.
12
 That is, only 
in looking back can we recognize the wrongdoing in need of repentance. 
 What Ramsey terms repentance for righteousness, however, is more elusive.  
He observes, ‘repentance for our unconscious sin, make no mistake about it, is 
repentance for our righteousness. It is superfluous to say “for our supposed 
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 Paul Ramsey, ‘Natural Law and the Nature of Man’, Christendom 9, no. 3 (1944): 373. 
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righteousness”, because before God all human righteousness is “supposed” until God 
has acted and judged’.
13
 The concept does not imply that we should repent of the 
“righteousness” imputed through the judgment and grace of God, but rather that we 
recognize even in our current pursuit of righteous action the broken character of 
human agency. He notes, ‘We also sin, not knowing what we do, whenever we act at 
all; even when, as by a metaphor we say, we do good’.
14
 That now unchanging 
aspect of fallen creation, even in the pursuit of good, requires repentance.
 
 
 Two forms of hubris collapse here under the judgment of God. The first is the 
presumption that on the basis of our limited human judgments we can identify past 
sin. The second is the absurdity of trying to relate self-conscious remorse to layers of 
unconscious sin. He says, ‘before God unrepentant unrighteousness and unrepentant 
righteousness come to the same thing’.
15
 The evidence that they ‘are judged alike by 
God’ is that ‘in history they come in time to the same thing, namely, cruelty’.
16
 Here 
Ramsey calls to mind H.R. Niebuhr’s emphasis on the suffering of the innocent as 
the principal result of war. He continues the Niebuhrian theme, saying, ‘this is the 
Cross in History from which also, in the light of the Cross of Christ, we learn that 
man’s deepest sin lies in an unrepentant righteousness that knows not the sin for 
which it is responsible’.
17
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 Ibid. Ramsey also speaks of the action of God in history and human action in light of the judgment 
of God. The presence of these themes only further reinforces my claim in the previous chapter that he 
develops the political theme of repentance out of interaction with concepts from the work of  H. R. 
Niebuhr.  
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 The question that emerges from this is how Christians are to ‘repent for the 
unconscious sin of our righteousness’.
18
 He says, ‘repentance for … the unconscious 
sin of each moment for which we are nevertheless responsible is something which 
must necessarily be simultaneous with the act’.
19
 The unavoidable simultaneity of 
our responsibility for repentance and our continual sinfulness renders contrition an 
impractical and somewhat inappropriate response. The troublesome nature of 
repentance for righteousness is revealed by the unintelligibility of ‘trying to be sickly 
sorrowful for what we are now doing’.
20
 Contrition is an appropriate moral response 
only when subsequent to sin (and never contemporary with it).  
 Ramsey lingers on this issue because of his anxiety over the potentially 
crippling effect repentance of that sort would have on the pursuit of the good. He 
says, ‘we cannot remorsefully repent and put away from us all our sins, because this 
would mean ceasing to do what we are now doing’.
21
 Contrition ‘is impossible with 
regard to all our actions, save by an act of renouncing life which is itself an act of 
life’.
22
 Any attempt to emphasize contrition as the principal response to the 
continually broken character of all human endeavors – even those involving 
determinations of right – drives him to say of the these forms of repentance, 
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 His theological perspective becomes clearer in light of the reflections on guilt 
and repentance in the chapter titled ‘God’s Grace and Man’s Guilt’ in Nine Modern 
Moralists.
24
 He explains in this essay that ‘we sin, and while we may be simply 
aware of that fact … we are also aware of ourselves as sinners and objectify 
ourselves as such’.
25
 The tendency to objectify ourselves as sinners – that is, to 
despair over the fact that we ‘repeatedly every moment continue to fall short’ – 
causes ‘the difficulty of repentance’.
26
 This speaks to the way repentance in the form 
of contrition is susceptible to a kind of hubris which overwhelms its proper role in 
the Christian life. 
 Repentance is thus constantly undercut by a tendency to objectify sinfulness 
through guilt and despair. He continues the description of this difficulty, saying,      
 The myriad multiplication of selves in self-awareness also makes difficult an 
integral act of true repentance. Even in the face of proffered forgiveness, like 
Augustine we are always ‘willing and nilling’ the same good at the same 
time; we will nothing wholly or entirely; we are in this sense unwilling to be 
forgiven. We will our sin and our forgiveness at one and the same moment; 




I mentioned in the previous chapter that he believes guilt can only be properly 
grasped in light of the Cross of Christ, or, in light of forgiveness. Here he expands 
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that concept by arguing that our inability to understand repentance, sin and 
forgiveness stems from the fact that self-consciousness gets in the way.  
 
3.1.1 A Turn toward Politics 
 In ‘The Manger, the Cross, and the Resurrection’ his warning against self-
indulgent despair takes the discussion in a distinctly political direction. His principal 
example of one who avoids the inappropriate confusion of the two forms of 
repentance is the Christian soldier. If repentance for unrighteousness is the only kind 
of repentance – that is, if contrition is the only response to sin – he observes, ‘then 
Charles Clayton Morrison is right in saying that we cannot be repentant for what we 
are doing in wartime, but only for our part in the prior actions and failures that led to 
war’.
28
 Ramsey, unlike Morrison, wants to sustain an idea of repentance in war. He 
does this by pointing to the Christian soldier who ‘repentantly fights the just war’ but 
‘is not one who is always blubbering over his gunpowder!’
29
  
 He later describes this permanent attitude characteristic of repentance for 
righteousness in war with what I take to be the most illuminating line of the article. 
He observes, ‘more fundamental than sorrow for our past sins is a repentant faith 
which in acting nevertheless waits for the Lord to complete by His Divine 
Providence the goodness of our finite actions, and which still trusts Him when in His 
Divine Judgment our action is thwarted and rejected’.
30
 He italicizes in acting 
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precisely because he considers the primary response to unconscious sin to be the 
steadfast and trusting ‘judgment about what is good’, however ‘infected by our sinful 
righteousness’ that judgment may be.
31
 For the magistrate this means repentance is to 
act decisively in political judgment.  
 As I mentioned in the previous chapter, ‘an ethics grounded in justification in 
Christ has no urgent need to avoid making judgments of right and wrong in 
politics’.
32
 That is not to say such judgments transcend their “infected” character. As 
he says elsewhere, ‘since value judgments are always the judgments of men who are 
also sinful, no … ethic can ever be complete’.
33
 It does, however, recognize that 
God’s transcendence places political judgments under a greater judgment and therein 
sustains them as moral acts. Ramsey’s theology of repentance funds a call for 
political action in the form of judgments on what is good and right. They constitute 
faithful response in knowledge that ‘waits for the Lord to complete by His Divine 
Providence the goodness of our finite actions’.
34
  
 Two elements of the previous discussion come back into view at this point. 
The first is my discussion of Ramsey’s doctoral writings on the philosophy of 
“absolute idealism” at the beginning of chapter one. His emphasis on the significance 
of human judgments is a political and theological reinterpretation of the earlier claim 
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that ‘only finites are pursued directly’ in service to the transcendent “Absolute”.
35
 
That philosophical accent on individual agency has given way to the belief that 
God’s transcendent judgment endows human judgments with their moral character. 
His theological objection to repentance as perpetual contrition is precisely aimed at 
sustaining the constructive character of faithfulness in act and the radical dependence 
of those limited judgments on the divine will of God.  
 Second, my use of Luther to draw a contrast between Niebuhr and Ramsey in 
chapter two becomes clear in light of Ramsey’s comments in ‘Natural Law and the 
Nature of Man’. In this essay, published one year after ‘The Manger, the Cross, and 
the Resurrection’, he reintroduces the distinction between ‘two kinds of sin, and for 
each a corresponding type of repentance’.
36
 In his description of the second type, 
instead of using “repentance for righteousness”, he point to Luther’s Ninety-Five 
Theses. He writes,  
 Repentance in this case, unlike the former one, cannot be subsequent to the 
act of sin but must be simultaneous with it; … Such repentance is that to 
which Luther referred when he wrote, in the first of his ninety-five Theses; 
‘Our Lord and Master Jesus Christ in saying, “Repent ye, etc.” intended that 
the whole life of believers should be penitence’. This repentance is the 
orientation of the self away from itself while acting, away from both its 
righteousness and its unrighteousness, from both its idolatries and its 
idolatrous correction of idolatry, from its goodness and its guilt, from both 
sloth and pride; and its turning toward the God of the Gospel that by faith 





He again reinforces the theological significance of repentant faith taking shape in act. 
Although he does not on this occasion explore the political implications of this 
                                                
35
 Paul Ramsey, ‘The Nature of Man in the Philosophy of Josiah Royce and Bernard Bosanquet’, Box 
53, Ramsey Papers, 261.  
36
 Ramsey, ‘Natural Law’, 372.  
37
 Ibid., 374.  
 80 
claim, Luther’s definition of repentance is used to fuel the movement from contrition 
to action in the Christian life.  
 On the basis of these claims I believe ‘The Manger, the Cross, and the 
Resurrection’ offers a unique glimpse into the theological foundations of Ramsey’s 
political thought. He highlights constructive moral action as the faithful response of 
radically depraved agents to divine judgment. He also supplies a rationale for the 
significance of political judgments through a theology of repentance. With these 
foundational perspectives in place I want to face the most pressing debate over 
political repentance during his lifetime: the Vietnam war.  
 
3.2 Ramsey’s Understanding of Repentance in the Context of the Vietnam War 
 Ramsey was faulted by many critics for his delayed recognition of unjust 
U.S. military action in the Vietnam conflict. Only later did he admit the error of his 
judgments, saying that ‘I freely grant that in the fury and fog of the verbal wars I 
failed to keep my agenda for reasoning morally about insurgency and 
counterinsurgency warfare entirely distinct from my own conviction that we were in 
Vietnam honourably’.
38
 He writes in a letter to Glen Stassen in 1978, ‘I judged the 
war to be proportionate long after I should have changed my mind’.
39
 
 He was under pressure both to repent of his own judgments on the war and to 
incorporate a more substantial place for contrition for the ills of war in his political 
theory. The problem was that he saw no necessary connection between those two 
demands. Thus, even as he acknowledges to Stassen the wrongness of his judgments 
he refuses to compromise the truthfulness of the moral norms governing war. He 
                                                
38
 See Ramsey’s comments in Richard John Neuhaus, Speaking to the World: Four Protestant 
Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1983), 21. 
39
 Paul Ramsey to Glen Stassen, February 14, 1978, Box 26, Ramsey Papers.  
 81 
writes, ‘If I now went back and changed the political and military theory in order to 
accomplish repentance, I would be a very poor ethicist indeed’.
40
 In order, then, to 
understand how Ramsey approaches and employs the theme of repentance within the 
context of the Vietnam war, as well as to understand his response to calls from his 
critics for contrition, I turn to two significant pieces of correspondence from the 
1960s and 70s. 
 
3.2.1 A Letter to James Childress 
 An extensive letter to James Childress at the Kennedy Institute in 1977 
elaborates his refusal to allow the emotion of regret to overshadow an insistence on 
the moral norms of justifiable war. He discusses the call from others for an account 
of contrition in his political ethics, saying,   
Perhaps I have not searched for the precise word or words to use for the still-
remaining inward reverberations of agape in justified participation in war, 
because mine has been too much an ‘ethics of action’. Under that head, I 
would call your attention to more than a moral trace that remains in the 
structure of acts of war for me, namely, the cruciality of the distinction 
between direct intention and indirect collateral killing. … That still seems 




By pointing to the “moral trace” involved in his account of political action Ramsey 
assumes that regret must be made possible by prior standards with which to judge 
right from wrong. For instance, the distinction of note here is one separating direct 
intention (murder) from indirect killing. He had long contended that ‘murder is never 
ordinate; but unfortunately a good deal of killing may be’.
42
 His point to Childress is 
simply that if we are to rightly feel “regret” in war we must have a sense of which 




 Paul Ramsey to James Childress, January 21, 1977, Box 5, Ramsey Papers. 
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actions ought certainly to evoke that sentiment, e.g., murder, and which remain 
morally ambiguous, e.g., killing.  
 In the discussion of deferred repentance this led him to say that even it was 
made ‘quite impossible, where there is nothing in violation of fundamental principle 
to repent of, and to negotiate out of the realm of possibility’.
43
 The danger of calling 
for regret or repentance without proper attention to moral principles is that it can 
quickly become an instrument of self-justification. His seminary roommate and 
longtime friend Caxton Doggett warned him early in his career about the misuse of 
such sentiments. He wrote to Ramsey, ‘the self-knowledge of one who “sins 
bravely” but repentantly … is in the picture; but that form of self-knowledge … 
distorts the picture when brought to the fore – it uses “humility” and “repentance” 
and “debasement” as instruments of self-exhaltation’.
44
 This is precisely his concern 
with calls for regret or contrition as the principal substance of a political ethic. It 
invites self-deception and the erosion of moral principles governing acts of 
judgment.  
 To Childress he decries this error and says that the omission of contrition as a 
feature of his political thought ‘is to be explained (not excused) by the silliness of 
repenting for something that one judges to be an actual duty even while engaging in 
its performance, calling down on all heads alike God’s “justification”’.
45
 In light of 
the previous discussion of the two forms of repentance we can see clearly the target 
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of his claim. Sorrow and regret are counterproductive to current moral action – their 
theological function is always subsequent to the act. They also offer no justification 
to an otherwise immoral act. Ramsey says this to Childress in political terms: 
‘Repentance or sorrow doesn’t do anything to excuse [a war]’.
46
 That is why the 




 Ramsey rightly sees that this begs an additional question in the discussion 
with Childress. If Christians pursue political action through constructive judgments 
of right and wrong, how are they also to account for and limit the hubris behind those 
judgments? Michael McKenzie helps to capture his response to challenges of this 
sort, noting that Ramsey’s just war theory ‘was never meant to imply the presence of 
real justice on one side, its absence on the other. It does imply, however, that 
distinctions can still be made regarding competing and relative claims for justice’.
48
 
The just war theory should only ever involve relative judgments of right and wrong – 




 In the letter to Childress he pushes away from ‘objective’ claims to justice by 
trying ‘to get away from the “juridical model”, of declaration as a sentence from an 
impartial court’.
50
 Nonetheless he maintains that  
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Still one does the ostensibly just thing without subjective guilt. So there not 
only can but must be relative judgments of justice ad bellum, without the 
claim to encompass objective justice. Here I would say the overarching 
Christian perspectives of sin, tragedy, God’s overruling, forgiveness, 
historical vocation, etc., have their profound significance – but not that of 




In response to the call for a more robust account of political repentance he refuses to 
compromise the moral necessity of ostensible judgments. If repentance is not to 
become an instrument of self-justification, if it is not to lose its “profound 
significance”, it must not be used as a tool for vacating the proper function of 
judgment in the Christian political life.
52
  
 This is why the “structure of acts of war” is more crucial to Ramsey than 
notions of compunction or guilt. This is also why he speaks in War and the Christian 
Conscience of principles of righteousness ‘by which wrong gains some meaning’.
53
 
Moral norms simply play a more fundamental role in the determination of right 
political action – to allow contrition or regret to diminish the significance of right 
judgment would be to mischaracterize the moral task before us.   
 
3.2.2 A Letter to Kent Knutson, Editor of Dialog 
 In early 1967 his essay, ‘How Shall the Vietnam War be Justified?’, was 
published in Dialog with the revised title ‘Is Vietnam A Just War?’.
54
 Not only did 
the editor’s replacement of the original title offend Ramsey’s appreciation for the 
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distinction between ostensible and objective justice (and therein just war and 
justified war), the essay itself also incensed several of his critics. Robert Hoyer and 
Gordon J. Dahl responded with strongly critical essays in the subsequent issue titled 
‘Sad Self-Justification’ and ‘Repentance Rather than Rationalization’, respectively.
55
 
Ramsey then wrote a letter on May 10 to Kent Knutson, editor of Dialog, responding 
to Hoyer and Dahl. It was published later that year under the heading ‘Two 
Extremes: Ramsey Replies to His Critics’.
56
 
 Both essays criticize his refusal to condemn US participation in Vietnam. 
Hoyer observes, ‘the sadness lies in the fact that [Ramsey has] left no room for 
Christian ambivalence and doubt, no room for repentance’.
57
 In response Ramsey 
invokes a similar distinction to the one noted previously between ostensible justice 
and objective justice. He writes,   
I do not regard a line of ethical or political reasoning which just-ifies an 
action over its alternatives as thereby ‘justifying’ human agents or persons 
before God, rightwising their standing or making them righteous. For Hoyer, 
justification has the effect of levelling all distinctions between the just and 
the unjust, and the relatively more or less just; and this I do not think was the 





Hoyer misunderstands this impulse to protect the role of relative judgments in the 
Vietnam conflict. As McKenzie notes, ‘Hoyer has confused the horizontal with the 
                                                
55
 Robert Hoyer, ‘Sad Self-Justification’, Dialog 6, no. 2 (1967): 142-144; Gordon J. Dahl, 
‘Repentance Rather than Rationalization’, Dialog 6, no. 2 (1967): 144-145. 
56
 Paul Ramsey to Kent Knutson, May 10, 1967, Box 14, Ramsey Papers. It was published as Paul 
Ramsey, ‘Two Extremes: Ramsey Replies to His Critics’, Dialog 6, no. 3 (1967): 218-219. I will cite 
in this paper from the original version of the editorial letter in the Ramsey Papers. 
57
 Hoyer, ‘Sad Self-Justification’, 142.   
58
 Ramsey to Knutson. One example of Hoyer “levelling” all distinctions is his claim that ‘All of the 
arguments based on Viet Cong evil can be and are used by the thief who steals from the heartless 
banker; the priests who crucified Jesus lest the whole nation perish. We all justify what we do. To 
argue justification on the basis of another man’s evil is far from the moral order. In this day of striving 
for understanding, it is not even honest’. Hoyer, ‘Sad Self-Justification’, 142. 
 86 
vertical. Or better, he has left no room for the horizontal’.
59
 Ramsey’s point is that 
while ostensible judgments surely do not justify an individual before God, neither 
does the universal need for forgiveness “level” all earthly distinctions. What is 
“levelled” by repentance is the hubris of our judgments, not the judgments 
themselves.  
 Hoyer also overlooks the fact that without moral distinctions there is no basis 
for choosing one action over another. Ramsey says,  
One really cannot suck everything into ‘justification’, ‘faith’, ‘repentance’; or 
level everything before these grand moments in the Christian life. Not least of 
the telling arguments against this is that then there would be no reason why 
even Lutherans worry so much about what they should do. Even in luminous 




The problem with a theological interpretation of political action which abandons 
moral distinctions is that the void is quickly replaced by a cultural alternative. In the 
example of the Vietnam war, he is acutely aware that an American ethic will take the 
place of a Christian ethic. Thus, he warns,  
If we do not prolong Christian moral judgments into life and show that life-
situations are corrigible to Christian ethical analysis, and that even Lutherans 
have justifiable ways of telling what they should or should not do, then the 
consequence will not be shapeless behavior in which one act is like any other 
before God. The result will rather be that Christian life and thought will be 
shaped by the ‘evil military necessity/pacifist’ syndrome. Something from the 
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Setting aside his jabs at Lutherans, these two comments exhibit his anxiety over the 
consequences of Hoyer’s logic. A theology of repentance of that sort threatens to 
eliminate any possibility of a constructive moral and political good.  
 His response to Dahl, though shorter, is essentially the same. He says, ‘you 
could not call for “repentance rather than rationalization” unless by some alternative 
form of rationalization you first established what it is we politically should repent 
of’.
62
 He insists on the fundamental priority of moral norms to any functional notion 
of political repentance. He also rejects any appeal to repentance as a way of avoiding 
difficult political determinations of right and wrong.  
 The following year, in ‘Politics as Science, Not Prophecy’, Ramsey observes 
that ‘theologically speaking, we grasp something of God’s overruling of man’s 
ruling and self-ruling. To use this notion in our analysis of present experience, 
however, to introduce it into our analysis of the prospective shape of things to come 
or (hopefully) to be given to experience ahead is always a category mistake’.
63
 The 
category mistake made by Hoyer and Dahl is one of “levelling” all moral judgments 
under the weight of the “grand moments” of the Christian life. What becomes most 
clear in his response is the attempt to avoid that mistake by appreciating the proper 
tension between a need for human judgments and the transcendence of divine 
judgment. Repentance is made possible only by the prior identification of moral 
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3.3 Repentance as a Theological Foundation for Ramsey’s Political Ethics 
 At the conclusion of the previous chapter I noted that Ramsey takes 
Niebuhr’s account of repentance in a new direction by emphasizing the importance 
of constructive political action. In this chapter the aim has been to illuminate the 
theological rationale for that move by examining several of his explicit discussions 
of repentance in print and in personal correspondence. The remaining task is to make 
several concluding observations about the function of repentance in his political 
theology. These will help pave the way for my return to the topic in chapters seven 
and eight.  
 First, notice the emphasis on political judgment. This tends to appear in the 
form of deference to those in positions of political authority, but our attention is 
directed toward the structure of the political act rather than the transcendence of the 
agent. In his response to David Little Ramsey speaks in favor of ‘not so much the 
levelling of kings and emperors as the elevation of the private consciences of free 
men in political initiatives and resistance’.
64
 The “elevation” brought about by this 
emphasis on judgment is one that promotes discrimination between political 
alternatives on any level of authority.   
 This is because his principle theological distinction is between divine 
judgment and human judgments. There is a recurring interplay between that which is 
human – limited judgments, ostensible justice, knowledge of repentance for 
unrighteousness, etc.  – and that which is divine – eternal judgment, objective justice, 
knowledge of repentance for righteousness, etc. He repeatedly insists on the 
significance of the distinction precisely because he wants both to avoid the 
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presumption that human judgments reflect the divine perspective and to grant to 
limited judgments their due regard in created existence. He attributes great moral 
import to particular political judgments of justice and injustice while simultaneously 
contextualizing those judgments in a theological account of divine transcendence. 
 Ramsey learned from Niebuhr that the suffering of the innocent in war should 
focus our attention on the ambiguity of human political claims to justice. This leads 
to recognition of our contingency and the description of human judgments as only 
ever ostensible in light of divine judgment. We must add to this his acute sense of the 
temporal character of human agency. One feature of deferred repentance is the 
insistence that achievement of political goods takes time. He also orders his theology 
of repentance around sensitivity to the proper role of contrition subsequent to sin.  In 
this way his reflections on repentance demonstrate the reliance of all moral political 
judgments on a prior theological account of certain features of human interaction, 
namely, the contingency and temporality of created existence. We will return to this 
point again later. 
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Section II 
Covenant and Political Decision-Making 
 
 The second section of this study examines the concept of covenant in 
Ramsey’s political theology. In Basic Christian Ethics he uses social contract 
philosophy as a heuristic device for understanding the political implications of 
Israel’s covenant with Yahweh. His later disillusionment with Rousseau leads him to 
turn to Karl Barth’s doctrine of creation as a foundation for political ethics. I argue 
that he develops his esse/bene esse view of politics out of Barth’s internal 
basis/external basis formula. Finally, I demonstrate the role covenant plays in his 
understanding of moral theory and ecclesiological limitation of the church as 
‘theoretician’. This highlights his sensitivity to the contingency and temporality of 
created existence in the articulation of a political theology rooted in covenant.  
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Chapter Four 
Ramsey’s Analogical Reading of Covenant and Contract 
 
Political decision also should be guided by the righteousness of the God we know 
through the covenant. … As long as God’s covenant endures, human community 
cannot rightly be grounded in anything else.
1
 
– Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics 
  
Covenant is as ubiquitous in Ramsey’s theological ethics as repentance is 
absent. Jeffrey Siker notes that ‘covenant is the biblical theme around which he 
chooses to organize his appropriation of biblical ethics’.
2
 It appears as early as the 
1940s in articles preceding Basic Christian Ethics and as late as the 1980s in a 
published letter responding to James Gustafson’s interpretation of his work. Given its 
commanding presence, it is unsurprising that in an interview late in his career he 
refers to covenant as the Leitmotif of his work.
3
  
In his political writings the concept tends to come and go. It features heavily 
in Basic Christian Ethics and Christian Ethics and the Sit-In.
4
 Yet, his reliance on 
covenant in his principal publications on war from the 1960s is so concealed that 
William Werpehowsi observes, ‘the virtual absence of talk of creation, covenant, and 
fellow humanity in Ramsey’s political ethics is especially striking’.
5
 It appears again 
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in his final book, Speak Up for Just War or Pacifism, and in the previously published 
appendix to that volume, ‘A Political Ethics Context for Strategic Thinking’.
6
  
The aim of the next three chapters is to trace the concept of covenant in 
Ramsey’s political theology. Because he tends to be inconsistent with his use of the 
term, this task requires wrestling with those passages which employ it explicitly, as 
well as his introduction of other terms and concepts which take its significance for 
granted. In this chapter I will examine the way his early work uses an analogy with 
the social contract of Jean Jacques Rousseau to underscore the political significance 
of Israel’s covenant with Yahweh. On the basis of this comparison he argues that all 




First, however, I want to take note of a few basic ideas from his doctoral 
research at Yale University. As with the discussion of repentance, I believe 
Ramsey’s critique of “absolute idealism” provides a helpful point of entry into issues 
that arise in his later work. Thus, I will begin by offering initial comments on 
Rousseau’s role in ‘The Nature of Man in the Philosophy of Josiah Royce and 
Bernard Bosanquet’.
8
    
 
 
                                                
6
 Paul Ramsey, Speak Up for Just War or Pacifism (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1998); ‘A Political Ethics Context for Strategic Thinking’, in Strategic Thinking and 
Its Moral Implications, ed. Morton A. Kaplan (Chicago: University of Chicago Center for Policy 
Study, 1973), 101-147. 
7
 Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, 367.  
8
 Paul Ramsey, ‘The Nature of Man in the Philosophy of Josiah Royce and Bernard Bosanquet’ (Ph.D. 
thesis, Yale University, 1943), Box 53, The Paul Ramsey Papers, Special Collections and 
Manuscripts, Perkins-Bostock Library, Duke University. For extended treatments see D. Stephen 
Long, Tradition, Tragedy, Transformism: The Ethics of Paul Ramsey (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1993) and Kevin Carnahan, ‘Sin, Guilt, Justice and War: Paul Ramsey and Reinhold Niebuhr on the 
Moral Framework for Just War Thought’, Ph.D. diss., Southern Methodist University, 2007.  
 93 
4.1 Initial Comments on Rousseau in Ramsey’s Doctoral Research  
 I mentioned above that this chapter is occupied with Ramsey’s use of 
Rousseau’s social contract as a heuristic device for identifying the political 
implications of Israel’s covenant with Yahweh. Rousseau appears in several of his 
early writings as a kind of flintstone on which he sharpens his understanding of other 
thinkers and ideas.
9
 This is certainly the case in his doctoral writings on Josiah 
Royce and Bernard Bosanquet. He marshals philosophical points from The Social 
Contract and The Discourses throughout the thesis to make various observations 
about Bosanquet’s philosophy (Royce, too, though to a lesser extent).
10
 Most 
importantly, however, Rousseau sharpens Ramsey’s appreciation for the value of the 
absolute idealist philosophical emphasis on the individual nature of the human self in 
light of an Other, or “Absolute”.  
 In chapter one I observed that “absolute idealism” draws his attention to the 
relationship between the finite self and the infinite “Absolute”. He recognizes the 
general will in Rousseau (as well as in Royce and Bosanquet) as ‘a sort of lesser case 
of the Absolute’.
11
 The general will is not the “Absolute” – that, for Ramsey, is God 
– but he contends that the idea of the general will is able to shed light, by analogy, on 
the nature of the relationship between God and humanity. For example, he sees the 
transcendence of the general will over the individual as analogous to the radical 
transcendence of the divine will over any exercise of human agency.  
                                                
9
 See, for instance, Paul Ramsey, ‘A Theory of Democracy: Idealistic or Christian?’, Ethics 56, no. 4 
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 Problems emerge, however, when the God/general will analogy shifts into the 
realm of ethics. Ramsey expresses sharp disagreements with the absolute idealist 
belief that the “self” is the source of moral obligation. This view is particularly 
influenced by Kant and his ‘view of duty as self-imposed’.
12
 More importantly for 
this discussion, it also inherits the idea from Rousseau’s view of a social contract 
where ‘the individual by his own consent and action places upon himself a social 
obligation’.
13
 Ramsey rejects both of these accounts and their influences on “absolute 
idealism”, saying, ‘we agree that there are duties of the self to itself. … But, we deny 
that in this consists the entirety of man’s obligation or that it is the whole of ethics’.
14
 
 He rejects Rousseau as a foundation for ethics and criticizes both Royce and 
Bosanquet for their failure to account for the will of God in their concepts of 
obligation. He believes they take from Rousseau the idea that the self must teach 
itself what it really wants (which, consequently, produces a tension between what the 
self is and what it wants to be). But even if this is true in the sense that ‘our 
restlessness is perhaps the source of the knowledge of duty even to ourselves’, he 
insists nonetheless that ‘our restlessness comes from our nature, and our nature 
comes from God’.
15
 The dialectical, two-sided self cannot be the root of moral 
obligation because ‘a proper generic definition of obligation is the “will of God”’.
16
 
                                                
12




 Ibid., 199. As mentioned in chapter one, Ramsey’s tendency to summarize concepts from Royce 
and Bosanquet makes it difficult to locate his critical voice. Statements that begin with “we”, 
however, typically indicate that he is submitting his final analysis of the material. 
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 What Ramsey takes from this engagement with Rousseau is the firm 
conviction that moral obligation can only be rooted in the will of God. Thus, 
Rousseau is of limited use for ethics because of the glaring ‘need for an object of 
obligation other than the self’.
17
 He contributes to the analysis of “absolute idealism” 
by highlighting the failure of Bosanquet and Royce to ‘assimilate their notion of 
obligation to the traditional Christian view of the “will of God” and to the essence of 
the religious experience’.
18
 These developments contribute to the discussion at hand 
because they prepare Ramsey for his use of Rousseau in a similar manner in Basic 
Christian Ethics. There he compares the divide between the general will and the 
individual will in the social contract with the asymmetrical relationship between 
Israel and Yahweh. That, however, may be to get too far ahead of myself. First I 
must answer a few questions about what he finds so attractive in the 
covenant/contract analogy.  
 
4.2 The Covenant/Contract Analogy in Basic Christian Ethics 
 On August 1, 1949, Ramsey received a letter from William Savage at Charles 
Scribner’s Sons echoing the ‘excellent report’ from their reader and guaranteeing 
publication of the manuscript of Basic Christian Ethics.
19
 That reader was Reinhold 
Niebuhr. His review urges publication, but voices two concerns: first, that it ‘does 
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 Ibid., 202.  
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Ramsey subjects “absolute idealism” to a fundamental critique by Christianity. See, for instance, his 
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York: Plenum Press, 1981), 163. 
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 William Savage to Paul Ramsey, August 1, 1949, Box 32, Ramsey Papers.  
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not deal with that side of ethics which is concerned with “institutions” or the 
organized social arrangements of mankind’, and second, that ‘he does not elucidate 
how the “love” ethic of the Scriptures and of Christian life is related to the rational 
norms of justice and the equity by which the life of the world is ordered and its 
institutions organized’.
20
 Niebuhr submits that one or two additional chapters would 
be sufficient to address these issues.  
 Ramsey initially resisted the idea of elongating the manuscript, suggesting 
instead that he be given the option of revision within five years time.
21
 Eventually, 
however, he supplied three additional chapters, the last of which (chapter ten) was 
‘The Religious Foundation for Community Life’. This was a version of an essay 
published earlier that year in The Journal of Religion titled ‘Elements of a Biblical 
Political Theory’.
22
 He not only believed that this essay would address several of 
Niebuhr’s concerns, but as his career developed he came to appreciate its material 
and often referred critics back to it as evidence of his early understanding of 
covenant as an ethical concept.
23
 
 A central aspect of this important essay is his claim that engaging with the 
‘early modern social philosophers’ will produce ‘greatly increased understanding of 
the biblical notion of covenant’.
24
 But of all the available philosophical and 
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 Ibid. The review of Basic Christian Ethic was blind for Ramsey at the time. He reveals in later 
correspondence that ‘Reine Niebuhr’ was the reviewer. See Paul Ramsey to Gilbert Meilander, 
September 18, 1981, Box 17, Ramsey Papers. D.S. Long was the first scholar to make this connection. 
See Long, Tragedy, 35.  
21
 Paul Ramsey to William Savage, March 7, 1948, Box 32, Ramsey Papers. 
22
 Ramsey, ‘Elements’.  
23
 See, for instance, Paul Ramsey, ‘A Letter to James Gustafson’, Journal of Religious Ethics 13 
(1985): 74. He also offered a testy response to an inquiry from an equally testy Ph.D. student, 
reminding him that ‘first, the Biblical material concerning God’s acts in times past, and, second, the 
final chapter of BCE, were not accidents’. Paul Ramsey to David Schmidt, January 8, 1982, Box 25, 
Ramsey Papers. In fact, without the publisher’s insistence that he follow Niebuhr’s recommendations, 
the final chapter would not have appeared at all.  
24
 Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, 368.  
 97 
theological resources, why does he choose the social contract as his principal point of 
comparison with Israel’s covenant? It is worth keeping in mind that he lectured the 
material in Basic Christian Ethics in introductory courses at Princeton for several 
years prior to its publication. Rousseau would certainly have been an accessible 
thinker (and widely available text) for undergraduate teaching. He notes in 
‘Elements’ that ‘on hearing the word “covenant”, we are likely to think of … the idea 
of “social contract” employed by early modern political theory’.
25
 He is likely to 
have found the covenant/contract analogy a useful device in his undergraduate 
teaching. Furthermore, it seems to have been effective: Basic Christian Ethics was 
written as a textbook and sold quite well throughout the fifties due to heavy use in 
college and seminary classrooms.
26
 
 That is also how Ramsey received his instruction on the material. He 
acknowledges that his covenant/contract discussion is ‘greatly indebted to studies 
pursued under the direction of Professor Charles W. Hendel of Yale University and 
to his illuminating interpretation of the social philosophers’.
27
 Hendel was head of 
the philosophy department and Ramsey took two courses with him in the early 
1940s. Much of the analysis in Basic Christian Ethics follows the structure and 
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 Finally, he takes up Rousseau in order to correct an erroneous interpretation 
by Millar Burrows in An Outline of Biblical Theology.
29
 Ramsey sees in social 
contract theories a fundamental divide ‘according to whether two contracts were 
assumed or only one’.
30
 Single-contract theories establish ‘absolute sovereignty’ 
because they require no further agreement for the foundation of political authority. 
Double-contract theories, by contrast, first establish ‘limited sovereignty’ and then 
negotiate a second contract for political authority on the basis of inalienable human 
rights.
31
 The problem with Burrows’ account is not only that ‘he does not distinguish 
clearly enough’ between these two theories, but that he also fails to appreciate the 
implications of the distinction when considering them alongside Israel’s covenant.
32
 
Ramsey is adamant that the covenant cannot be similar to a double-contract theory – 
the parallel would indicate that Yahweh possesses only limited sovereignty and Israel 
retains certain inalienable rights in the relationship. Thus, he posits over and against 
Burrows the belief that in the nature of the case any fundamental social contract must 
be primarily one or the other.   
 The disagreement allows Ramsey to argue that ‘without ceasing to be fully 
aware of the danger of misleading analogies, it is still true to say that … Israel’s 
covenant was more like a single covenant establishing absolute sovereignty’.
33
 This 
sets in motion his development of the analogy between Rousseau’s social contract 
and Israel’s covenant with Yahweh. I want to briefly examine three features of that 
analogy – his emphasis on absolute sovereignty, the formation of the political 
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community and the significance of consent. This will afford a critical perspective on 
his early use of covenant as a theological foundation for political ethics.  
 
4.2.1 Sovereignty, Community and the Significance of Consent 
 Because of the disagreement with Burrows, Ramsey is principally attracted to 
the analogy for its ability to highlight the absolute sovereignty of Yahweh. 
Rousseau’s social contract assigns an unqualified sovereignty to the general will that 
is ‘simple and single, and it cannot be divided without being destroyed’.
34
 Ramsey 
observes a similarly transcendent and indivisible political authority in ‘the sovereign 
God [who] cannot be represented except by himself’.
35
 Despite his enthusiasm for 
this comparison, he also acknowledges that a significant dissimilarity plagues the 
analogy. Whereas the social contract brings into existence the general will (and 
therein a sovereign political authority), Ramsey sees clearly that the story of Israel 
involves a pre-existing political authority calling the Hebrew people into covenantal 
relationship. Thus, a significant difference arises ‘mainly from the fact that Rousseau 
constructs a sovereign while Israel recognizes one’.
36
 
 Earlier in Basic Christian Ethics he suggests that no amount of self-interest 
can ‘move across the border where community still needs to be created if it is to exist 
at all. This is the work of Christian love’.
37
 What this means in the discussion of 
sovereignty is that Yahweh precedes and calls Israel in a way discontinuous with the 
formation of the general will. He observes that ‘God did not depend on the fate of the 
nation or on his recognition and guarantee of the rights of the people; these depended 
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 Israel is able to recognize the sovereign that precedes them precisely 
because Yahweh ‘had already decisively spoken and revealed his purpose to them in 
delivering them from Egypt’.
39
 In this way he uses the social contract as a heuristic 
device to call attention to the absolute (and eternal) sovereignty of God.  
 Along with this set of observations come two further covenant/contract 
parallels. One is that both the social contract and Israel’s covenant yield collective 
political bodies. Rousseau sets out to protect individual freedoms that are threatened 
by the state of nature and natural, physical inequalities. The result is a contract which 
produces ‘a moral and collective body made up of as many members as the assembly 
has voices, and which receives by this same act its unity, its common self, its life and 
its will’.
40
 Ramsey likens this to the way Yahweh’s creative action ‘served as a kind 
of charter or national constitution’ for the Hebrew people.
41
 He says, ‘in covenanting 
with Israel [Yahweh] made her a nation’.
42
 The analogy highlights the fact that it was 
‘the covenant with Yahweh by which the community came into existence’.
43
 
Here, however, Ramsey must be careful not to overlook the substantially 
divergent nature of those political communities. One of the two aspects that 
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Rousseau identifies in natural humanity in The Discourses is self-interest.
44
 Civil 
society secures individual freedoms because it is rooted in self-interest (and with 
self-interest, property). He says, ‘the first man who, having enclosed a piece of 
ground, to whom it occurred to him to say this is mine, and found people sufficiently 
simple to believe him, was the true founder of civil society’.
45
 The problem is that a 
political community founded on self-interest (and for the protection of self-interest) 
cannot sustain itself forever. In The Social Contract this translates into a perpetually 
degenerate general will. Rousseau says, ‘the body politic, just like the body of a man, 




Contrast this with the eschatological destiny of Israel. Ramsey highlights 
Isaiah 24:5, noting, ‘Israel’s unusual share in the relationship is described as 
“breaking the everlasting covenant”, breaking the unbreakable!’
47
 While Israel’s 
responsibility is to be faithfully obedient, the covenant is never reliant on her 
obedience. It is eternally upheld by the promise of Yahweh to ‘maintain intact the 
covenant he commands’.
48
 He notes, ‘every Jew knew that the fidelity already 
displayed by God in the initiative he had taken to establish it could surely be counted 
on to keep the covenant secure’.
49
 Even in light of the contrast of their divergent 
ends, the contract/covenant analogy functions as a heuristic device to demonstrate 
Israel’s creation and destiny as a political community.  
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Finally, the last parallel concerns the significance of consent in the 
establishment of contract and covenant. In an early essay from 1946 Ramsey voices 
concerns with ‘traditional defences’ of democracy which ‘lose all sight of human 
sinfulness’.
50
 He points to Rousseau as an example of a thinker who can be used to 
correct that error, saying, ‘the truth of [Rousseau’s] position, we may provisionally 
concede, is that roughly the best practical machinery for assuring that the conditions 
be always the same for all is that every vote be counted. As a practical method, 
consent comes in the long run as close to normative generality as those who are “but 
men” are likely to achieve by any other device’.
51
 This funds his claim that ‘because 
of the sinfulness of man, we must be democratic in technique, as well as in the 
principle that rights be accorded to all’.
52
 This early interest in the role of consent in 
political relations translates in the covenant/contract analogy into an emphasis on 
Israel’s faithful response to Yahweh as a morally significant element of the covenant 
relationship.  
When speaking of Israel’s obedience to covenant, he says, ‘the people Israel 
are not only chosen by God, but they also “choose” Him for their God, and 
voluntarily enter into the covenant with him, freely undertaking to obey His laws’.
53
 
He also speaks of ‘the “ratification” or popular consent given the original covenant 
which God “commanded”’.
54
 The idea of collective ratification in the social contract 
is useful as a heuristic device because it approximates the response demanded of 
Israel upon the formation of the covenant.  
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But this parallel, too, introduces problems for his understanding of covenant. 
Rousseau posits that morality is wholly absent in pre-contractual human relations.
55
 
He says, ‘this transition from the state of nature to the civil state produces a most 
remarkable change in man … endowing his actions with the morality they previously 
lacked’.
56
 Because the social contract precedes the identification of humans as moral 
agents, consent is a precondition for obligation. That is to say, if morality requires a 
political body and a political body requires consent through contract, then moral 
obligation becomes to a large degree consensual. While he may be willing to 
embrace a sense of “ratification” on the part of Israel, Ramsey is wholly unwilling to 
root moral obligation in their collective consent.  
 
4.2.2 Consent and Rousseau’s Emphasis on the Self 
The issue of consent and Rousseau’s emphasis on the self merits further 
treatment for what it reveals about Ramsey’s approach to the political significance of 
covenant. I noted at the beginning of this chapter that his early philosophical 
engagements with Rousseau in ‘The Nature of Man’ drove him to reject the self as 
the ground of moral obligation. There he criticized Bosanquet and Royce for their 
proximity to Rousseau, as well as for their failure to account for the will of God in 
concepts of obligation. He continues this line of thought in notes from the years 
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before Basic Christian Ethics, warning that the attempt to use the self as ‘the source 
of obligation’ is ‘a subtle continuation of self-interest’ which ‘cultivates idolatry’.
57
 
In 1946 he writes that ‘mere consent does not suffice to determine the nature of 
political obligation. Since consent itself may be sinful, it is obliged to be right; it 
ought to agree only to what is just’.
58
 If Ramsey is attracted to the parallel need for 
“ratification” or consent in covenant and contract, he is equally eager to avoid 
adopting Rousseau’s account of moral obligation rooted in the self.  
In Basic Christian Ethics he does this first by observing that both moral 
obligation and natural order are grounded in God’s covenant faithfulness. In the Old 
Testament ‘two things filled the Hebrew mind with awe: the starry heavens above 
declaring the glory of God and the moral law within historical covenants’.
59
 
Yahweh’s initiation of the covenant supplies Israel with ‘a nature as a religious 
nation which can no more be broken than you can break his covenant with the day 
and his covenant with the night so that day and night no longer come at their 
appointed times (Jer. 33:20, 21)!’
60
 This reinforces the divine will as the source of 
moral obligation and the radical obedience expected of Israel.  
He also avoids the pitfalls of Rousseau’s emphasis on the self by suggesting 
that ‘to find a closer parallel to Israel’s covenant, we should not go to John Locke’s 
limitation of sovereignty but to Jean Bodin and Hugo Grotius’.
61
 Bodin appreciates 
that ‘there might be some recognized authority to give law without consent’.
62
 His 
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political authority ‘rules by a kind of implicit “consent”, but consent is not necessary 
to his law’.
63
 Ramsey thus uses Bodin to highlight the importance of consent without 
making it an essential element of moral obligation (law). 
This approximates the transcendence of Yahweh over the covenant and the 
idea that ‘Israel … was under obligation to God, who himself was not made 
sovereign by contract but by his own strong hand’.
64
 In terms of moral obligation this 
highlights ‘Israel’s acknowledgement of the covenant by which she consented not to 
have to consent to law or to have a part in determining what is just’.
65
 Bodin’s 
appreciation for the ability of political authority to demand obligation without 
consent more clearly resembles Israel’s sovereign than Rousseau’s account of 
sovereignty built on self-interest.  
Grotius also describes political sovereignty in a way more similar to covenant 
than the social contract. He argues that ‘in the formation of a civil society or in its 
subjection to a ruler or rulers, a promise is made … to abide by whatever the 
majority, or those entrusted with power, should decide’.
66
 Because the political 
subjects ‘are not thereby demonstrably superior to the person so constituted’, it is 
unintelligible for individuals to transfer the right of governance to a sovereign and 
simultaneously retain that right to themselves.
67
 Ramsey says, ‘the people keep 
possession of themselves and their personal liberty, but their civil liberty and “the 
perpetual right of governing them, as they are a people,” these are alienated’.
68
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This transference of ‘rights of a governing kind’ places upon the sovereign 
the responsibility not to abandon the collective body or to ‘turn them over to the 
governance of another’.
69
 The security of the relationship rests not on continued 
consent but on the protection of the sovereign. Ramsey believes this more adequately 
reflects the Old Testament notion that once Israel responded to being chosen by 
Yahweh, not even disobedience could terminate the covenant. It was paradoxically 
understood as ‘breaking the unbreakable!’
70
 If ‘consent’ is to be ‘at all a proper 
manner of speaking’ of the covenant relationship, ‘do they not consent to God’s 
“perpetual right of governing them, as they are a people”, themselves retaining no 
rights of a governing kind, nor yet the right of revoking what they have conferred?’
71
 
The shift toward Bodin and Grotius and away from Rousseau on the issue of 
consent is symptomatic of the covenant/contract analogy on the whole. By that I 
mean that in his explanation of the usefulness of the social contract as a heuristic 
device Ramsey is consistently forced to push away from the emphasis on self-
interest. This is the reason for his reminders that he is ‘in the midst of wide analogy’ 
and ‘fully aware of the danger of misleading analogies’.
72
 Despite those warnings, I 
do not think he is completely free of such danger. I want to offer two critical 
observations of his account. The first concerns his inadequate support for the 
transition from covenant as the foundation of Israel as political community to 
covenant as the ground of the ‘human community’.
73
 The second involves his 
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attempt to link an emphasis on consent with divine will as the source of all moral 
obligation.  
 
4.3 From Israel to the ‘Human Community’ 
Ramsey opens the discussion of covenant and social contract theory by 
observing that ‘in the Bible God appears as a covenant-making, covenant-restoring 
and covenant-fulfilling God; Israel, as people of the covenant and a covenant-
breaking people’.
74
 He adds that covenant is ‘the foundation of human life in 
community’.
75
 This transition – from the community of Israel to the human 
community – takes place on a number of occasions in the final chapter of Basic 
Christian Ethics. He notes that study of Israel’s covenant enables us to attend to the 
political ‘relevance or irrelevance’ of the sovereignty of God.
76
 It also ‘gives man 
whereon to stand in opposing the present shape of the world’.
77
 Most explicitly, he 
says ‘political decision also should be guided by the righteousness of God we know 
through the covenant … As long as God’s covenant endures, human community 
cannot rightly be grounded in anything else’.
78
 Each of these moves demonstrates his 
belief that the political significance of Israel’s covenant applies to all political 
communities.   
 My concern over this interpretive move has to do with his lack of theological 
rationale for the transition. Ramsey simply fails to spell out how Yahweh’s 
relationship with Israel relates to the human community as a whole. The answer, of 
course, is that the work of covenant-love in creation displays the same faithfulness to 
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all humanity that Yahweh shows to Israel. Her redemption reveals Yahweh’s 
sovereignty to the nations just as the natural order calls Israel to remember her 
obedience to the Creator. But Ramsey lacks a doctrine of creation on which to rest 
these claims.  
He is not without the resources to make this connection more explicit. In 
unpublished notes on these subjects he observes ‘the covenant with a chosen people 
is a part of God’s purpose to save man in general from the dire consequences and 
universal sway of sin’.
79
 Thus, ‘the nationalistic promise is not given without other 
words: “in thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed”’.
80
 Even in the 
discussion of Burrows he is sensitive to the significance of nature in the Old 
Testament – the prophets such as Jeremiah ‘spoke of these natural occurrences as due 
to “covenant”’.
81
 Yet, the closest he comes to connecting creation and covenant is to 
cite approvingly Paul Minear’s claim that ‘in creating the world, God made a 
covenant with it’ and add ‘in covenanting with Israel, he made her a nation’.
82
  
I want to suggest that his failure to establish a theological foundation for the 
move from Israel to the human community can be partly attributed to his attention to 
Rousseau. Take, for instance, their radically divergent interpretations of the covenant 
of Noah. Rousseau employs the flood narrative in his so-called Second Discourse to 
highlight the non-historical nature of the social contract, saying,  
 
It did not even enter the mind of most of our philosophers to doubt that the 
state of Nature had existed whereas it is evident, from reading the Holy 
Scriptures, that the first Man having received some lights and Precepts 
immediately from God was not himself in that state, and that, if the Writings 
of Moses are granted the credence owed them by every Christian 
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Philosopher, it has to be denied that, even before the Flood, Men were ever in 
the pure state of Nature, unless they relapsed into it by some extraordinary 





Humanity, if not with Adam then surely with the Noahic covenant, must have 
received direction from God which drew them beyond the state of nature. This 
underscores the discontinuity of the social contract with the natural order of 
humanity.  
 Ramsey, by contrast, uses the flood narrative as his first example that ‘the 
covenant enacted in history has the steadfastness of an order of nature’.
84
 He says, ‘in 
the time of Noah, God covenanted everlastingly with “every living creature of every 
sort that is on the earth” (Gen. 9:16), imposing upon the rainfall his decree, 
establishing its barriers and doors’.
85
 The Noahic covenant following the judgment of 
the flood affirms and restores creation and the created state of nature (and seals that 
covenant within nature through the rainbow of Genesis 9). It confirms to Israel the 
place their covenant holds in the created order. 
 The problem this example highlights is the way Ramsey’s attraction to the 
similarities between Rousseau’s contract and Israel’s covenant prevents him from 
attending to the more significant relationship between covenant and creation. The 
Noahic covenant is with “every living creature”, not simply Israel. This provides an 
opportunity for him to explain how the political implications of the Noahic covenant 
extend to all human communities. In fact, he makes precisely that claim many years 
later in ‘A Political Ethics Context for Strategic Thinking’.
86
 But in Basic Christian 
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Ethics the covenant/contract analogy distracts him from providing the adequate 
structural (i.e., theological) support to sustain a transition from Israel’s covenant to 
the human community. 
 
4.4. Grotius and the Union of Consent and Creation 
 My second critical observation of Ramsey’s covenant/contract analogy 
concerns his attempt to link an emphasis on consent with an account of moral 
obligation rooted in divine will. I mentioned above that he is drawn to the analogy in 
part because the notion of “consent” or “ratification” gestures toward the moral 
responsibility demanded of Israel in the covenant relationship with Yahweh. 
Unfortunately, he spends the majority of his time engaging with what he takes to be 
the more distant point of comparison: Rousseau. Only at the end of the discussion 
does he turn to closer parallels of Bodin and Grotius briefly to correct the centrality 
of self-interest in Rousseau’s account. I believe a closer look at Grotius’ 
contributions to political theology would have given Ramsey a resource for 
emphasizing divine will as the source of moral obligation and the demand for faithful 
response. Furthermore, comparison of Ramsey and Grotius contributes to my 
observation that his political use of covenant suffers from the absence of a doctrine 
of creation.  I want thus to turn briefly to selected observations from Grotius in The 
Right of War and Peace.
87
 
                                                                                                                                     
used to ground our moral political relationships. In an interview conducted in his office in 1986 he 
observes, ‘How in all the relations of life do we respond responsibly to one another and to God? We 
are a people covenantally related together, in a nation. We resolve to be together as a people through 
time’. Vaux, et. al., eds., Covenants, 256. 
87
 LeRoy Walters discusses both Ramsey and Grotius in ‘Historical Applications of the Just War 
Theory: Four Case Studies in Normative Ethics’, in Love and Society: Essays in the Ethics of Paul 
Ramsey, ed. David H. Smith and James T. Johnson, (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1974), 115-138. 
Unfortunately his aim is not to explore similarities in their thought but to ‘complement the work of 
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 The key to understanding Grotius’ contribution to this discussion is to seize 
upon his insistence that pre-political humanity is still essentially social. That sociality 
is present because of God’s work in creation and the influence of covenant on human 
nature. He says, ‘the mother of natural Right is human nature, which would incline 
us to one another’s society even if we had no needs at all. The mother of civil Right, 
on the other hand, is obligation created by agreement, and since this derives its force 
from natural Right, nature may be said to be its grandmother’.
88
 Although the 
familial analogy is a bit confusing, his point is simply that civil society emerges as a 
consequence of our (created) social nature rather than self-interest.  
 With self-interest removed from its central role in the institution of political 
obligation, Grotius is free to locate that obligation in God. He says,  
In former times it was commonly believed that each person had over his own 
life the same right which he had over other things that come under ownership, 
and that this right, by tacit or expressed consent, passed from individuals to 
the state. … But now that a truer knowledge has taught us that lordship over 
life is reserved for God, it follows that no one by his individual consent can 





Consent is not entirely removed from the picture, but it is rooted in God’s reservation 
of “lordship over life”.  
 This brief glimpse into Grotius’ perspective reveals that adequate 
attentiveness to creation and the role of covenant in human nature can produce a 
more attractive account of political obligation. He also reveals the extent to which 
                                                                                                                                     
Ramsey by attempting to reconstruct the social-historical situation in which several of the just war 
theorists thought and wrote’ (115). 
88
 Grotius, ‘The Right of War and Peace’, 795. This selection is taken from the prolegomena, section 
sixteen. Ramsey’s typed notes on The Right of War and Peace highlight these passages. See 
unpublished notes, Box 43, Ramsey Papers.   
89
 Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis libri tres, trans. Francis W. Kelsey, Classics of International 
Law, no. 3 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913-1925), 743. This passage is taken from chapter xi, section 
xviii, section I. I cite from the Kelsey edition here simply because the passage is not included in the 
selections in From Irenaeus to Grotius.  
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Ramsey could have highlighted the role of consent in political society without 
pinning it to the logic of the social contract. As with my previous criticism, Ramsey 
was not without the resources to make these connections. As early as 1946 he 
recognizes a tension between Rousseau and a Christian account of creation: ‘Genesis 
understands sin as sin before God and therefore apprehends it with intensity as an 
ultimate infraction … Rousseau understands sin as sin over man’.
90
 Furthermore, as I 
noted at the start of this chapter, his doctoral research announces that Rousseau is a 
distracting influence on theological and philosophical attempts to understand moral 
obligation as rooted in the will of God.    
 He also recognizes in unpublished notes from the 1940s that the concept of 
covenant is capable of carrying such a theological load. He uses the prophet Nathan’s 
rebuke of David for Uriah’s death in 2 Samuel 12 to make this point, writing, 
‘Nathan does not say that Uriah, Bathsheba’s wife (sic, husband), was one of the 
elders of the people with whom David covenanted, so that the people’s covenant has 
been broken. He says God’s covenant has been broken. Neither king’s will nor 
popular will but God’s will!’
91
 Yet, even here he lacks the move toward a doctrine of 
creation as a way of connecting Israel as uniquely responsible to the covenant with 
Yahweh to the human community as accountable for obedience to God.  
I have throughout this chapter restricted my sources to those composed in the 
1940s and early 50s. This is because the influence of Karl Barth in the 50s leads 
Ramsey to reject the usefulness of social contract theory in political theology as ‘a 
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mistaken view of God’s creation in man’.
92
 He seizes upon the doctrine of creation 
and attacks Rousseau, noting that ‘the idea of covenant-bond stands between or 
beyond the idea of contract’ because ‘the creation in him is in order to covenant’.
93
 
Much later he moves even farther away from an appreciation of Rousseau’s logic, 
writing in a letter to a doctoral student, ‘I would never locate our “creation for 
covenant” in our wills alone; then I would be a contractarian … ‘we are born into 




These later developments, however, are reliant on his appropriation of 
Barth’s doctrine of creation in Christian Ethics and the Sit-In. He found in Barth a 
theological foundation capable of sustaining a constructive political ethic rooted in 
covenant. And it is to the task of understanding those developments that I now turn. 
  
                                                
92
 Ramsey, Christian Ethics and the Sit-In, 31.  
93
 Ibid., 36, 31.  
94
 Paul Ramsey to Deborah Streeter, July 7, 1978, Box 24, Ramsey Papers.  
   114 
Chapter Five 
Covenant, Creation and Politics: Ramsey’s Use of Karl Barth’s Doctrine of 
Creation as a Foundation for Political Ethics 
 
‘The saving distinction ought to be kept clear … between creation and covenant, 
between the cohesions of any actual human community and the fact that we are and 
therefore are to become one in Christ’.
1
 
 – Paul Ramsey, Christian Ethics and the Sit-In  
 
 Speaking of the gradual release of volumes of Karl Barth’s Church 
Dogmatics throughout the 1950s and 60s, Ramsey writes late in his career, ‘I read 
every volume of Barth as those were issued in English translation, as soon as they 
came out! This was my summer’s reading!’
2
 The most important of those volumes 
for his theology of covenant was 1958’s Church Dogmatics III/1, The Doctrine of 
Creation.
3
 While he gestures at the importance of Barth in Basic Christian Ethics, it 
isn’t until the 1961 publication of his second book, Christian Ethics and the Sit-In, 
that he begins to fully incorporate Barth’s systematic perspective into his political 
theology.  
 In this chapter I want to analyze Ramsey’s use of Dogmatics III/1 for his 
account of the central role of covenant in Christian political ethics. What will be 
immediately apparent to readers familiar with Barth’s theology is that he does not 
use III/1 in a way that Barth likely would have approved, nor in a way that is 
                                                
1
 Paul Ramsey, Christian Ethics and the Sit-In (New York: Association Press, 1961), 59. 
2
 Paul Ramsey to David Attwood, December 8, 1984, Oliver O’Donovan personal collection. 
3
 Karl Barth, The Doctrine of Creation, vol. III, 1 of Church Dogmatics, ed. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. 
Torrance and trans. J.W. Edwards, O. Bussey, and Harold Knight (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1958). 
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compatible with the “special ethics” of Dogmatics III/4.
4
 One of the central tasks of 
interpreting Christian Ethics and the Sit-In is that of examining the unique features 
of his use of III/1 precisely because it simultaneously draws upon Barth and tends in 
a distinctly non-Barthian direction.
5
 The substance of this claim should become clear 
in the forthcoming pages.   
 Given the tendentious nature of Ramsey’s reading of Barth, this chapter is 
oriented around two central questions. First, what is he doing when he adopts and 
adapts this theology of covenant and creation from Dogmatics III/1? To answer this 
question I will initially consider the essential features of Barth’s formula that 
“creation is the external basis of covenant and covenant is the internal basis of 
creation”. This will provide the foundation from which to launch an examination of 
the ways he alters Barth’s systematic account to explicitly engage the 
covenant/creation motif as a foundation for political morality.   
 The second question stretches beyond Ramsey’s explicit appropriation of 
Barth and delves more deeply into his political ethics by inquiring how his 
description of the esse and bene esse of politics (in The Just War and elsewhere) is 
reflective of his interaction with the creation/covenant motif.
6
 This will facilitate a 
fresh interpretation of his use of III/1 by amending Oliver O’Donovan’s standard 
account of the relationship between Ramsey and Barth on politics. It will also 
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establish a clear vision of the central role Barth plays in his use of covenant to 
capture the contingent and temporal features of political morality.   
 Before moving explicitly to the content of Barth’s doctrine of creation, I want 
to offer a brief initial description of the scholarly and commercial reception of 
Christian Ethics and the Sit-In in the early 1960s. There is a tendency to overlook its 
importance among Ramsey’s political writings and attending to some of the details 
of its publication will help frame my attention to his adaptation of Barth. Perhaps 
more interestingly, however, it will help to paint a picture of him as a young scholar 
hoping to build upon the foundational theological work accomplished in Basic 
Christian Ethics.7   
 
5.1 The Publication of Christian Ethics and the Sit-In 
 In 1961 Association Press distributed numerous copies of Christian Ethics 
and the Sit-In to reviewers in an attempt to piggyback on the previous success of 
Basic Christian Ethics, which sold quite well in the early fifties due to its usefulness 
as a course textbook in colleges and seminaries.8 Several months after its release, 
however, James Best wrote to notify Ramsey that they had sold only 150 copies and 
that ‘review-wise it has not yet been a spectacular success’.9 Although by year’s end 
over a thousand copies were sold, the second year of publication saw the distribution 
of only 184 copies. He barely made enough in royalties in total to cover his $500 
advance and ended up buying 100 of the remaining 1,000 books left in stock at the 
                                                
7 Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1950). 
8 John C. Bennett, for instance, observed that the book ‘immediately places [Ramsey] in the front rank 
of American theologians’. Review of Basic Christian Ethics, Box 33, The Paul Ramsey Papers, 
Special Collections and Manuscripts, Perkins-Bostock Library, Duke University.  
9 James Best to Paul Ramsey, July 11, 1961, Box 33, Ramsey Papers.  
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close of 1964.
10
 By contrast, War and the Christian Conscience (also released in 
1961) had by the end of that year already outsold all of the other books in a series of 
publications from Duke University Press.
11
  
 Ramsey wrote Christian Ethics and the Sit-In with high hopes for its success. 
He suggested the book for promotion by the Religious Book Club instead of War and 
the Christian Conscience because he felt the former was ‘not such heavy reading’.
12
 
Even when sales continued to falter he requested that a revised and enlarged edition 
be released with substantial amount of new material and rearranged chapters. He felt 
that it was important to provide ‘further extension of the conceptual analysis that was 
begun to be set forth in that book’.
13
 The publishers offered a sympathetic but swift 
refusal, noting that the number of first edition copies remaining in stock would be 
sufficient to sustain the current rate of sales for several years.
14
 Nine months later 
Christian Ethics and the Sit-In was out of print.  
 Despite its woeful commercial success, in the early nineteen eighties when 
Ramsey reflects on his intellectual development, he appeals to Karl Barth as the one 
who provided ‘the major leap forward’ in his thinking about theological ethics.
15
 
That “leap” came in Christian Ethics and the Sit-In by way of the formula in 
Dogmatics III/1 that covenant is the internal basis of creation and creation is the 
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external basis of covenant. I now turn to address the role of that motif in Barth’s 
development of his doctrine of creation.   
 
5.2 Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Creation in Dogmatics III/1 
Barth arranges his discussion around exegesis of the creation stories of 
Genesis 1 – 2:4b and Genesis 2:4b – 25. He addresses the former under the heading, 
‘Creation as the External Basis of the Covenant’.
16
 Here “external basis” expresses 
the view that the cosmos and the earth are formed by the creative action of the triune 
God as a place prepared to make possible the relationship between God and 
humankind.
17
 “External basis” represents the structural framework and the physical 
substance that enable both human-human and human-divine relationships (including 
the reconciling work of Christ). As such, his doctrine of creation allows for no 
‘external presupposition’ of creation; beyond creation there is only Trinity.
18
  
He addresses the second creation story under the heading, ‘The Covenant as 
the Internal Basis of Creation.
19
 “Internal basis” expresses the view that covenant is 
the purpose or driving force of creation because the covenant-love of the divine 
Creator precedes, sustains and eclipses the history of creation. He says, 
The fact that covenant is the goal of creation is not something which is added 
later to the reality of the creature, as though the history of creation might 
equally have been succeeded by any other history. It already characterises 
creation itself and as such, and therefore the being and existence of the 
creature. The covenant whose history had still to commence was the covenant 
which, as the goal appointed for creation and the creature, made creation 
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Thus the internal character of creation – its nature and limitations, the ends placed 
before human society and the essence underlying humanity – is drawn from the 
covenant. 
 It is noteworthy that Barth draws upon Reformed covenant theology when he 
speaks of the history of the covenant as the covenant of grace. He rarely refers to the 
covenant in history, or the history of covenant, without calling it the covenant of 
grace, or simply the covenant.  For him, history itself is embodied in the history of 
Israel such that she lives out what creation ascribes to humanity (that is, covenant).
21
 
He describes ‘the history of the covenant of grace instituted by God between Himself 
and man; the sequence of the events in which God concludes and executes this 
covenant with man, carrying it to its goal…’
22
 The covenant of grace thus takes place 
in history and in time because the historical and temporal creation is the (external) 
sphere in which God has chosen to save his people.
23
 
 Three further observations concerning the external basis/internal basis motif 
will ease the transition into a discussion of Ramsey’s appropriation of the formula. 
First, Barth sustains an emphasis on the creature and creaturely well-being. Despite 
the narrative of disobedience in the opening chapters of Genesis, he is adamant that 
the creature is ‘destined, prepared and equipped to be a partner of this covenant’.
24
 
There are no aspects of the created existence – in his words, ‘no attributes, no 
conditions of existence, no substantial or accidental predicates of any kind’ – which 
are not formed for covenant with God in creation.
25
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Second, he constantly reminds readers that the covenant driving creation also 
draws it toward its eschatological end.
26
 There is no teleology for the creature outside 
of covenant with God – what unites Israel’s history with that of the cosmos is their 
shared eschatological end. There is a deep connection between that which was at the 
beginning of creation and that which awaits creation at its end. He does not mitigate 
the tension characteristic of time in created history, but he does affirm God’s love as 
that which sustains creation from start to finish.
27
 
My third observation is slightly longer. While Barth demonstrates the 
inseparability of covenant and creation, he also maintains that they are not identical. 
He observes, 
Creation is not itself the covenant. The existence and being of the one loved 
are not identical with the fact that it is loved. … Nor is creation the inner 
basis of the covenant. … The inner basis of the covenant is simply the free 
love of God, or more precisely the eternal covenant which God has decreed in 





There is an important distinction between creation and covenant that resembles the 
difference between the existence of the creature and the fact that the creature is 
loved.  The creation-covenant formula thus cannot be reversed to read that covenant 
is the external basis of creation and creation is the internal basis of covenant. This is 
a reminder that existence and well-being are not identical and that the well-being of 
God’s creatures is constituted by “simply the free love of God”. To be created for 
covenant is one thing, to be in covenant, yet another.  
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 Further comment on Barth’s doctrine of creation will have to be suspended 
for now. This summary of his external basis/internal basis understanding of creation 
and covenant should be sufficient to consider the differences between his doctrine 
and Ramsey’s political theology. As such, I will now reflect on the ways Ramsey 
adopts and adapts this understanding of creation and covenant. 
 
5.3 Ramsey’s Adaptation of the Creation/Covenant Formula 
 After reading Dogmatics III/1 in 1958, Ramsey wrote a piece for the Clarence 
D. Ashley Lectures on Law and Theology at New York University School of Law. 
He wrote there,   
If man is created for Exodus, it should not be surprising if there is present 
among the utterances of his created nature an echo of his call into covenant 
… As Karl Barth might put the point that has to be made: natural justice or 
the requirements made known to us through fundamental inclination or 
disinclination are the external or natural basis, the precondition, and the 
possibility of Exodus into covenant; while covenant-righteousness is the 
internal basis, the true meaning and the final purpose of whatever utterances 





 This is his first mention of the formula, though it was not published until 1962 in 
Nine Modern Moralists. His more substantial engagement came, however, in 1961’s 
Christian Ethics and the Sit-In.
30
 
 I mentioned above that Ramsey does not use Dogmatics III/1 in a way that 
Barth likely would have approved, nor in a way that is compatible with the special 
ethics of Dogmatics III/4.
31
 For this reason William Werpehowski notes that he has 
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‘his own purposes’ in the appropriation of Barth.
32
 David Attwood adds that his 
‘application of the idea was not in the direction Barth intended’.
33
 While these 
observations are certainly accurate, Ramsey also never presumes that his position 
will remain wholly within the Barthian framework. Rather, as an unpublished piece 
in the Paul Ramsey Papers indicates, he feels that too many Reformed thinkers are 
afraid to ‘wrestle with [Barth] for insight’ in the realm of ethics, having deepened 
their ‘knowledge into God which his theology yields’.
34
 
 In Christian Ethics and the Sit-In his wrestle with Barth produces the 
assertion that ‘an analysis of “natural” justice on the basis of covenant-creation is 
imperative even for a Barthian theological ethics’.
35
 This stems from his 
unhappiness with the perception that ‘guidance for the political order’ can easily be 
derived from ‘church law’ or ‘the human law developed within the community of 
believers’.
36
 He seeks an account of how ‘creation-covenant may provide criteria for 
this movement of secular law from worse to better’ and charges theological ethics 
with the task of establishing these criteria.
37
 
 Here, of course, in using creation and covenant to move the social order from 
worse to better, is the Ramseyian transformist ethic closely aligned with H. Richard 
Niebuhr’s fifth type of Christ-transforming-culture. But we should not let this 
distract us from the fact that a call for closer attention to the structures of the moral 
life is also a common theme in his interpretations of Barth. In Nine Modern 
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Moralists he is concerned that ‘there may be a danger that some who follow Barth’s 
lead will fail to elaborate fully a doctrine of man or to articulate an ethic which 
results from the proclamation of the gospel’.
38
 As late as the 1980s in ‘Liturgy and 
Ethics’ he still maintains that ‘Barth will have nothing to do with legal righteousness, 
but anyone who supposes that this means the Christian life is structureless simply has 
not read him’.
39
 He thus takes Barth’s doctrine of creation as a source for identifying 
moral structures that constitute and shape our public lives. 
 Already in the quotation highlighted above from Nine Modern Moralists he 
speaks of ‘natural justice’ as something to be derived from a theology of creation and 
covenant.
40
 In Christian Ethics and the Sit-In he again develops a (distinctly non-
Barthian) account of natural justice, as well as one of political order. Together they 
mark the two most significant features of his adaptations of the creation/covenant 
formula. I will address both concepts, beginning with natural justice.  
 The roots of justice for Ramsey lie in the positive function of covenant 
working in creation to determine norms of equity and desert in nature and in political 
institutions.
41
 Justice brings humanity together in right relation and equitable 
arrangements, thereby creating the conditions for the possibility of charitable and 
loving action. It bears ‘the external marks of man’s destiny for steadfast covenant 
love. It provides only the external possibility of covenant’.
42
 This means that the 
work of covenant as the internal basis of creation produces an element of justice in 
the natural created order.  
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 As the external basis of covenant, natural justice is also the external basis of 
the work of Christian love. The unity of charity and justice is rooted in creation and 
found in ‘the goal toward which we are being redeemed’.
43
 He uses Micah 6 to 
explain justice as the positive moral function of covenant, saying,   
The state and its law as an ordinance of creation, natural justice, human and 
legal rights, and social institutions generally, so far as these have a positive 
purpose under the creative, governing, and preserving purposes of God – all 
are the external basis making possible the actualization of the promise of 
covenant; while covenant or fellow humanity is the internal basis and 
meaning of every right, true justice, or law.  This enables us to see why the 
requirements of charity, or of steadfast covenant-love, and the requirements 
of justice, or of natural right, are ultimately inseverable. Each conditions the 
other, and we are told that what is required of us is only to do justice [the 
justice that provides an in-principled expression of divine charity or gives 
external basis for or promise of, or prepares in the desert a highway for God’s 
mercy] and to love mercy [the mercy that determinately fashions our human 




He employs the external basis/internal basis formula to establish natural justice as the 
work of covenant love at creation. In this way the meaning of justice is ‘resting upon 
the foundation of the created order’ and, at the same time, ‘the promise and pledge or 
the possibility of covenant-love’.
45
  
 If natural justice is the positive function of covenant love working in creation, 
political order serves the negative function of restraining sin. Ramsey asserts that 
‘broken covenants cause disorder, which ‘can destroy … the presuppositions and 
external basis of covenant’.
46
 Thus, ‘the Christian understanding of the fallen 
creation and its always already broken covenants gives the justification for a regard 
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for order as well as for justice’.
47
 The responsibility of the state for supplying 
political order in a world of repeatedly broken covenants is to make possible ‘man’s 
life in community’.
48
 Thus, it is not merely natural justice, but ‘the political order 
with its justice and its law … [which] are the external basis, the promise, the 
possibility and capability for covenant-community’.
49
 Because the state is ‘a body 
composed of covenant relations’, it is responsible for maintaining the external 




5.3.1 Three Ways Ramsey Remains within Barth’s Thinking 
In spite of the tendentious approach, I want to suggest three ways that 
Ramsey’s political themes are faithful to Barth’s line of thinking in III/1. After all, 
the external basis/internal basis motif is, however dimly, still recognizable in 
Ramsey’s hands and the ways in which he is faithful to Barth are worth mentioning 
for what they reveal about his political ethics. First, his shift into political ethics 
retains Barth’s emphasis on eschatology. He warns against abstracting from the 
world and losing ‘the capacity to be undergoing change by creation-covenant in 
which and toward which we live and by the ultimate reality of the church and the 
Spirit of Christ’.
51
 That capacity rests upon the distinction (and tension) between 
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what we are (creatures in a good but fallen creation) and what we are to become 
(creatures in eschatological covenant with God).
52
  
At the opening of the previous chapter I noted Ramsey’s early dissatisfaction 
with Rousseau’s attempt to root moral obligation in the movement from what the self 
is to what the self wants to be. He suggested instead that only divine will could 
determine the moral good toward which we move. Here Barth’s eschatology gives 
him the theological resources to describe the space between what we are and what 
we are to become – he says, ‘the saving distinction ought to be kept clear … between 
creation and covenant, between the cohesions of any actual human community and 
the fact that we are and therefore are to become one in Christ’.
53
 It is a “saving” 
distinction precisely because it describes the eschatological tension of our lives and 
our ultimate end in covenant with God. At the same time it upholds the significance 
of the moral good by pointing to the fact that we are not yet at the goal for which we 
are destined.   
Second, Ramsey’s claim that political and ethical judgments take place in 
history distinctly resembles Barth’s assertion that all covenants are historical 
covenants. This is most frequently expressed in his repetition of the idea that it is, 
after all, ‘in this world, and not some other, covenant must be enacted’.
54
 His account 
of humanity is such that ‘God who created me … at the same time gave me a nature 
in the form of fellow humanity in the historical time and space of my existence in 
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covenant’.
55
 Although he drops the phrase “covenant of grace”, he sustains the deep 
Barthian relation between covenant, history and time.  
Finally, Ramsey faithfully reflects Barth’s idea that covenant and creation are 
connected, yet not identical. He notes, ‘the justice we know is still not the same thing 
as love – just as nature is not grace or grace nature, and creation is not covenant nor 
covenant the same as creation’.
56
 This preserves Barth’s notion that the formula 
cannot be reversed; as noted earlier, beyond creation is only Trinity. It also 
safeguards the sovereignty of God and therein the distinction between divine love 
and creaturely faithfulness. Ramsey adopts Barth’s insistence that the external marks 
of the covenant cannot be equated with the covenant itself. To be created for 
covenant is one thing, to be in covenant, another.  
 
5.4 The Origin of the Esse and Bene Esse in Ramsey’s Political Theology  
At this point, I have established the initial elements of Ramsey’s adoption 
and adaptation of Barth’s doctrine of creation. I have also demonstrated his use of the 
external basis/internal basis motif as the foundation of central political concepts of 
natural justice and political order. With this in place, it is now appropriate to consider 
my suggestion that he develops the central doctrine of his political theology – the 
esse/bene esse construction – out of Barth’s external basis/internal basis motif.  
Just three years after the publication of Christian Ethics and the Sit-In he 
publishes his most comprehensive statement of political theory: ‘The Uses of 
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Power’.
57
 Two excerpts from this essay will prove illuminating for my insistence on 
the foundational character of the external basis/internal basis structure for his 
political theology. First, he declares,   
The proposition that the use of power, and possibly the use of force, belongs 
to the esse of politics (its act of being) and is inseparable from the bene esse 
of politics (its proper act of being, or its act of being proper politics) is 




He adds later, 
Power, which is of the esse of political agency, may be a conditional value 
only; but order and justice, which are ever in tension yet in inter-relation, 
both are values that comprise the well-being, the bene esse, of political affairs 




The idea set forth – that there is a political act of being which is distinct from yet 
inseparable from politics’ proper act of being – reflects the formulations witnessed in 
Barth’s distinction between what it is to be human (created) and what it is to be 
properly human (i.e., to be in covenant with God).     
Now, surely there is quite a difference between the esse of the creature that 
Barth describes and the esse of political agency that Ramsey describes. There is also 
a difference between what it is for a human to be a human and what it is for a state to 
be a state, or a magistrate to be a magistrate. Yet, just as he adopts the external 
basis/internal basis formula in Christian Ethics and the Sit-In to reinforce his 
understanding of natural justice and political order, here he takes up that same 
structure to reinforce his esse/bene esse understanding of the relationship between 
power and politics. 
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It is a common misinterpretation of the claims excerpted above to believe that 
Ramsey understands the essence of political agency as simply the exercise of force. 
But notice the important technical (and provisional) function of power in his account. 
Power itself is not the bene esse of politics – that belongs to the ‘terminal goals’ of 
order and justice.
60
 But power is the medium by which the political agent moves the 
community with purpose toward that good. Thus, Ramsey insists that ‘a political 
action is always an exercise of power and an exercise of purpose. Power without 
purpose and purpose without power are both equally nonpolitical’.
61
 The purposive 
exercise of power is the currency of moral political progress.  
I mentioned earlier that Barth’s attention to eschatology provides Ramsey 
with the theological resources to describe our capacity for moral transformation. It 
rests upon the distinction (and tension) between what we are (creatures in a good but 
fallen creation) and what we are to become (creatures in eschatological covenant 
with God). That same structure is here driving his emphasis on the technical (and 
provisional) function of power as that which connects the esse and bene esse of the 
political realm. At the same time it draws attention to the good end to which creation 
(and therein the political realm) is ultimately destined: the unity of charity, order and 
justice. I submit that Ramsey’s political distinction between the esse and the bene 
esse is clearly developed out of his interaction with Barth’s doctrine of creation and 
his ethical appropriation and adaptation of the external basis/internal basis motif in 
Christian Ethics and the Sit-In. 
 What I have shielded from the reader’s view until this point – and what 
obscures this connection between Ramsey’s view of politics and Barth’s doctrine of 
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creation in secondary literature – is that in the first of the quotations I highlighted 
above one of the two “views of the state” that he describes as neglecting this proper 
view of politics is the political ethics of Karl Barth. I mentioned previously that it is 
noteworthy that Ramsey used Dogmatics III/1 to reinforce his political theology 
rather than III/4. ‘Uses of Power’ uncovers the reason for that turn by revealing 
several criticisms of the special ethics of III/4.
62
 To understand Ramsey’s criticisms 
of Barth and to better understand the importance of the differences between their 
theological views of politics, however, I must introduce Oliver O’Donovan’s 




5.5 Engaging Oliver O’Donovan’s Account of Barth and Ramsey’s ‘Uses of 
Power’ 
O’Donovan’s essay, on the whole, makes three points about Ramsey and 
Barth on the basis of their understanding of the uses of power in politics.  First, he 
notes that Ramsey’s two significant criticisms (in ‘The Case of the Curious 
Exception’ and in ‘The Uses of Power’) wrongly characterize Barth’s political 
ethics.
64
 Second, he seeks to demonstrate that Barth’s ethics abnormalize the use of 
power for political authority and that this move is related to a ‘general intellectual 
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matrix’ of the contractarian theory of John Locke.
65
 Third, he argues that Ramsey’s 
account of the esse and the bene esse of politics offers an alternative to the Barthian 




On O’Donovan’s first point he is correct that Ramsey mischaracterizes 
Barth’s ethics by mistakenly associating his Christological rooting of the state with 
collapsed eschatological perfectionism. Barth was not the only person he falsely 
accused of eschatological perfectionism – it was one of his favorite lines of attack. 
Both Who Speaks for the Church and Speak Up for Just War or Pacifism are 
grounded in a rejection of the same problem.
67
 As with the question of his use of 
III/1, my intention is not to defend Barth against Ramsey’s distortions but to ask 
what can be learned from them. I will leave to Barthian scholars the task of 
defending him against those misguided attacks.  
To take up O’Donovan’s second point regarding Barth’s indebtedness to the 
Lockean intellectual tradition would be to stray too far from the discussion at hand. 
Accordingly, I will abstain from offering any judgment on that matter. For the 
purposes of this argument the stimulating aspect of the essay comes by way of his 
third point: the identification of Ramsey’s esse and bene esse construction with the 
just war theory of Christendom.   
I want to begin by considering his commentary on Barth and the use of power 
as abnormal. O’Donovan describes the way in which Barth locates the state 
Christologically by observing ‘the proper location of the political order within the 
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covenant of reconciliation between God and man’.
68
 While this Christological root 
affords a positive account of the work of the state, Barth does not affirm in Christ 
any “natural substrata” or “orders of creation”. Indeed, it is this lack which makes 
Ramsey’s appropriation of Barth’s doctrine of creation seem so far afield from 
Barth’s own political ethics. For O’Donovan, however, this absence means that 
‘much in Barth’s political ethics bears a distinctly Christian stamp in fact, and Barth 
certain has an idea of a Christian political ethics. But his is a distinctly Christian idea 
of political ethics, not an idea of a distinctly Christian political ethics’.
69
 This point is 
significant, if obscure, so allow me a brief attempt at explaining what I take him to 
mean.  
Both Ramsey and Barth operate within what O’Donovan calls a ‘generally 
Augustinian’ notion of the ‘ambiguity of all political right’.
70
 Ramsey harnesses this 
ambiguity by describing it as reflective of the tension which characterizes the pre-
eschatological struggle of fallen creation. Christ has revealed not only the 
eschatological peace (and justice) to which creation is being drawn but also the 
irrevocable rootedness of the now fallen creation in his covenant-love. Political 
action is given Christian purpose only when it embraces the ambiguity of the in 
between times by acting decisively in the direction of the bene esse. As David Smith 
observes, ‘Ramsey claims that it is the intentionality of the act, what is “directly 
done”, that is decisive amid the ambiguity’.
71
 Creation, natural justice and political 
order are the external bases (the esse of politics) which make possible Christian 
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pursuit of covenant-love, peace, order and justice (the bene esse of politics). Only 
when the Spirit of Christ sustains created existence in this in-between time can the 
ambiguity of politics be harnessed with Christian purpose – with a Christian political 
ethic. For Ramsey the ambiguity of politics is itself a witness to the kingdom of God 
because it makes possible faithfulness to that kingdom.  
Here comments from his 1972 essay ‘Force and Political Responsibility’ 
make clear how acts of political judgment both depend on systemic ambiguity and 
witness to the kingdom of God. He says 
 In their capacities as ‘magistrates’ men exercise creative rulership. Political 
decision and action is in the image of God, who also rules by particular 
decrees. God does not create a world in general; he creates a specific world 
out of myriad possibilities that might have been. … The political act calls the 
things that are to be into being from things that are not. … For all the doctrine 
and the policy research that went before, a statesman shapes events by 
decisions or indecisions that go beyond doctrine, that launch out into the 
unknown and the not-yet, and that do not pop out of research, game playing, 
or systems analysis. A statesman must actualize what is to be from among a 
number of legitimate choices, each of which is plausible before the event. He 
has the high and lonely responsibility of choosing what shall actually be done 
from among a number of possibilities, any of which might have been.
72
   
 
Just as God creates a specific world – one in which we are particular and contingent 
creatures – so, too, does the magistrate act with judgment in a world of political 
ambiguities and endless possibilities. Certainly this does not mean that all such 
judgments are right and good. Rather, it demonstrates how the indeterminacy of our 
political existence makes possible faithful obedience to a God who also rules with 
particularity in a contingent world.  
What this should make clear is that Ramsey’s insistence on the provisional 
union of power and purpose in moral political agency relies on a prior theological 
account of systemic ambiguity in human relations. Barth, on the other hand, uses that 
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ambiguity to fuel a “reservation” in the way that the state witnesses to the kingdom 
of God. Rather than embracing the ambiguity of all political right (and therein the 
intimate connection between power and political purpose), Barth seeks an account of 
the normal function of the state which marginalizes power and ambiguity. As 
O’Donovan observes, ‘For Ramsey power is always suspect and always necessary, 
while Barth considers it usually suspect and occasionally necessary’.
73
 Barth seeks to 
‘locate a different ground on which a “normal” politics can function without having 
to incur the perpetual self-affliction of those who think that they must put to death, 
but know that they cannot raise from the dead’.
74
 
Rooting the normal function of the state (but not the abnormal use of power) 
in Christ severs the ambiguity of politics – the perpetual self-affliction – from 
Christian purpose. Barth’s ‘dialectic between the normal, central functions of the 
state and its marginal, occasional function’ lacks the sense of Christological purpose 
in political action aimed at the bene esse.
75
 Thus, O’Donovan says, ‘it is always the 
esse of politics that is in [Barth’s] view, not a Christian bene esse that might have to 
correspond to some esse that lay behind and before it’.
76
 In light of this analysis of 
both thinkers on the ambiguity of political right, O’Donovan’s claim that Barth has a 
Christian idea of political ethics but not an idea of Christian political ethics becomes 
clearer. I take him to mean that while he can see how Barth links the normal function 
of the state to Christ, he cannot see how it contains the possibility of political action 
imbued with distinctly Christian purpose. Ramsey’s embrace of the ambiguity of 
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politics as characteristic of the tension between the esse and the transcendent bene 
esse, on the other hand, contains precisely the foundation of such purpose.   
  
5.6 Ramsey’s Uses of Power and the Just War Theory of Christendom 
Ramsey and Barth share a commitment to the Christological center of 
political thought – indeed, Ramsey was constantly defending himself on this point. 
Their divergence stems from the fact that he embraces the ambiguity of political 
endeavors rather than turning away from it. Political authority is both unfulfilled and 
provisional fulfilment because of the ambiguous way it corresponds to the authority 
of Christ. As O’Donovan says, ‘Ramsey so repeatedly asserts that earthly politics 
belongs in unfulfilled salvation-history (“this side the ploughshares”) that it is too 
easy to miss the obvious: politics construed in terms of lex, ordo and iustitia is a fruit 
of that provisional fulfilment which is given us in the advent of Jesus Christ’.
77
 The 
Christological root of political authority is why the ethics governing political 
judgment are defined by Christian charity rather than a purely “natural” account of 
self-defence. Ironically, it is Ramsey (not Barth) who endorses the idea of “natural” 
justice while at the same time advocating a political ethics more directly infused with 
a distinctive sense of Christian purpose.   
 O’Donovan explains, and I agree with him on this point, that Ramsey’s esse 
and bene esse offer precisely what Barth lacks, ‘the evangelical interpretation of 
politics … so that the homo politicus that is redeemed is recognizably the same homo 
politicus in need of redemption’.
78
 Yet, he also believes that Ramsey leaves his 
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reader without a complete account of the esse and bene esse. He says, ‘Ramsey has 
almost nothing to tell us about the esse of politics, other than that power is “of” it. 
Yet its role in his thought is important: it is a safeguard against Utopianism in our 
speculations on the bene esse’.
79
 One aim of this discussion has been to show that 
Ramsey says quite a bit about the esse (and the bene esse) of politics – only not in 
‘The Uses of Power’ but in Christian Ethics and the Sit-In. In fact, he takes his cues 
in that discussion from Barth’s Dogmatics III/1.  
 As mentioned above, the roots of justice for Ramsey lie in the positive 
function of covenant working in creation to determine norms of equity and desert in 
nature and in political institutions. The power which is of the esse of politics is that 
which brings humanity together to create the possibility of charitably just and loving 
action; political order makes possible life in community. O’Donovan describes his 
position by noting that living well ‘must be described in terms consistent with simply 
“living”’.
80
 Christian Ethics and the Sit-In establishes precisely this concept by 
arguing that governing rightly must be consistent with simply governing. He seizes 
upon the theological resources in Barth’s doctrine of creation to articulate this 
interpretation of political agency and morality.    
 This at last makes us able to address O’Donovan’s assertion that Ramsey’s 
line of thinking on the theological interpretation of politics lies squarely within the 
just-war theory of Christendom. He traces the roots of Ramsey’s political ethics to 
‘the Neo-Thomists and Grotius, and … the implicit theory of Augustine and 
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Aquinas’.
81
 He links Barth, on the other hand, to a ‘general intellectual matrix’ of 
Lockean social contract theory; he takes Barth’s abnormalization of coercion to be a 




The first response to such a claim, particularly in light of the previous chapter 
on Rousseau, is that Ramsey is entangled in his share of deeper contractarian 
tendencies to over-estimate social institutions and elevate consent-politics. His 
covenant/contract analogy breaks down precisely at points where Israel’s faithful 
response to Yahweh cannot be made compatible with the central role of consent in 
the social contract. It also obscures several of his stronger misgivings about 
Rousseau’s failure to root moral obligation in the transcendence of the divine will. 
My second response has to do with O’Donovan’s identification of the 
influences on Ramsey’s theological interpretation of politics. In the previous chapter 
I began to acknowledge his debts to classical thinkers such as Grotius and Bodin. 
O’Donovan is certainly right that if forced to choose between Barth and Ramsey the 
latter more adequately reflects the justified war theory of Christendom. Yet, my 
gesture toward the potential value of Grotius’ theories for Ramsey’s political theory 
was just that: a gesture. Ramsey may fit squarely in the line of just war thinkers but 
he found his way there by way of substantial theological engagements with Barth, 
not Grotius. If my argument here is correct, the Barth of Dogmatics III/1 belongs, 
however awkwardly, among the list of significant figures who influence his vision of 
politics as constituted by an esse and a bene esse. 
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Ironically, the link between Ramsey and Barth emerges through 
O’Donovan’s suggestion that there were adequate resources within other sections of 
Barth’s own work that he might have drawn on to account for the difference between 
an esse and a bene esse of Christian politics. He says, ‘there was much in [Barth’s] 
thought that could, and should, have taken him the other way. The humanum of 
Christ … demonstrates that even the old humanity was never unnormed, but was 
claimed from the beginning – and, in the event, decisively claimed – by the God of 
the covenant’.
83
 This points to the central role of Christ in the old humanity – and the 
creation of that old humanity – as that which was normed from the beginning yet in 
need of redemption. Ramsey builds his esse/bene esse distinction on precisely these 
Barthian themes.    
 It would certainly be accurate to read ‘The Uses of Power’ and think that 
Ramsey’s political ethics are quite different from Barth’s political ethics. That is not 
here in dispute. But if my argument is correct then it would be inaccurate to read 
‘The Uses of Power’ and think that his political ethics are quite different from 
Barth’s doctrine of creation. Rather, it is that doctrine of creation which informs from 
an early stage his central political concepts.  
 
5.7 Covenant as a Theological Foundation for Understanding the Contingency 
and Temporality of Politics  
 I mentioned in the introduction to this thesis that reading Ramsey as a 
political theologian means grasping the theological significance of contingency and 
temporality. We live not merely in historical time, but in a particular historical time 
                                                
83
 Ibid., 22-23.  
   139 
between creation and eschaton. Similarly, the indeterminacy of political pursuits is 
not merely an incidental defect in human existence but the gift of a good Creator 
enabling the possibility of faithful creaturely response. This chapter demonstrates 
that his theological rationale for these aspects of political existence comes by way of 
his understanding of the concept of covenant. He describes the function of the 
political state as both the external basis for the possibility of covenants and as a sort 
of ‘organized covenant’ itself.
84
 In this way political authority must keep in mind 
what Ramsey calls ‘man with man’ (justice) and ‘man for man’ (charity).
85
 He 
charges the state both with ensuring that the political community continues to exist 
(esse) and with the pursuit of covenant-defined aims to which the political 
community is ultimately ordered (bene esse). The tension of these two aims 
represents and reflects the tension of historical time between creation and eschaton.  
 Although he does not explicitly use the language of covenant in the following 
example, I believe that it demonstrates what Ramsey takes to be the importance of 
his theological perspective for the identification of the esse and bene esse of politics. 
In an unpublished essay titled ‘A New Understanding of National Security’, he 
argues against a false view of national security (again, rooted in eschatological 
perfectionism) which results in ‘an entire reversal of the esse and the bene esse of 
politics’.
86
 He attributes the reversal and the subsequent misunderstanding of 
national security to ‘a theological mistake’. The mistake is to assume that ‘the 
theological basis for a new context of national security, can be obtained only by a 
dissolution of the necessities and purposes of statecraft’.
87
 Taking “necessities and 
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purposes” to represent the esse/bene esse balance of political morality, he explicitly 
notes that a proper understanding of the political realm is essentially a matter of 
getting a hold of the right theology. He ties the false understanding of national 
security to ‘a denial of important features of the theological context in which 
Christian discussion of national security and other tasks of the state should 
proceed’.
88
 Theology should not dissolve but uphold the proper role of political 
authority.  
 The aim of this thesis is to treat Ramsey as a political theologian and to take 
seriously his claims that the basic operations and structures of political action have 
fundamental theological significance. I have tried in this chapter to demonstrate that 
such a theological perspective for him begins with a right understanding of covenant 
and, more particularly, the relation between covenant and the doctrine of creation. 
Covenant is the theological perspective which funds a proper understanding of our 
contingent and temporal political lives.   
 Of course, one of the challenges to this reading is that his political ethics 
often fail to explicitly acknowledge these theological foundations. This is 
particularly true of his arguments on issues of moral theory and ecclesiology. The 
next chapter builds upon the interpretive gains of this chapter by demonstrating the 
common logic of covenant through which he addresses those topics.  
                                                
88
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Chapter Six 
‘Jesus Did Not Tell the King the Conclusion He Should Reach’: Covenant, 
Moral Theory and Ramsey’s Ecclesiological Perspective on Politics  
 
This continues to be the acid that eats away at moral relations, and at the very idea 




– Paul Ramsey, Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics 
 
 In 1967 United International Press released an article by Louis Cassels on 
Ramsey’s newest book, Who Speaks for the Church? A Critique of the 1966 Geneva 
Conference on Church and Society.
2
 The article ran in a number of papers across the 
United States and local editors were responsible for supplying their own titles for the 
piece. Albion, Michigan’s Recorder titled it ‘Ministers Should Not Just “Pop Off”’, 
while Youngstown, Ohio’s Vindicator offered ‘Churchmen Should Bite on 
Tongues’. Perhaps most pointedly, Bristol, Pennsylvania’s Courier Times advertised, 
‘Advice to a Minister: You Talk Too Much’.
3
 
 Bowdlerizing titles of small-town papers were, however, the least of 
Ramsey’s troubles with the release of Who Speaks. Franklin Sherman suggested in 
The Christian Century that he could be called ‘the angry young man’ of Christian 
                                                
1
 Paul Ramsey, Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1965; 
Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1967), 44. The title of this chapter is taken from Paul 
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2
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and Society (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1967).  
3
 These articles are collected in the published book file for Who Speaks for the Church?, Box 25, The 
Paul Ramsey Papers, Special Collections and Manuscripts, Perkins-Bostock Library, Duke University.  
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ethics and that the book was ‘annoyingly repetitious’.
4
 Roger Shinn suggested that he 
replaced ‘the church militant with the church studious’ and D.L. Munby called it ‘too 
donnish and academic’.
5
 Richard Johnson observed that ‘even Ramsey’s admirer’s 
must admit there is something a little “ivory tower” about his call for the Church to 
remove itself so completely from the arena of specific policy decisions’.
6
 
  What these newspaper titles and critical reviews reflect is that Who Speaks is 
at the same time a very straightforward yet obscure and difficult book. Ramsey is 
quite clear that he is displeased with the ecumenical pronouncements from the 1966 
Geneva Conference of the World Council of Churches. On any given page the 
message “you talk too much” is inescapable. At the same time, his arguments are 
arduous and he fails to make clear the theological and systematic foundations upon 
which he calls for such a clear sense of limitation on ecumenical pronouncements. 
His target is so clearly in view – the specific political “directives” issued by the 
WCC conference – that it can be difficult to see how the project fits into his wider 
theological considerations of Christian political ethics.  
 The substance of Who Speaks is not explicitly doctrinal – as mentioned 
above, Ramsey shields his theological commitments behind argumentative 
engagements with the Geneva conference. Nonetheless, I believe that it marks an 
important continuation of his use of covenant as a theologically significant political 
theme. As detailed in the first two chapters of this section, there is a line of thinking 
that travels through Rousseau and Barth to yield an account of ethics as movement 
                                                
4
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from the esse to the bene esse of politics. The argument of this chapter is that the 
same line of thought shapes and determines his insights into moral theory and, 
through moral theory, an ecclesiological perspective on the political realm. 
 Demonstrating the influence of his covenant theology on Who Speaks 
operates on two significant, if unexpected, presuppositions. First, I believe that the 
most adequate way to understand his elevation of decision-making as the central task 
of political authority and limitation of the church to the role of theoretician is to 
examine his wrestle with situation ethics in Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics.
7
 
Only a careful examination of his anti-situationist moral theory makes clear the 
systematic and theological foundations of his arguments in Who Speaks. Second, I 
believe that this interpretive approach reveals that Who Speaks is the ecclesiological 
outworking of his political theology of covenant. That is to say, the limitations he 
places on the church have everything to do with his theological interpretation of 
politics as inescapably contingent, temporal and ordered to the transcendent bene 
esse.  
 This chapter will initially develop Ramsey’s objections to “act-agapism” and 
situation ethics in Deeds and Rules. This identifies his emphasis on contingency and 
temporality as defining characteristics of moral (and political) agency. Subsequently, 
I take up the arguments in Who Speaks to address the contours of his strict 
limitations on ecumenical pronouncements and appreciation for the political 
authority and office of the magistrate. I suggest that his protection of the 
“magistrate’s conscience” stems from those criticisms of situation ethics and his 
sensitivity to the role of properly framed and informed choice in political agency. 
                                                
7
 I will also keep in view Paul Ramsey, ‘The Case of the Curious Exception’, in Norm and Context in 
Christian Ethics, ed. Gene H. Outka and Paul Ramsey (London: SCM Press, 1968).  
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Finally, I argue that his description of the church as theoretician can be most 
adequately understood as a continuation of the covenant theological perspective on 
the structure and direction of political morality detailed over the last few chapters.  
 
6.1 Temporal and Interpersonal Moral Bonds in Ramsey’s Critique of 
Situationism 
 In the 1960s the adequacy of moral rules and principles for ethics came under 
fire from situation ethicists such as Joseph Fletcher and Paul Lehmann. Fletcher 
taught at Harvard Divinity School throughout that decade and his Situation Ethics 
was a seminal contribution to the debate.
8
 Lehmann was a Presbyterian minister who 
studied with both Reinhold Niebuhr and Karl Barth and worked at Harvard and 
Union Theological Seminary until the 1970s. His Ethics in a Christian Context 
frustrated Ramsey for its failure to rightly understand the significance of covenant 
relations of life with life.
9
 Ramsey initially contributed to the debate through selected 
essays, though he later arranged two book-length treatments of the subject.
10
 The 
earliest of those was originally published in 1965 as an occasional paper for the 
Scottish Journal of Theology. A substantially enlarged version was released in 1967 
– Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics. His second treatment was an edited volume 
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 I want to examine his response to situation and contextual ethics through his 
assertion that Christian ethics involves the determination of ‘love-embodying’ moral 
rules.
12
 He also calls these ‘rules of practices’ and insists that ‘an inquiry into the 
meaning of practices is of the utmost importance for the whole of Christian ethics’.
13
 
Before taking up his explicit criticisms, however, it is important to have a clear view 
of his appropriation of William Frankena’s distinction between ‘pure act-agapism’, 
‘summary rule-agapism’, and ‘pure rule-agapism’.
14
   
 Pure act-agapism assesses the facts of each moral “situation” independently 
in such a way that ‘the facts of other similar situations, or generalizations drawn from 
such situations, or from previous moments of loving obedience, are simply irrelevant 
or misleading’.
15
 Ramsey calls this situation ethics ‘in its purest form’.
16
 Because 
pure act-agapism cannot appeal to general principles, rules, etc. (because they lie 
outside of the situation itself), the primary moral task is to identify the facts of each 
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 Summary rule-agapism (or, modified act-agapism) is akin to pure act-
agapism in that there can be no limits placed upon the working of agape in each 
individual situation. While certain ‘rules of conduct’ can be derived from ‘summaries 
of past experience’, such rules lack authority to restrict the freedom of love.
18
 
Summary-rule agapism fails to offer an improvement over pure-act agapism to the 
extent that summary rules serve only the limited function of ‘aids to love’.
19
  
 Against pure and modified forms of act-agapism, pure rule-agapism upholds 
the notion that each situation is to be governed by a set of rules. This makes the 
primary moral challenge not the determination of the most love-embodying action, 
but the most love-embodying rule.
20
 While the criticisms most relevant for the 
following discussion are those directed at act-agapism, it is important to note that he 




6.1.1 Objections to Act-Agapism 
 I want to consider carefully two explanations Ramsey sets forth for his 
disapproval of the “situational” approach to ethics in pure and modified act-agapism 
(and in the work of Fletcher and Lehmann). While speaking of two quotations from 
Frankena that he takes to be emblematic of situation ethics, he notes, 
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There is nothing wrong with any of these statements except their two silent, 
unexamined assumptions: (1) that Christian love has in itself no breadth to 
match its personal depth and therefore no rule-implying power, and (2) that 





Later, he says,  
 But for all that, the basic philosophy of act-agapism is drawn from no 
Christian source. It is drawn rather from the atomistic individualism of 
secular thought in the modern period. This continues to be the acid that eats 
away at moral relations, and at the very idea that there are moral bonds 




Each rejection of act-agapism has two parts: a criticism of situation ethics’ ability to 
account for the moral aspects of human relations and an emphasis on the importance 
of the moment-to-moment character of such relations. Both parts require further 
explication.  
 His first complaint concerns the lack of “breadth”, or any recognition of the 
moral bonds between individuals. The emphasis on the facts of the individual 
situation in act-agapism may allow for “personal depth”, but it lacks a wider account 
of moral descriptions expanding beyond each specific situation. That is to say, in any 
particular situation it cannot account for the trans-situational moral claims arising out 
of human relations and interactions.   
 He identifies Rousseau as the model of this ‘ethic of atomistic acts in 
Christian clothing’.
24
 He observes, ‘for Rousseau there can be no bond (but only 
bargains) between two contracting individuals because there can and should be no 
bond established between one atomistic moment of willing, or consenting, and the 
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next, and the next after that’.
25
 Whereas Ramsey was once drawn to the role of 
consent in the social contract (see my discussion in chapter four), he now protests the 
protection of individual freedoms and elimination of moral bonds. Against this view 
he advocates an account of binding and morally significant human relations. As he 
says in ‘The Case of the Curious Exception’, ‘in the Christian life we are driven 
deeper and deeper into the meaning of covenant obligations … We are therefore 
driven ever deeper into the meaning of the bonds of life with life’.
26
 Recognition of 
the moral significance of those bonds accounts for the breadth of Christian love. 
 His second criticism of act-agapism concerns temporal moral bonds. Ethics is 
a discipline that makes judgments across time and sustains notions of obligation and 
responsibility which extend beyond individual moments. Act-agapism and situation 
ethics fail because they ‘can find no sustaining moral bond between the present 
moment of action and a later moment of action’.
27
 
 It is worth taking note of the significance of this emphasis in Ramsey’s essay 
on Marxism in Nine Modern Moralists. There he expresses the inescapably temporal 
character of ethics by noting the importance of ‘taking time seriously as a relation 
among creatures and the measure of the activity of creatures’.
28
 He writes also that 
‘linear, temporal history and all the events that happen upon this plane have basic 
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 In Deeds and Rules this basic significance of actions in time means 
that they ‘are in fact already morally joined together’.
30
 Situation ethics neglects the 




 Ramsey’s fundamental points of contention concern the significance of 
interpersonal relations and the passage of time for a proper theological perspective 
on ethics. He says, ‘it is of the very greatest importance that we understand the 
connection between the presence or absence of bonds or structures between man and 
man, and the presence or absence of bonds or structures relating one moment to 
another’.
32
 Act-agapism fails on both points. 
 I mentioned at the conclusion of the previous chapter that the foundational 
emphasis on covenant in his political ethics produces an insistence on the theological 
significance of contingency and temporality. Barth’s doctrine of creation enables him 
to argue that humanity lives not merely in historical time, but in a particular 
historical time between creation and eschaton; also that the contingency of political 
pursuits is not merely an incidental defect in human existence but the gift of a good 
Creator making faithful creaturely response possible. In this discussion of moral 
theory and situation ethics, he leaves behind the explicit theological warrants that 
drive his earlier comments. Yet, he squarely retains his insistence that an adequate 
understanding of ethics must take account of the necessary contours of human 
relations and the moral significance of time.  
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6.1.2 Covenant Theology and the Problem of Choice  
 What is most significant about this discussion of situation ethics for the 
interpretation of Who Speaks is the way that Ramsey uses temporal and interpersonal 
moral bonds to sustain an emphasis on the role of choice in ethics. In order to 
understand what he means by “choice” we must first understand his claim that ‘to be 
born means to be born among practices’.
33
 Practices are rule-governed activities, e.g., 
driving on the highway, playing a card game, or voting in an election. There is an 
important distinction, however, between ‘justifying a practice and justifying an 
action falling under it’.
34
 For instance, the belief that voting is a morally justifiable 
rule-governed social practice in many countries does not automatically translate into 
the belief that all actual acts of vote-casting are morally justifiable. The difference 
between the “practice” and the “act” is an exercise of the will, or, what Ramsey calls 
‘the production of a deed’.
35
  
 His claim that we are born among practices highlights the fact that we are 
surrounded (temporally and contingently) by rule-governed activities. The problem 
with situation ethics is that it strips away their role in the determination of right 
actions. It attempts to account for an exercise of the will without attending to the fact 
that ‘everywhere, and at all recorded times, practices preceded individual choice’.
36
 
Ramsey pulls the curtain back on situation ethics to reveal that its supreme interest in 
the particular moment voids all possibility of identifying resources (i.e., temporal 
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bonds and moral relations) for the particular choice required in that moment. He says 
that situation ethics ‘has therefore little or no light to shed upon any particular choice 
or upon the problem of choice itself. It does not tell us how to get on track (or do the 
good)’.
37
 It simply cannot account for the world in which we finds ourselves as 
moral agents.  
 The theological device Ramsey uses to represent the practices and moral 
relationships which constitute human existence and uphold the role of choice in 
morality is that of covenant. He rejects the adequacy of situational moral thinking by 
saying that it cannot account for ‘a sufficient interpretation of the covenants of life 
with life enacted and mandated by God’s covenant with men’.
38
 Just as with his 
previous discussions, the theological foundation of covenant is inseparable from the 
doctrine of creation. He continues, ‘not so were we “enmeshed” when God created 
out of nothing his covenant folk, or when he saw that man was alone’.
39
 The only 
adequate ground for moral obligation is one that accounts for the fact that we are 
“enmeshed” in relations with God and each other across time.  
 At this point he turns again to Barth as a theological resource. He notes ‘in 
Barth, the moral agent is bound, obliged; in [Joseph Fletcher’s situationism], he 
chooses, if he does, to be bound (which is to say he is not bound at all) … But God 
stooped to the condition of the isolated and free moral agent. We are placed on notice 
that we can not and may not and must not be alone with the act in situ’.
40
 Fletcher’s 
non-binding choice resembles Rousseau’s non-binding consent. In both cases 
Ramsey uses Barth to emphasize that choice is only intelligible in the presence of 
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obligation. Thus, ‘only obligation can oblige one moment to be connected with 
another, or reliably forecast any route. … Love must be able to adduce, produce, or 
discover these universal requirements’.
41
 To translate: a workable social (and 
political) ethic relies on an account of obligation rooted in the “enmeshed” character 
of our created existence.    
 Ramsey upholds covenant theology at the base of his moral theory in his 
description of interpersonal and temporal relations as steadfast. He says, ‘There may 
be in our creation traces of our creation toward steadfast covenant, toward the image 
of Christ’.
42
 This emphasis on the ‘forms of steadfastness in responsibility and 
accountability one to another’ is another attempt to sustain the moral importance of 
choice by transcending it with a sense of obligation rooted in covenant.   
  
6.1.3 The Meaning of Choice  
 I have detailed Ramsey’s discussion of choice in Deeds and Rules, but I want 
to supplement that account with a few additional observations in order to get a clear 
view of his understanding of the term. The first comes by way of the opening section 
of this thesis on repentance. There I described his debate with David Little over the 
nature of political decision-making. He says in ‘Some Rejoinders’, ‘I would say 
prudence or practical wisdom is needed … not “discretion” – which, as Little reads 
me, seems to mean arbitrary, baseless choice’.
43
 It is important to keep in mind that 
“choice” in his moral and political theory is never simply an arbitrary exercise of the 
will.  
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 It is also significant that he frequently uses the language of prudence to 
capture the movement from practices to actions described in Deeds and Rules as 
choice. In 1961 Ramsey wrote in a letter to Byron Johnson that prudence ‘is not a 
derogatory word. … It is “practical wisdom” in applying ethical principles to actual 
cases. Without prudence there would be no morality at all put forth into actual 
practice and decision-making’.
44
 He says, later, that prudence ‘completes the ethical 
act by choosing’.
45
 This locates the exercise of the will in proper relation to moral 
norms. He explains the relationship in Nine Modern Moralists, saying, ‘prudence, or 
practical wisdom in actual exercise, is always in the service of prior insight, 
conviction, or principle. Its function is the application in living action of something 
prior which governs our choices’.
46
 Thus, the presence of governing moral norms is 
central to a proper understanding of choice.  
 Third, Ramsey occasionally uses the term “conscience” instead of choice or 
prudence. He says in an unpublished essay called ‘Living with Yourself’, ‘but when 
morality goes to pieces, man also goes to pieces. Man has no place, for conscience is 
his place. Displacing conscience, he himself becomes a displaced person, with no 
place from which his truth … can be launched into life or into human discourse’.
47
 
He adds later, ‘If conscience is our place, men cannot live below or above 
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conscience, below or above the distinction between good and evil, between truth and 
falsity. You will have to learn to live in the place of your conscience, since that is 
who you are’.
48
 There is a legitimate place for choice in political theology because he 
understands that we cannot escape that element of human agency.   
 I suggest on the basis of these claims that what Ramsey means by “choice” 
might be more accurately described as “properly framed or informed choice”. 
Hopefully this will ease some of the fears of those who are concerned that his 
understanding of the term teeters too close to a neo-liberal, market-driven version of 
the word. Perhaps his most apt expression of this in political terms is his self-
description in the early 1980s of an ethicist ‘who happens not to believe that choice 
among alternative military policies can itself be deduced from just war criteria’.
49
 
Choice is to be properly informed and governed by the just war criteria, but it cannot 
be subsumed into the criteria themselves. Neither strict attention to the facts of any 
individual moment (situation ethics) nor emphasis on the inflexibility of transcendent 
norms (just war criteria) can be allowed to mitigate its role in political morality. 
 
6.2 Who Speaks for the Church?:  Ecumenism and Political Pronouncements 
 Now we turn to the task of interpreting Who Speaks in light of these 
developments in moral theory. Ramsey’s principal concern in that book is to reject 
the practice of offering specific policy advice to politicians in the name of the 
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church. His criticisms are explicitly directed at the 1966 Geneva Conference’s 
irresponsibility in issuing condemnations of US military intervention in Vietnam and 
possession of nuclear weaponry. He feels that ‘there is no way to speak for the 
church … and address particular prudential recommendations to the leaders of 
nations’.
50
 The movement from particular issue to particular issue is ‘trying to 
compile a Christian social ethic by leap-frogging from one problem to another’.
51
   
 Two consequences of this practice are especially important for this 
discussion. One is that the church blurs ‘the distinction between itself and all other 
groups in the society’.
52
 He feels that when the church pretends to offer specific 
political advice she joins the chorus of secular voices hoping to have their particular 
judgments mimicked by the political realm. Such ecumenical pronouncements are 
unsympathetically condemned as ‘the most barefaced secular sectarianism and but a 
new form of culture-Christianity’.
53
 His concern on this point is for the integrity and 
distinctiveness of the church in its witness to the political realm. 
 The other significant consequence of making specific recommendations is 
that the conscience of the magistrate is “faulted”. While this term is somewhat 
obscure, he uses it to voice his concern that specific political pronouncements from 
ecumenical councils will deprive the office of the magistrate of its proper function in 
the determination of particular political judgments. He tries to capture this by 
speaking of ‘two sorts of competence’ in relation to moral political insight.
54
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 I want to reflect upon these two objections in Who Speaks in light of the 
previous discussion of his moral theory in Deeds and Rules. First, I suggest that his 
rejection of situationism and promotion of interpersonal and temporal moral bonds 
provides a framework for understanding the inability of particular political 
pronouncements to sustain an adequate account of political authority. Second, I argue 
that his protection of the magistrate’s conscience and assertion of two competencies 
is based upon his understanding of choice as central to moral political reasoning.  
 
6.2.1 Situation Ethics and Ecumenical Pronouncements  
 Ecumenical pronouncements on specific policy initiatives mirror the inability 
of situationism to account for ethics from moment to moment and person to person. 
Just as situation ethics obscures the reality of practices shaping and governing moral 
existence, so also the ‘bag of specifics’ issued by ecumenical councils cannot be 
‘brought to bear upon the realities in the midst of which the statesman lives and must 
decide and act’.
55
 He rejects the false assumption that increasing specificity and 
particularity in moral deliberation (whether of situations or policies) necessarily 
produces a more “realistic” perspective. 
 One problem with the “bag of specifics” mentality is its inability to account 
for a theologically informed understanding of Christ, creation and time. The phrase 
he uses to capture this inadequacy is “truncated Barthianism”. He says, ‘the 
revolutionary theology pervasive at the conference was, of course, a truncated 
Barthianism, stressing Christ and the revolutionary situation, lopping off Barth’s own 
“prolongation” of his Christocentric ethics into a doctrine of man and of creation and 
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many a principle and structure’.
56
 In this case, “prolongation” means a theological 
understanding of the work of Christ in creation and throughout history as opposed to 
limiting it only to the “revolutionary situation”.  
 He calls truncated Barthianism ‘a quite definite narrowing of the bases of 
ecumenical theology’, because it organizes ‘the Christian understanding of life and 
of politics under the second article of the Creed only (reducing the first, “creation”, 
to the processes of historicized “nature” and the third to Christ’s ever coming present 
triumph over the powers)’.
57
 Instead, ecumenical statements should witness to the 
political realm by representing more fully the theological resources of the Christian 
tradition. The blunted theological character of specific pronouncements marks the 
difference between ‘true prophecy’ and ‘the way to succeed as prophets without 
really trying’.
58
 Of course, as one commentator notes, the call for greater attention to 
the role of doctrine in shaping ethics is ‘like Mother’s Day. Nobody is against it’.
59
 
The question is what is at stake in the loss of the theological breadth and depth of 
ecumenical pronouncements.  
 Ramsey’s concern is principally with the integrity of the church, which it 
maintains by attending ‘first of all … to the business of Christian reflection upon all 
sorts and structures of human activity’.
60
  Later, he provides a more substantial 
description of such reflection, saying,   
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[Ecumenical pronouncements] should clarify the grounds on which 
government must rest. They ought to open wide the articulation of structural 
elements in that human reality which statesmanship must govern and the 
range of alternatives it is legitimate for statesmen to have in mind as they rule 
by specific decree. They should inform the ethos and conscience of the 





The integrity of the church is upheld not by issuing specific decrees but by 




 He explicitly links this clarifying task with the esse/bene esse construction 
detailed in chapter five. Ecumenical ‘attempts to influence decision’ lead the church 
away from the meaning of the ‘esse and bene esse of politics’ that ‘might have been 
drawn forth from Christian understanding’.
63
 Previously I noted that this allows for 
purposive movement toward the good across the contingency of our moral lives. In 
this case that same theological interpretation of political agency is his correction of 
the “truncated Barthianism” of ecumenical pronouncements. Although he does not 
use the language of covenant, he calls for witness to theological truth which can be 
‘made ready for action’.
64
 This protects the proper role of political agency without 
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6.2.2 The Magistrate’s Conscience and the Question of Competency  
 When the church issues particular political pronouncements, Ramsey feels 
that they “fault” the conscience of the magistrate. I want to look carefully at what he 
means by this concept and suggest that his position is closely related to the 
prioritizing of the role of choice in moral theory in Deeds and Rules. This involves 
also a closer look at his assertion that there is a distinctive form of “competency” in 
political agency.   
 For Ramsey the ‘majesty of political rulership’ includes ‘the right of persons 
in their official capacities of magistrate or citizen not to have their consciences 
faulted’.
66
 The church should therefore avoid the ‘fascination with decision making 
exercises’ that undercuts the proper role of judgment in political authority.
67
 But it is 
important to note that he pairs his concern about “faulting” the magistrate’s 
conscience with a similar concern to avoid easing it. He writes that no ecumenical 
insights should attempt to ‘supplant the office of political judgment and decision on 
the part of magistrate and citizens, bind or fault their consciences, or in the slightest 
degree ease their special responsibility for deciding’.
68
 As mentioned above, the role 
of properly framed and informed choice is central to his understanding of ‘the 
integrity of the office of political prudence’.
69
 Ecumenical pronouncements should 
not usurp that office with specific policy directives.  
 Seizing upon this aspect of his work, Ernest Lefever rightly observes that 
Ramsey is ‘more concerned about the overburdened statesman than the under-
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 But we must not read him too narrowly and presume that he is 
promoting a kind of moral political aristocracy.
71
 As he notes in ‘Some Rejoinders’, 
‘the mantle of magisterial authority [falls] upon the shoulders of every citizen. We 
are all, in our degree, decision-makers, magistrates’.
72
 He frequently reads 
democratic citizenship through John Calvin’s language of ‘lesser magistrates’.
73
 This 
serves to emphasize the way the ‘special responsibility for deciding’ falls upon even 
those outside offices of political authority.
74
  
 When Ramsey protects the magistrate’s conscience he is attempting to uphold 
‘the majesty of political rulership’.
75
 Any ecumenical pronouncement must not usurp 
or collapse this proper function of authority.  What stems from this strict sense of 
limitation on ecumenical pronouncements is an appreciation for the unique 
“competency” of political agency. He speaks of ‘two sorts of competence, between 
the moral and political insights that may come from the heart of the Christian faith 
and the competence we all may have, in varying degrees, to make the decisions that 
belong to the exercise of political prudence’.
76
 There are two principal forms of 
justification for this division.  
 On one hand, he tends to argue that the difference in competencies is based 
on knowledge or access to information. For instance, he rejects specific proposals 
                                                
70
 ‘Protestant Political Pronouncements Under Fire’, Ernest Lefever, October 6, 1967, Box 25, 
Ramsey Papers.   
71
 For more on this misreading of Ramsey see McKenzie’s comments on John Bennett and David 
Little in Paul Ramsey’s Ethics, 20-21.  
72
 Ramsey, ‘Some Rejoinders’, 187.  
73
 See McKenzie, Paul Ramsey’s Ethics, 19.  
74
 Ramsey, Who Speaks, 119. Paul Camenisch observes, ‘Ramsey’s case for respecting the integrity 
and role of the specialists’ prudential judgments is at the same time a case for respecting the integrity 
and role of every moral agent’s prudential judgment’. ‘Paul Ramsey’s Task’, 86. 
75
 Ramsey, Who Speaks, 153. Just as choice is described as ‘the production of a deed’, so political 
agency ‘makes life-giving, or at least actuality-giving, deeds out of words’. ‘Case of the Curious’, 
106; Deeds and Rules, 153. 
76
 Ramsey, Who Speaks, 128.  
 161 
‘that attach labels “right” or “wrong”, “moral” or “immoral”, to innumerable 
particular choices of the statesman about which churchmen as such know less than 
he’.
77
 They, as he observes elsewhere, lack ‘the services of an entire state 
department’ and so can only offer ‘supposedly expert specific advice’.
78
 In War and 
the Christian Conscience he says, ‘there are questions of fact in diplomacy and in 
weaponry … which the moralist as such knows nothing about’.
79
 This suggests that 
access to facts differentiates the competency of the magistrate from that of the 
citizen. 
 On the other hand, he also suggests the distinction is based on the unique 
responsibilities of political office. As D.S. Long notes, the competency distinction is 
‘making a descriptive claim about who actually makes governmental decisions’.
80
 
Ramsey says the church ‘inordinately seeks to assume … decisions that belong in the 
realm of the state’.
81
 This is not to say that ‘magistrates … are always wise. It means 
only that they are magistrates, which the church is not’.
82
 The distinction of 
competencies in this case depends on the authority to choose rather than knowledge 
or expertise.  
 These two forms of justification converge when considered in light of my 
earlier discussion of moral theory. It is not simply choice that marks the political 
competency – if decision-making is not to be arbitrary or baseless if must be properly 
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framed by structures identifying and upholding positions of authority. It must also be 
properly informed by particular facts and governing moral norms. Both contribute to 
a proper understanding of political agency.   
 
6.3 Understanding Ramsey’s Limitation of Church as Theoretician 
 In light of the “competency” assigned to political authority, what becomes of 
the “competency” designated to provide moral and political insights ‘from the heart 
of the Christian faith’?
83
 I want to conclude by examining Ramsey’s claim that in the 
realm of politics the church is a theoretician. This will draw together the various 
observations and assertions that I have made in this chapter in a way that makes clear 
what I think Deeds and Rules and Who Speaks have to offer to this discussion of his 
political theology of covenant.  
 His description is worth quoting at length:   
 In politics the church is only a theoretician. The religious communities as 
such should be concerned with perspectives upon politics, with political 
doctrine, with the direction and structures of the common life, not with 
specific directives. They should seek to clarify and keep wide open the 
legitimate options for choice, and thus nurture the moral and political ethos of 
the nation. Their task is not the determination of policy. Their special 





On the basis of the idea that increased specificity and particularity produce more 
useful moral judgments for the political realm – the view driven by situation ethics – 
Ramsey’s limitation of the church appears to render it irrelevant to the determination 
of political morality. Yet, in light of his theology of covenant we have a clearer 
picture of what he means by the “direction and structures” of the common life. He is 
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here acknowledging the importance of a theological account of political morality 
which does not mitigate the inescapable contingency and temporality of the political 
realm. The “exceedingly limited” role of the church is a product of a proper 
sensitivity to the moral significance of choice. 
 To say this another way, Ramsey’s limitation of the church does not mean 
that in the face of war and political conflict she is reduced to merely reciting the 
Nicene Creed or the Gloria Patri. The articulation of “political doctrine” is the 
identification of good and legitimate political ends – the bene esse of politics. It is 
also holding those in political office accountable for their ‘special responsibility for 
deciding’.
85
 That is what it means to say ‘every saving word but no more than can be 
said upon this basis’.
86
 
 Furthermore, despite his criticisms of the Geneva Conference, there are other 
church pronouncements that he finds more than satisfactory. One prime example is 
his positive endorsement of the perspective on war in the Pastoral Constitution on 
‘The Church in the Modern World’ adopted by Vatican II. He is pleased with the 
statement’s perspective on ‘the morality of deterrence and the need for new security 
arrangements’.
87
 He is also supportive of the ‘signal reassertion of the principle 
surrounding non-combatants with moral immunity from direct attack’.
88
 
 What is most important, however, is that these conclusions are ‘the fruit of 
Christian political reason connecting every political consideration with the whole 
idea of God’.
89
 It is the opposite of the ‘truncated Barthianism’ of the Geneva 
Conference. As he says in Who Speaks, ‘the Vatican Council was able to place equal 
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moral force behind the need for new directions in international politics and the need 
for world public authority, without being betrayed into making demonstrably false 
statements about Christian responsibility in the meanwhile before these are 
established.
90
 By understanding the proper limitation of their task the council speaks 
for the church and witnesses rightly to the political realm.  
 The limitation of the church as theoretician contains within it all the elements 
of this discussion – an emphasis on properly framed and informed choice as evidence 
of a right perspective on political ethics; an understanding of the balance between the 
structure of created existence and the direction toward which that existence is being 
drawn in historical time; an appreciation of the church’s role in illuminating the bene 
esse of politics. Across this section on covenant I have tried to demonstrate 
Ramsey’s significance as a theological commentator on the essential features of 
political agency. While he does not use the language of covenant heavily in these two 
discussions in Deeds and Rules and Who Speaks, I believe that the arguments of each 
piece reveal the extent to which he articulates his political ethics from that 
theological perspective.  
 There is a line of thinking in Ramsey’s work that begins with Rousseau, 
produces the esse/bene esse construction and shapes his particular insights into moral 
theory and ecclesiology. I have tried to trace that line and identify it with his 
distinctive contribution to a theological perspective on politics. The line, however, 
does not end with Deeds and Rules and Who Speaks. He continues to develop his 
theological perspective and, indeed, shifts his use of covenant (and repentance) in the 
final years of his career. Understanding these shifts in theological perspective are not 
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only helpful for appreciating his development as a theologian, but they also help 
clarify the shape and purpose of covenant and repentance in his political ethics. 
 Having dedicated two sections to repentance and covenant, I want to turn in 
the last section to the convergence of those two concepts in his later work and to the 
theological developments which drive his later writings. Until this point both 
concepts have remained distinct in my analysis of Ramsey’s perspective on politics. 




Covenant and Repentance in Paul Ramsey’s Political Theology 
 
 The third section of this study addresses the convergence of the theological 
themes of covenant and repentance in Ramsey’s later political writings. I detail three 
significant theological shifts influencing his perspective on the political realm 
through engagements with Albert Schweitzer, H. Richard Niebuhr and Helmut 
Thielicke. On this foundation I examine two focal points which reformulate concepts 
of covenant and repentance. The first is his use of the covenant of Noah to develop a 
theological account of political realism. The second is his concept of “moral 
anguish” and the demand that moral evils be considered “no moment more”. His 
continued insistence on the theological significance of contingency and temporality 
in these claims is highlighted through his interpretation of Luke 14, the distinction 




Three Shifts in Theological Perspective  
 
Somewhere I read a statement, something to the effect that this cannot be the sort of 
world in which right actions lead to greater evil. Now I believe ultimately that is so, 
but not necessarily in space-time.
1
 
– Paul Ramsey to Edwin O’Brien, 1976  
 
 The preceding two sections offered treatments of covenant and repentance as 
concepts in Ramsey’s political writings. The final section of this study now begins 
the task of drawing together those two strands of thought in order to articulate a more 
unified view of his theological perspective on the structure of political morality. 
While chapter eight will take up two reformulations of covenant and repentance, it is 
important to contextualize that discussion by observing three significant and 
intentional theological shifts. These mark attempts to take his theology in new and 
more constructive directions and to repair perceived defects in earlier concepts. He 
shifts: (1) from eschatology to Christology as the theological ground of political 
ethics; (2) from repentance to responsibility as the critical political concept to be 
appropriated from H. Richard Niebuhr’s theological ethics; (3) a shift from Karl 
Barth to Helmut Thielicke as the source of covenantal theology for the political 
realm.  
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7.1 Albert Schweitzer and Ramsey’s Shift from Eschatology to Christology as 
the Foundational Doctrine for Ethics 
 In 1987 Ramsey exchanged regular letters with Stanley Hauerwas in 
preparation for a joint volume to be published under the title Speak Up for Just War 
or Pacifism.
2
 The letters address a range of theological and logistical issues related to 
the preparation of the manuscript (eventually it was decided that Hauerwas’ 
contribution would be listed as an epilogue). In one of those letters, dated March 6, 
1987, he writes, ‘I’ll take the time here to tell you what I would change in [Basic 
Christian Ethics] about eschatology’.
3
 What follows is a lengthy discussion which 
argues that he now considers not eschatology but Christology to be the ‘real issue’.
4
  
 Ramsey’s letter to Hauerwas was not his first admission that his perspective 
on eschatology shifted after the publication of Basic Christian Ethics. In the final 
chapter of Nine Modern Moralists on Jacques Maritain and Edmond Cahn, he flags a 
discussion of eschatology and the work of Albert Schweitzer with the observation, 
‘the above paragraph significantly changes the emphasis, but not the substance, of 
my interpretation of the relation between eschatology and ethics in Jesus’ teachings 
in Basic Christian Ethics’.
5
 As Schweitzer is a central figure in each of these 
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discussions, briefly consulting The Quest of the Historical Jesus will illuminate the 
significance of Ramsey’s later comments.
6
 
 Schweitzer argues against eighteenth and nineteenth century attempts to 
interpret Jesus’ moral teachings independently of his vision of the coming 
apocalypse. Against this view he argues, first, that Jesus’ moral teachings must be 
seen in the context of his apocalyptic vision. They must be interpreted as an ‘interim 
ethic’ because of his sense of the coming apocalypse.
7
 Second, most modern 
individuals of Christian faith hold views of the apocalypse radically different from 
those of Jesus. He notes that they are ‘incapable of translating his world-view from 
its late-Jewish form into their own forms of understanding’.
8
 These conclusions 
present him with the challenge of reconciling the indispensability of Jesus’ 
eschatological vision with the modern inability to adopt that vision.  
 Schweitzer’s response is to call for modern analogues to the radical 
apocalyptic perspective. He notes, ‘a period can have a real and living relationship 
with Jesus only to the extent to which it thinks ethically and eschatologically within 
its own categories, and can produce in its own world-view equivalents of those 
desires and expectations which hold such a prominent position in his’.
9
 Later, he 
adds, ‘all that is required is that we think of realizing the kingdom by moral effort 
with the same passion as that with which he expected it to be realized by divine 
intervention’.
10
 This means that while we cannot genuinely replicate the interim 
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ethic, it is our ability to mimic the intensity of the apocalyptic vision bearing down 
on Jesus that will enable the realization of the kingdom. 
 Ramsey inherits the belief that Jesus has a distinctive apocalyptic vision that 
cannot be separated from his moral teachings. He also agrees that modern society 
contains many individuals who ‘no longer in any vivid or significant sense share the 
primitive perspective of apocalypse’
11
 He is thus faced with a challenge similar to 
Schweitzer’s, only he plainly rejects the idea that Jesus offers only an ‘interim 
ethic’.
12
 Instead, Ramsey charts an alternative course by proposing a distinction in 
Jesus’ ethics between those teachings ‘in which the effect of Jesus’ kingdom-
expectation may be seen mainly in their greater urgency or stepped-up intensity, but 
whose essential meaning may be translated without great loss into more moderate 
statements’, and those teachings ‘whose very content and meaning, not simply the 
urgency associated with them, show the effect of Jesus’ kingdom-expectation’.
13
  
 The suggestion that there is a division of apocalyptic-content teachings and 
apocalyptic-intensity teachings is heavily criticized in secondary literature for its 
illegitimacy as an exegetical strategy.
14
 I wish neither to rehash those debates here 
nor to defend Ramsey’s position on this point. For the purposes of this discussion it 
is sufficient to observe that both classes of moral teachings are principally defined by 
their relation to Jesus’ eschatological vision. Shaun Casey may be right to say that 
Jesus’ eschatological perspective is, for Ramsey, ‘a problem to be dealt with’, but I 
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do not think this also means that it is ‘morally insignificant’.
15
 Rather, as David H. 
Smith observes, ‘the “apocalyptic” element which appeared to be a liability in the 
teaching of Jesus turns out to be its strongest asset’.
16
 Schweitzer’s influence leads 
him to underscore the indispensability of eschatology in Christian ethics.  
 He retains this approach in Nine Modern Moralists, saying that ethics are ‘not 
understandable apart from the presence of God’s kingdom’.
17
 On this occasion, 
however, the accent has shifted away from eschatology as ‘urgency and intensity’.
18
 
He says, ‘it was not, as Schweitzer supposed, the immanent coming of the kingdom 
which produced Jesus’ teachings as an “interim ethic”. It was rather the presence of 
the kingdom which produced this unlimited estimate of what one man owes another 
in prompt and radical service’.
19
 Having been criticized for his interpretation of 
Schweitzer, Ramsey tries to change the ‘emphasis but not the substance’ of his early 
work in Basic Christian Ethics.
20
     
 In his letter to Hauerwas twenty years later he links the presence of the 
kingdom not to eschatology but to Christology. He writes that in Basic Christian 
Ethics, ‘I was too enamored with Schweitzer’s “consistent eschatology”. Not that I 
bought that view of interim ethics; exactly the opposite. But I used him – or came out 
of his analysis of the extremity of Jesus’ teaching – for pedagogical purposes’.
21
 
What he revises in his later thought is the idea that eschatology is the theological 
doctrine on which the ethics of Jesus stand or fall. He says, ‘I would go back now 
and speak also of the Kingdom already present, of the words “The Son of Man is 
                                                
15
 Casey, ‘Eschatology and Statecraft’, 174, 176. 
16
 David H. Smith, ‘Paul Ramsey, Love and Killing’, in Love and Society: Essays in the Ethics of Paul 
Ramsey, ed. James T. Johnson and David H. Smith (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1974), 5. 
17
 Ramsey, Nine Modern Moralists, 248.  
18
 Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, 32.  
19




 Ramsey to Hauerwas.   
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Lord also of the Sabbath,” giving full credit in Christian faith to the Messianic claims 
in the Gospels and in the mouth of Jesus (with no worry about trying to prove out 
Jesus’ self-consciousness)’.
22
 The ground of ethics now lies primarily in Jesus as 
Messiah rather than Jesus as apocalyptic figure, just as the role of the kingdom in 
ethics lies largely in the possibilities opened by its inbreaking presence rather than 
intensity afforded by its expectation. He says of this shift, ‘the upshot is to say that 
not [eschatology] but Christology … is the real issue’.
23
 
 The most heavily criticized section of this discussion in Basic Christian 
Ethics falls under the heading ‘In What Way, Then, Are the Teachings of Jesus 
Valid?’ Ramsey recognizes that he must reformulate its central claim about the need 
to translate Jesus’ apocalyptic vision. He assumes that an emphasis on Christology 
and the presence of the kingdom absolves the need to translate radical eschatological 
expectation. He does not, however, believe that his conclusions regarding the moral 
teachings of Jesus are invalidated by this shift. In typical fashion he does not think 
that the shift changes ‘the essential argument about preferential loves, protecting the 
innocent, etc’.
24
 His political ethic remains in tact, only ‘the ground is just more 
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7.1.1 Eschatology and Christology in Moral Perspective 
 For the purposes of this discussion of covenant and repentance it is important 
to observe that as Ramsey sought to revise and reformulate some of his earlier 
political concepts, he did so with an underlying desire to emphasize the foundational 
importance of Christology for ethics. For instance, while he insists that Christology 
rather than eschatology is the basis of disagreement between pacifists and just war 
theorists in Speak Up, only in this private correspondence does he link that assertion 
to a transition in his thinking since the publication of Basic Christian Ethics.
26
 
 Another telling example comes by way of an interview late in his career with 
Edwin O’Brien, who was writing his Ph.D. on Ramsey in Rome at the time.
27
  
Because I believe the exchange is particularly important for our discussion, I will 
reprint it then offer several observations.  
 Ramsey: I use eschatology as a way to cut the link in moral reasoning, 
reasoning back from the good consequences. In this case whatever insures 
survival of judgments of right and wrong. 
 
 O’Brien: Then you are not an incarnationalist, thinking that there will be a 
transition between this world and the next. You seem to emphasize a 
complete cut. There is no direct connection between eschaton and what we 
are doing now, that there will be a continuation of this life in a new heaven 
and earth. 
  
 Ramsey: No, no. Somewhere I read a statement, something to the effect that 
this cannot be the sort of world in which right actions lead to greater evil. 
Now I believe ultimately that is so, but not necessarily in space-time. In the 
noumenal sense of Emmanuel Kant this cannot be a universe, the grain of 
which runs ultimately against good will. But I do think that Catholic moral 
thought since Vatican II has tended more toward taking the consequences to 
decide the rightness and wrongness of moral acts. … So in general I would 
say I am more pessimistic than the general Catholic mind about the human 
fate in the moral sense, but it’s also the case that I am a messier thinker. I 
think the moral universe is pluralistic. 
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Notice, first, the stark contrast between this criticism and earlier attacks on Basic 
Christian Ethics. He is accused of a “complete cut” between this world and the next, 
whereas earlier he was accused of constructing an ethic entirely on translated 
apocalypticism. The distance between these two criticisms marks the significance of 
the shift in his perspective on the role of eschatology for Christian ethics.     
 More importantly, however, is the attempt to define his position on 
eschatology in relation to Catholic moral thought since Vatican II. As he observes in 
1980, Ramsey is concerned about the impulse in those thinkers ‘to explain all moral 
judgments in terms of proportionate reason’.
28
 Such a move supplants judgments of 
right and wrong by using calculation of consequences as the sole criteria for 
determining morally appropriate action. In The Just War he says that ‘would be like 
giving up sin during Lent and returning to it afterward – for the sake of choiceworthy 
consequences’.
29
 But, as we have seen, his sensitivity to the indeterminacy of 
political endeavors leaves Ramsey eager to retain a place for the ‘sort of ambiguity 
that cannot be eliminated from moral choice’.
30
  
 The unspoken reference in his interview with O’Brien is to his frustration 
with the work of Catholic moral theologian Richard McCormick. In a jointly edited 
volume published in 1978 titled Doing Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in 
Conflict Situations, Ramsey rejects McCormick’s claim that all moral goods are 
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 Instead, he argues that ‘indeterminate decisions 
are often an obscure task of moral decision making’.
32
 The only way to cut across 
this indeterminacy is through acts of judgment in accordance with moral principles 
of right and wrong. This is essentially the same argument that I have detailed in the 
preceding chapters on his use of covenant and repentance: political judgments are at 
the same time inescapably indeterminate and governed by rigid moral principles.  
 What is remarkable about his comments in the interview with O’Brien is his 
claim that consequentialism is plagued by a failed eschatology. Because it uses 
human calculation to determine ‘the rightness and wrongness of actions’, 
consequentialism wrongly undersells the Christological foundation of the moral 
universe. The interviewer assumes that he seeks to sever all connections between this 
world and the next – i.e., that his eschatology is not “incarnationalist”. In fact, 
Ramsey is making the more fundamentally theological point that judgments of right 
and wrong can only be sustained by the work of Christ in proper (eschatological) 
perspective. As G. Scott Davis says of Ramsey’s view, ‘the gulf between “already” 
and “not yet” can only be bridged by Jesus, not by any human attempt at “elision 
between this world and the next”’.
33
 Ironically, it is in a more “pluralistic” moral 
universe that eschatology and Christology can be seen in proper perspective. 
Ramsey’s comments demonstrate that developments in his theological perspective on 
eschatology – highlighted here as a shift from eschatology to Christology as the 
ground of ethics – is connected to his theological emphasis on contingency and 
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temporality as features of moral political existence (‘I am a messier thinker. I think 
the moral universe is more pluralistic’).  
 This interview does not explicitly display the fruits of his heightened 
emphasis on Christology – that will be more apparent in the forthcoming discussion 
of Helmut Thielicke. Nonetheless, it demonstrates the way that his later 
understanding of eschatology is constructed on a foundational allegiance to the 
centrality of Christology in the determination of right and wrong. At the moment it is 
sufficient to note that his mature theological perspective maintains both that the grain 
of the universe runs with the good and at the same time that we cannot avoid the 
basic moral indeterminacy of all human endeavors.     
 
7.2 Ramsey’s Transition from Deferred Repentance to Responsibility 
 In the early 1970s “strategy” was the word on Ramsey’s mind when it came 
to political ethics. He, like many, was troubled by the US government’s expanding 
stockpile of nuclear weapons and policy of “Mutual Assured Destruction”. For such 
a calculated thinker it is remarkable that he described it as ‘the most politically 
immoral nuclear policy imaginable’.
34
 His response was to call for ‘maximum 
concern [for] strategic, moral and political reasoning’.
35
  
 This interest in “strategic thinking” motivated a number of his political 
writings from this period. The most significant (and substantial) of these is ‘A 
Political Ethics Context for Strategic Thinking’, which originally appeared in a 
                                                
34




volume titled Strategic Thinking and Its Moral Implications.
36
 The piece is an 
attempt, as James Turner Johnson notes, to turn ‘to the ground shared by himself and 
the secular strategists with whom he would communicate’.
37
 In the first half of the 
essay he accepts the assignment of saying ‘something theological’ about strategic 
thinking.
38
 In the second half he presents a number of conclusions from his life’s 
work on ‘the morality of war and deterrence’.
39
 It was clearly an important essay for 
Ramsey and at the end of his career he reprinted a revised version as an appendix to 
Speak Up for Just War or Pacifism.
40
  
 There are two features of this essay that are particularly important for the 
discussion at hand. The first is his use of Helmut Thielicke’s reading of the covenant 
of Noah as a point of entry into a discussion of political realism. I will have to delay 
comment on that until the start of chapter eight – the forthcoming description of the 
shift from Barth to Thielicke contains essential groundwork for that discussion. The 
second is his reading of H. Richard Niebuhr’s The Responsible Self.
41
 Ramsey was 
particularly fond of Niebuhr’s ethic of responsibility and I want to examine here his 
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use of the work to shift from repentance to responsibility as a central interpretive 
concept for political ethics.
42
 
 Ramsey initiates the discussion by pointing to two different ways of 
interpreting ‘the international system’.
43
 The first of these is the secular strategic 
approach represented by Thomas Schelling’s The Strategy of Conflict, which was a 
significant contribution to political science in the 1960s.
44
 It interprets political 
action according to the ‘law of move and countermove’ or by ‘the action-reaction 
syndrome’.
45
 Because there are a variety of interests and agents in the political realm, 
the job of strategic thinking is to ‘anticipate the subsequent behavior of other 
actors’.
46
 Political action is always anticipatory, reactive and responsive to the 
changing landscape of international relations. He calls this the ‘common 
interpretation of action coming upon us’.
47
  
 The second approach is called the ‘large pattern of interpretation’ and is 
represented by Niebuhr. This position ‘defines the attitude and action of the “church” 
in contrast to the “state”’.
48
 It interprets political action according to ‘something 
more ultimate than the opposed international system’.
49
 While the secular strategy is 
a closed system of response (i.e., only between actors in the same political sphere), 
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the large pattern of interpretation is responsive and reactive to the transcendent 
action of God (or, in Niebuhr’s language, radical monotheism).  
 Ramsey has three purposes in describing this division between the strategic 
‘opposed-system’ and the theological ‘trust-system’.
50
 The first is to demonstrate to 
his secular audience that Niebuhr’s understanding of response shares ‘remarkable 
similarities’ with the strategic viewpoint.
51
 It is their sensitivity to the responsive and 
reactive character of human moral existence that makes ‘the subtle analyses’ of both 
systems ‘mirror images of one another’.
52
 He exhibits this point by calling attention 
to similar interpretations of responsive action in Schelling’s The Strategy of Conflict 
and Niebuhr’s The Responsible Self. 
 But Ramsey also suspects that secular theorists will not buy into the 
Niebuhrian suggestion that the trust-system is a comprehensive guide for political 
action. His second point is to acknowledge both the significance of the theological 
perspective and Niebuhr’s inattention to the role of strategic political analysis. He 
notes that Niebuhr’s account of human agency as responsive is ‘activated and given 
content by an interpretation of God’s action as the context in which all finite actors 
live and move’.
53
 Because Niebuhr is ‘first and foremost a theologian, not an analyst 
of the international system’, he sees that ‘there is good in whatever is happening’.
54
 
This relativizes and subjects judgments of justice and injustice in the international 
system under the divine judgment of God.  
 Ramsey acknowledges that this view alone will not suffice for the 
determination of right political action. There are important considerations that 
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‘simply by omission, [Niebuhr] may seem to deny or underrate, namely, the need for 
independent analysis of action in the opposed international system’.
55
 He adds later 
that Niebuhr ‘can perhaps be faulted for not having analyzed the peculiar nature of 
various other action-systems’.
56
 This wrongly gives the impression that the 
theological perspective is sufficient to ‘erode or displace’ the strategic perspective.
57
 
Given his audience, Ramsey is eager to distance himself from this interpretation of 
political action. His criticism of Niebuhr’s viewpoint is a gesture toward his 
sympathy for the essential role of strategic analysis in international politics.  
 Shaun Casey interprets the protest against Niebuhr as ‘a major theological 
break with his teacher’.
58
 But to make that judgment is to overlook Ramsey’s third 
point of rescuing the interpretation of Niebuhr and demonstrating that a transcendent 
theological perspective on political action can also have a proper role for strategic 
thinking. To do this he needs a theological way of upholding the eternal truth of the 
“trust-system” without neglecting the inescapable “opposed system” of international 
politics. His answer comes by way of Augustine’s two cities doctrine.  
  Ramsey says that it would ‘not be a mistake to attribute to Niebuhr the view 
of the great Augustine’.
59
 Because the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena are 
‘inextricably intermingled to the end of time’, the Christian ‘lives by trust and he 
also lives in a system of distrust’.
60
 This allocates an appropriate role for both 
strategic and theological reasoning by recognizing the nature of responsive and 
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responsible political action. On one hand, the moral agent responds ‘in all action 
coming upon him, also to the action of God; he moves with confidence among the 
living’.
61
 On the other hand, he responds ‘in all action coming upon him, also to the 
action and the anticipated action of a companion in an opposed-system; he … moves 
with wariness among the living’.
62
 His redundant use of the term “also” is meant to 
highlight the overlapping and intermingled cities in which we find ourselves as 
political agents.  
  The balance of moving jointly with confidence and wariness reflects a 
common theme in the preceding discussions of covenant and repentance: political 
judgments are inescapably ambiguous and yet grounded in the certainty of moral 
principles fashioned by Christian love. It is, as Johnson describes, ‘an Augustinian 
appeal to charity in a world where until the end of time there exists an ambiguous 
mixture of the City of God and the City of Earth’.
63
 The two cities language has the 
effect of rejecting the false assumption that the political realm is ‘wholly inimical’ 
and radically opposite to the trust-system.
64
 It also rejects the assumption that 
‘kingdoms of the world can in time become the kingdom of God and his Christ’.
65
 
Both mistakenly elide the intermingled character of historical time and avoid the 
delicate balance of working for good simultaneously with confidence and wariness.  
 
7.2.1 Politics as a Realm of Responsibility 
 It is noteworthy that even Ramsey’s earliest commentary on Niebuhr’s ethics 
recognizes a dual responsibility to God and to others. He observes in the essay on 
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Niebuhr in Nine Modern Moralists, ‘the response is not only to God. Instead, the 
extension and intensification of the scope of responsibility for is largely a matter of 
response to every one of the creatures of God’.
66
 Although those early comments 
have not fully considered the political implications of such a claim, he uses The 
Responsible Self in ‘A Political Ethics Context’ to make essentially the same point 
about the theological necessity of responding both to the action of God and the 
actions of God’s creatures. His belief that Niebuhr’s ethic of responsibility captures 
the essential function of Augustine’s two cities doctrine is one reason Scott Davis 
claims that ‘Ramsey sees in H. R. Niebuhr the contemporary theologian who most 
fully embodies Augustine’s insights into the transforming nature of Christ’s advent 
into the human world’.
67
 
 His insistence that a theological perspective is essential for but not identical 
to the strategic approach to political action goes all the way back to his discussion of 
Augustine in War and the Christian Conscience. There he criticized Ernest Barker’s 
account of absolute justice for so radically transcending earthly determinations of 
justice that the heavenly city ‘did not fundamentally challenge the earthly one’.
68
 
Ramsey insisted that Barker ‘did not take seriously into account Augustine’s belief 
that there can be no justice, or rendering man his due, unless God is given his due’.
69
 
The upshot of the two cities doctrine for political ethics is that all earthly justice is 
rooted in the justice of God. Thus all political strategy is in some way dependent 
upon theological accounts of political action in relation to divine action. The two 
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cities doctrine allows Ramsey to temper his criticisms of Niebuhr by highlighting the 
significance of the theological perspective for a proper appreciation of strategic 
thinking.  
 At the same time, this later use of Augustine also serves to rescue one of his 
early fundamental distinctions in Christian political reasoning, namely, the divide 
between public and private. In chapter one I observed that in War and the Christian 
Conscience he positions himself against ‘the modern period’ where ‘a complete 
distinction between personal and political morality … [has] only exhibited or 
accomplished a return of mankind to significant citizenship in one city only’.
70
 But 
his allegiance to Reinhold Niebuhr left him unable to avoid this distinction 
altogether. The impetus for his use of repentance as a point of entry into political 
ethics was a desire to understand the difference between private and public morality 
(though he insisted there was ‘not an essential difference’).
71
 With the shift to the 
language of responsibility he no longer juxtaposes demands on an individual in 
private capacity and demands on the office of the magistrate in the political 
community. Rather, he has replaced that account altogether with one where the 
tension of moral political existence is now characterized by two intermingled cities.
72
 
 Two hallmarks of his description of politics as a realm of responsibility 
follow from this shift from private/public to city of God/city of man. First, all 
political endeavors are limited by the unpredictability of the city of Man. He says, 
‘statesmen are called to action in the midst of the unpredictabilities of other 
collectives and their leaders. The nation-state is surrounded by arbitrariness on all 
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 He is quick to add that being surrounded by arbitrariness is not the same as 
being surrounded by hostility. Rather, the unpredictability of the political realm 
‘requires, among other things, preparedness, threat, and perhaps an actual use of 
force’.
74
 This simply means that the politician is responsible for preparing for the 
possibility of the worst political event, but not the inevitability of it.  
 Of course, unpredictability rather than enmity as a hallmark of the political 
realm was Ramsey’s point all along. He insisted to John Hick that deferred 
repentance was not sinister but rather merely doing what is right in a climate where 
the determination of right action is dependent upon continuously changing 
circumstances.
75
 The problem with the earlier account was that deferred repentance 
confusingly implied a suspension of moral norms in the political realm. With the 
language of responsibility Ramsey is free to speak of the political system as 
‘characterized by the unpredictability of autonomous actors and reactors’.
76
 This still 
allows him to maintain and define ‘the minimum morality of responsible action 
within the inter-state system’.
77
 The tension of the heavenly city and the earthly city, 
as he says in ‘Turn Toward Just War’, ‘puts politics in its place’ and allows that 
‘decision and action can be what they are worth’.
78
 When paired with the two cities 
doctrine the language of responsibility allows him to sidestep any indication of moral 
anarchy and emphasize systemic unpredictability and the importance of political 
judgment.   
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 The second hallmark of politics as a realm of responsibility is that political 
actors cannot simply do as they please; there are rules of practice governing political 
conduct. Because politics is a realm of response – in Ramsey’s words, ‘since the 
actors are peoples (or their governments) who have purposes’ – he rejects any 
attempt to analyze political interaction which refuses to come to terms with the 
systemic limitations and rules of practice.
79
 This is why the just war theory offers not 
merely ‘statements of the justifications needed for resorts to conflict’, but, more 




 These rules of practice are essentially similar to the ‘judgmental criteria’ in 
his account of deferred repentance.
81
 The shift here is to define those moral criteria 
in the theological language of responsibility. Thus, as he says elsewhere, ‘theological 
ethics, of course, must go as far as it can … in clarifying the meaning of political 
responsibility’.
82
 What is most significant about Ramsey’s shift to politics as 
responsibility is that he sustains the basic political themes of contingency and 
temporality, as well as the insistence on “judgmental criteria”, while leaving behind 
both the tenuous distinction between our private and public moral capacities and the 
ambiguity over who or what is having its repentance deferred.   
 Thus, I believe Ramsey reinterprets his account of politics as deferred 
repentance in light of Niebuhr’s The Responsible Self to produce an account of 
politics as a realm of response and responsibility. This theological shift sets the stage 
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for Ramsey’s later reformulation of these perspectives in the concepts of “no 
moment more” and “moral anguish”. Now, however, I turn to Ramsey’s shift from 
Barth to Thielicke.  
 
7.3 From Karl Barth to Helmut Thielicke  
 Covenant does not disappear from Ramsey’s later writings quite as 
repentance does. In discussions of politics he instead continues reinventing his use of 
the term to accord with the expanding range of doctrines upon which he situates his 
understanding of political realism. One of these late reformulations of covenant 
relies on a shift from the theology of Karl Barth to that of Helmut Thielicke. I want 
to suggest that the shift reflects an attempt to infuse his realism with, at the same 
time, a stronger doctrine of Christology and a more accessible description of the 
political realm to secular reasoning. That he thought Thielicke could address these 
problems, however, requires demonstration. The evidence is disparate and he never 
explicitly gives reasons for the disappearance of Barth and the appearance of 
Thielicke. I give my conclusion, then, up front, and ask the reader’s good faith in 
withholding judgment on the evidence until the full argument has been made.   
  
7.3.1 Ramsey’s Turn away from Barth’s Covenant Theology in Political Ethics 
 Given that he felt the need to shift the ground of his ethics from eschatology 
to Christology, why not simply return to Barth for this manouvre? I want to offer 
three reasons why I believe Ramsey is hesitant to continue using Barth as a resource 
for his political ethics. The first is what appears to be a fear of misinterpretation of 
Christian Ethics and the Sit-In, which he composed in part as a deliberate attempt to 
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engage those (particularly in the South) who were inclined to privilege social order 
to the pursuit of justice through civil disobedience.
83
 When he sent a copy to Mary 
Frances Thelen, Professor of Religion at Randolph-Macon Women’s College, he 
noted, ‘some parts of my book are calculated to make me persona grata with the 
Southern white man, and therefore persona non grata in other quarters. I hope that 
these parts will be received as an effort to induce some fundamental reflection into 
the situation, and not at all a rejection of the action itself, much less the notives (sic) 
of the participants’.
84
 He seems to have hoped that his use of Barth’s covenant 
theology would be a form of theological and social reasoning accessible to those 
unconvinced by the witness of the sit-ins and the moral rationale of civil 
disobedience.  
 At the same time, he also seems to be frustrated by misinterpretations of this 
approach. One folder of writings and speeches in the Ramsey Papers contains a 
response to a paper by ‘Professor Edwards’ of Wesley Theological Seminary on 
‘White Racism’.
85
 Although the original paper by Edwards is lost and the argument 
is difficult to reconstruct based solely on Ramsey’s comments, I take the author to 
have interpreted Christian Ethics and the Sit-In as a defense of the conservative 
structures of oppression in the South at the time. Ramsey, upset that his use of Barth 
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had been interpreted as a rooting of racial distinctions in the doctrine of creation, 
responds,  
 Throughout his paper, I regret to say, Professor Edwards associates me with 
the theological view that makes racial distinctions a part of the ‘order of 
creation’. This despite the fact that I cite with approval the eloquent passage 
of Karl Barth which says that the only ‘inter-face’ situation that is of the 
order of God’s ineffaceable creation is our man-womanhood, and in that 





I take Edwards’ misinterpretation to have put some measure of fear in Ramsey’s 
mind over the usefulness of Barth for such arguments. The poor commercial and 
academic reception of Christian Ethics and the Sit-In – his appeals for a revised and 
enlarged edition, as noted in chapter five, were swiftly rejected and the reviews of 
the book were largely negative – must have offered little encouragement of a more 
charitable reception.  
 Notice that in the above quotation rather than defending his position on 
political ethics, Ramsey retreats into the created significance of gender distinctions. I 
take his confidence in the book and his vision for its potential impact on a Christian 
understanding of political ethics to have been on the rocks not long after its release. 
Add to that uneasiness about misinterpretation and he seems to have been content to 
leave behind the usefulness of Barth’s covenantal theology in political ethics.  
 His move into the realm of gender distinctions gestures toward my second 
proposed reason for the shift to Thielicke. Although brief, I believe it to be 
significant: Ramsey found that Barth’s formula fit more comfortably with his 
arguments in medical and sexual ethics. After 1961 the internal basis/external basis 
formula next explicitly appears in its new role as the theological groundwork for The 






 Secondary literature mirrors this movement by tending to 
consider the implications of his use of Barth for medical and reproductive ethics 




The third reason I propose for the abandonment of Barth’s covenantal 
theology in political ethics has to do with Barth’s own ethics and selected “Barthian” 
interpretations of Ramsey’s just war theory. In chapter five I highlighted the fact that 
he uses Dogmatics III/1 to reinforce his political theology rather than III/4.
89
 In his 
essays ‘Uses of Power’ and ‘The Case of the Curious Exception’, he uncovers the 
reason for that preference by voicing several criticisms of the ‘special ethics’ in III/4. 
In both essays he characterizes Barth’s position by associating the Christological 
rooting of the state with collapsed eschatological perfectionism.
90
 Barth is not the 
only person Ramsey falsely accuses of eschatological perfectionism (it is one of his 
favorite lines of attack), but it seems in this case that his flawed reading of III/4 
contributes to the turn to Thielicke.  
Along these lines he also seems to think that Barth’s Christology leads to a 
distinct misinterpretation of his own use of Christ as the ground of just war norms. 
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Said another way, he never feels that his just war theory gets a fair reading from 
“Barthians”. An exchange of letters with Arthur Cochrane at Yale University proves 
instructive on this point.  
 In 1964 Cochrane writes in response to Ramsey’s published review of his 
book on war in Cross Currents. He begins by reciting Ramsey’s observation that the 
Barmen Declaration ‘puts the just war theory on trial and condemns it along with the 
natural justice it expresses. [The perspective of the Barmen Declaration is that] if 
there is a just war theory beside the revelation of Christ, then it will come to pass that 
“Christians” will use it to justify their allegiance to some Hitler or nation as a second 
Lord’.
91
 Cochrane objects to this claim, saying, ‘may I suggest, Paul, that there is a 
certain confusion here (a) in regard to the relation of the Barmen Declaration to 
natural law; (b) in regard to the relation of Barmen to a theory of just war’.
92
 He goes 
on to protest Ramsey’s judgment that the Barmen Declaration denies the existence of 
natural law and to remind him that ‘all the signatories of the Barmen Declaration 
then believed in a doctrine of just war!’
93
 
 The aspect of Ramsey’s response relevant for this discussion is his concern 
over Barmen’s failure to locate the theological ground of the just war theory in 
revelation rather than natural law. He rejects Cochrane’s suggestion that his doctrine 
of just war ‘must derive from natural law’, arguing instead that just war norms have 
to do with ‘the drawing out of the implications of Christian faith and love for 
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concrete social and political issues’.
94
 Just war norms must be rooted in Christ if they 
are to take seriously the depth of human sin and the radical work of charity made 
possible by his redemptive love. As early as Basic Christian Ethics Ramsey insisted 
that it was not natural law but agape that determined the just war criteria.
95
  
 Almost 25 years later he makes precisely the same point with regard to the 
work of a Mennonite thinker operating within a Barthian theological framework, 
John Howard Yoder. He says in Speak Up,  
 Unless his understanding is corrected or supplemented elsewhere, Yoder 
believes that just-war appeals are only and simply to natural justice, … If 
that were sufficient, then the state’s function in the use of armed force and 
citizen participation are based entirely on another morality than that of the 
Gospel; there is then a ‘double morality’ needed to warrant Christian 
participation in the resistance of evil, … This minimalist justice could 
exhaust itself in defense of one’s own life, one’s own family, one’s own 
nation against aggression; and it would require a doubling of loyalties to 





What he intends by rejecting any understanding of a “doubling of loyalties” is the 
idea that an appeal to ethics based entirely on something other than the Gospel would 
subsequently present to Christians two separate accounts of their justified moral 
action in politics.   
 Although Ramsey’s protests are difficult to understand, he seems to think that 
the kind of Barthian theological perspective on politics found both in the Barmen 
Declaration and Yoder’s work produces a distinct blindness to the way in which just 
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war norms are derived from the love of Christ and not from a double loyalty between 
revelation and natural law. He is worried that Barth will tempt readers into 
overlooking the deeply Christological roots of his political theology. This becomes 
clearest in his attempt to articulate to Cochrane his suspicions of the usefulness of 
Barth’s theological perspective for political ethics. He writes,   
 I do not even object to Barth’s denial that resort to war is of the essence of 
the State’s responsibilities (though this statement of a christological doctrine 
of the state’s appointment is apt to be exceedingly misleading), provided his 
position allows not just for what he calls an exception (here and elsewhere in 
his specific ethics) but that there are love-embodied principles for the 
governance of the ‘exception’. Where his statement misleads is that it is apt 
to tempt us into supposing that the polis, Christologically viewed, is now 
already the heavenly polis, and that the use of force is something less than a 
generally valid responsibility, whose limitations are to be Christologically 





Just as detailed in chapter five, the difference between Barth and Ramsey emerges 
over their understanding of the use of force. But Ramsey’s comments on this 
occasion reflect an underlying anxiety about Barth tempting readers into a 
misinterpretation of the just war theory as “derived from the fall”. That is precisely 
what he thinks has taken place in the Barmen Declaration and Yoder’s critical 
approach.  
 I mentioned above that after Basic Christian Ethics he seeks to increase the 
visibility of the Christological foundations of his political ethics. Although he 
misinterprets Barth (and Barmen) here – Cochrane makes this point and Ramsey 
ignores it – the crucial observation is that he feels the need to turn away from Barth 
to make that move. However possible it may have been for him to employ Barth in 
the direction he wanted his ethics to go, he could not see Barth’s usefulness for the 
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project. Thus, as early as 1964, just three years after the publication of Christian 
Ethics and the Sit-In, Ramsey was looking for a new source of covenant theology to 
emphasize the Christological root of political ethics.  
 
7.3.2 Ramsey’s Turn to Covenant in the Political Ethics of Helmut Thielicke 
 This search leads Ramsey to the second volume of Helmut Thielicke’s 
Theological Ethics.
98
 Thielicke developed a Lutheran approach to political ethics in 
Hamburg, Germany during the 1960s and 70s while Ramsey worked on similar 
themes at Princeton University. Early in his career Ramsey observes that in Luther’s 
political ethics soldiers and magistrates determine right action ‘entirely by natural 
justice and by the necessities of the situation, and not at all by love’.
99
 While on the 
basis of this claim a turn to a Lutheran thinker like Thielicke may seem to run 
against the aforementioned emphasis on the Christological root of just war norms, 
Ramsey shares several significant affinities with Thielicke’s political writings.
100
  
 Here James Childress helps to capture the difference between Barth and 
Thielicke as resources for political theology. He says,   
 Ramsey indicates the affinities of his position along these lines with the 
Lutheran interpretation of the state, which appears in Künneth’s and 
Thielicke’s thought, among others, as an ‘order of necessity’. For Ramsey, 
then, in contrast to Barth, the Fall and God’s governance of man post lapsum 
and pre-resurrection are ‘decisively important for Christian political theory’. 
He offers a ‘realistic interpretation of the state and its law as God’s 
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Childress helps to call attention to the fact that in Ramsey’s turn from Barth to 
Thielicke he seeks an account of political realism with a proper respect for the fallen 
world in which we find ourselves. The important distinction to keep in mind here is 
the one previously noted in the exchange with Arthur Cochrane: the difference 
between ethics determined by Christ in a fallen world and ethics determined by the 
Fall. Ramsey seeks a place for the Fall in the determination of realism while at the 
same time insisting on the ground of political ethics in the person and work of Christ.  
 Charles Curran fails to account for this difference when he comments on the 
role of Thielicke in Ramsey’s ethics, saying, ‘Jesus Christ has come into the world 
and sent his Spirit upon us, but political activity goes on much as before under its 
own sign’.
102
 Thielicke provides a theological link between covenant in the Old 
Testament and the modern context of just war norms – but it is always for Ramsey 
the love of Christ that determines those norms. His turn to Thielicke is accordingly a 
way of renewing the Christological center of political ethics through covenant 
theology.
103
   
 Through Thielicke he also seeks potential inroads into dialogue with secular 
accounts of the political realm. He sees Thielicke’s use of the covenant of Noah and 
Tower of Babel narratives as accessible to secular reasoning. In ‘Force and Political 
Responsibility’, the first major essay written on political ethics after The Just War, 
he notes,  
 In speaking of these stories, I may sound like a literalist. I claim rather to be a 
mythologist, who happens to believe that there is more light and truth 
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concerning the political task of mankind to be found in these myths than in 
any number of theorems about politics consecutively arranged, or in any 
amount of ‘systems analysis’ or decision-making with or without the 
assistance of computers. The claim is doubtless true of other great cultural 
myths as well; but these are ours. … Instead of taking these stories to be 
either literally or mythically true, you are welcomed to regard them as 
legends and fantasies. I suggest only that you join me in the thought-
experiment of asking what would be the contour’s of man’s political task on 
the underside of these myths if they were true of the human condition. I ask 
you to think as if you with all men are present at political creation, at the Fall, 
at Babel, and with Noah after the evil propensities of men’s hearts in that 
generation deservedly ended in the first destruction – and the end of that end 




He takes these ‘myths of Genesis’ to be ‘one of the world’s best commentaries on 
government’ and hopes they will provide a point of entry into political realism even 
for those who are not Jewish or Christian. 
105
  
 There are several other examples of attempts by Ramsey to make secular use 
of Thielicke. He writes to Michael Walzer in praise of Just and Unjust Wars and 
recommends that Walzer’s position ‘bears strong resemblance’ to Thielicke’s.
106
 In 
1973 he assigns ‘Force and Political Responsibility’ as ‘homework’ to a group of 
military chaplains and uses the narratives as a neutral starting point for describing the 
context of political action.
107
 Lastly, in ‘A Political Ethics Context for Strategic 
Thinking’ he reads Thielicke alongside H. Richard Niebuhr and secular strategic 
political theorist Thomas Schelling.
108
 As I mentioned above, the essay is an attempt 
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 However counterintuitive it may seem, I suggest that Ramsey turns to 
Thielicke’s covenant theology for an emphasis on the Christological center of 
political ethics and, simultaneously, an accessible way of characterizing political 
realism to secular forms of reasoning. There is much more to be said in the next 
chapter on his appropriation of Thielicke’s commentary on the covenant of Noah. 
The aim of this chapter has been to initiate the process of bringing together the 
concepts of covenant and repentance by taking note of three significant theological 
shifts from eschatology to Christology, from repentance to responsibility and from 
Barth to Thielicke.   
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Chapter Eight 
Late Reformulations of Covenant and Repentance 
 
Such reflection is required by the tension among just-war teachings, by the fact that 
we are obliged to observe all the norms.
1
 
 – Paul Ramsey, Speak Up for Just War or Pacifism 
 
 As I argued in the introduction to this study, Ramsey does not talk enough 
about repentance for it to serve as a general category in his political ethics. 
Covenant, too, though he calls it the Leitmotif of his work, is employed 
unsystematically and to various purposes in his political ethics.
2
 There is no 
summative piece of writing from the end of his career which draws together his 
thinking on covenant and repentance and plainly justifies the path our exploration 
has taken. Yet, I believe that the concepts of contingency, temporality and political 
judgment, which have weaved in and around these two terms, do significantly 
converge. I hinted at this in the previous chapter; now I want to take the matter 
further by relating covenant and repentance to two focal points in Ramsey’s later 
writings. The first of these is the use of the covenant of Noah and Tower of Babel 
narratives in ‘A Political Ethics Context for Strategic Thinking’.
3
 The second 
involves two striking phrases that occur in his last book, Speak Up for Just War or 
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Pacifism: “no moment more” and “moral anguish”. These two focal points mark an 
attempt to repair and rethink the theological perspective behind his earlier use of 
covenant and repentance. Once my analysis is in place, I will return finally to discuss 




8.1 The Covenant of Noah, the Tower of Babel and Politics as Power vs. Power 
  I mentioned in chapter seven that ‘A Political Ethics Context’ contains two 
essential arguments for the discussion of covenant and repentance. I have already 
addressed his use of H. Richard Niebuhr’s The Responsible Self with regard to the 
shift from repentance to responsibility. Now we must take up his use of Helmut 
Thielicke.
5
 In 1962 Ramsey observes that the Genesis narrative of the Tower of 
Babel can ‘teach us a great deal about man’s political life’.
6
 In ‘A Political Ethics 
Context’ he pairs that insight with Thielicke’s reading of the covenant of Noah to 
offer two lessons from these Genesis “myths”.
7
 
 From the story of the Tower of Babel we learn that human striving is subject 
to divine overruling (and therefore limited). He repeats the H.R. Niebuhrian idea that 
‘each man and nation has “a view of the universal”, but none has “the universal 
view”’.
8
 Politically speaking, ‘there is confusion of tongues, confusion of justices’.
9
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Because our political lives continue to operate under the divine judgment witnessed 
at Babel, contingency of knowledge and limitation of certainty are fixed elements of 
the context of political action. Michael McKenzie captures nicely the function of this 
narrative, saying, ‘the story of humanity is consistently one of submerged 
pretensions … divine judgment is always the result of such hubris’.
10
 To say it 
another way, the story of Babel displays Ramsey’s understanding of what it means to 
be political agents living in the earthly city.  
 From the story of the covenant of Noah, we learn that government – i.e., 
systems of political authority and representation – is the good gift of God for the 
preservation of the fallen world. He learns from Thielicke that ‘the world between 
the fall and the judgment is not only empowered to set up states, it is condemned to 
do so’.
11
 We are “empowered” in the sense that the covenant ‘holds the waters of 
God’s wrath in place’.
12
 The promise that God’s judgment will never again take the 
destructive form it takes in the flood frees us for the pursuit of justice in a fallen 
world. At the same time, we are “condemned” in the sense that the covenant 
commissions government by these words from Genesis 9: ‘Whoever sheds man’s 
blood, by man shall his blood be shed, for in the image of God made he man’.
13
 The 
covenant installs ‘a power’ that ‘holds in place the imaginations of men’s hearts’.
14
 
This reflects the continual limitation and contingency of human agency and political 
determinations of justice. In so doing it determines the ‘nature, mission, and means’ 
                                                
10
 Michael C. McKenzie, Paul Ramsey's Ethics: The Power of 'Agape' in a Postmodern World 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 8.  
11
 Thielicke, Theological Ethics, 441. 
12
 Ramsey, Speak Up, 185.  
13
 Ibid.  
14
 Ibid. As Thielicke says, ‘egoism … is not set aside but limited, controlled, and used so that its force 
may be directed into positive channels’. Thielicke, Theological Ethics, 165-166. 
 200 
of government in a fallen world.
15
 Thielicke thus provides an account of the 
covenant of Noah that articulates the divine link between limitation and preservation, 
restraint and gift and empowerment and condemnation. 
 It is also worth noting that Ramsey uses two phrases – “power vs. power” and 
“the law of move and countermove” – to describe the character of political 
engagements in this period of time between the fall and the last judgment. He argues 
that ‘the Noachian covenant means that … power must be limited by further power, 
else it is bound to become arbitrary and unlimited’.
16
 The upshot of this is a rejection 
of any analysis of political action adhering to a philosophy of “might is right”. He 
writes in unpublished notes on Thielicke that such an approach ‘is a decision against 
the Noahic order of the world … against the principle of order from which the state 
derives and on which all authority and law depend’.
17
 In this way he uses Thielicke’s 
reading to set up his subsequent discussion of the similarities between secular and 
theological descriptions of politics as governed by anticipation, response and 
responsibility rather than simply the unbridled exercise of power. 
 Charles Curran criticizes this use of the Genesis narratives by arguing that it 
subverts the impact of the advent of Christ on political ethics. He says, as I noted 
previously, ‘the political life of man in this world goes on under the sign of Babel 
and nothing this triumphalistic secular age can do will undo that verdict. Jesus Christ 
has come into the world and sent his Spirit upon us, but political activity goes on 
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much as before under its own sign’.
18
 Curran is right to recognize that Ramsey reads 
these Old Testament stories as revealing eternal truths about the context of political 
action that remain unchanged by the advent of Christ. Yet, I think he confuses the 
difference between a Christian political ethic wholly determined by the earthly city 
and one faithful to the heavenly city in the midst of the earthly one. As I noted in 
chapter seven, the critical point in Ramsey’s correspondence with Arthur Cochrane 
is his insistence that the limitations of just war are ‘to be Christologically reflected 
upon in the service of life in a fallen world (not derived from the Fall)’.
19
 Said 
another way by David Smith, in his political ethics ‘the irrelevance of love … is the 
one thing that can never be assumed’.
20
 Curran’s critical interpretation denies 
Ramsey the space for the two cities to be intermingled rather than wholly inimical.   
 Curran also voices concerns that ‘there are no balancing remarks about a 
more positive role of the state’.
21
 This overlooks his adoption of the Lutheran view, 
via Thielicke, that ‘enforcement and power are an alien work of [God’s] mercy’.
22
 
Government as a preservative ordinance is a positive role of the state stemming from 
(and ordained by) God’s mercy. More importantly, this also overlooks the fact that 
Ramsey goes farther than Thielicke in his vision for the positive role of the state. 
David Attwood makes this clear when he says ‘there is a world of difference 
between the typically positive way in which Ramsey speaks of the state’s concern to 
preserve justice and order, and the way in which Thielicke speaks negatively of the 
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state as an emergency institution’.
23
 While Thielicke speaks of ‘the demand for the 
limitation of power’, he lacks the tension between limitation, obligation and 
justification so ubiquitous in Ramsey’s writings.
24
 His prescriptive norms of the just 
war theory contain within them moral obligation that assumes a constructive social 
function to the work of political authority.  
  A recent article by Shaun Casey revisits and expands Curran’s line of attack. 
His most damaging criticism highlights the way that ‘A Political Ethics Context’ 
treats the Babel/Noah narratives in reverse order. Ramsey says, ‘the confusion of 
tongues, taken alone, meant that what happened was bound to happen: that by the 
time of Noah every imagination of the thoughts of men’s hearts was only evil 
continually’.
25
 This implies that the Noahic covenant of Genesis 9 follows the Tower 
of Babel narrative of Genesis 11. Casey says, ‘If the Noah episode displays the 
depravity of humanity and the need for government, then the Babel story must show 
that government didn’t work very well’.
26
 While Casey’s point is certainly on target, 
I am hesitant to conclude that it has a devastating effect on the essential argument 
that these Genesis narratives teach us about the futility of human strivings in light of 
divine judgment and the constructive (albeit limited) purpose of government as a 
good gift of God. Jeffrey Siker attempts a more comprehensive treatment of the role 
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of scripture in Ramsey’s ethics and I am content to defer to that study on the 
question of his quality as an exegetical scholar.
27
  
 After voicing this initial criticism, Casey derives two further conclusions 
from Ramsey’s use of the Genesis narratives: (1) ‘He gives no account of how the 
duty to love one’s neighbor relates to international order and politics’; (2) ‘Instead 
the biblical warrants which are invoked are used to endorse a realist political view’.
28
 
The second claim is surely correct – Ramsey does use the narratives to endorse a 
realist political view. The problem is that he would not have thought that he needed 
to apologize for doing so. Thus, while Casey’s term ‘realism transforming theology’ 
is meant pejoratively, I suspect Ramsey would have taken it as something of a 
compliment.
29
 As Who Speaks for the Church demonstrates, he certainly felt that 
there was a good deal of modern theology in need of a healthy dose of political 
realism. This leaves Casey’s first claim as the one requiring substantial engagement.  
 As I mentioned in chapter seven, Ramsey divides ‘A Political Ethics Context’ 
into two halves. The first uses the covenant of Noah, the Tower of Babel and a 
reading of H.R. Niebuhr alongside Thomas Schelling to explain his theological 
interpretation of the political realm.
30
 The second half opens with the heading ‘The 
Morality of War and of Deterrence’ and shortly thereafter offers this introductory 
comment:  
 The political ethics limits and determination of justice in war’s conduct and 
in deterrence policy I have elaborated elsewhere. Readers who do not know 
this literature are my loss. That loss cannot be repaired here. I can only 
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28
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summarize certain theses which I have, I believe, proved elsewhere in 
extenso. The following are conclusions which I believe are demonstrable in 




What follows is a summary of his lifelong wrestle with expressions of agape in the 
political sphere. Discrimination, immunity of non-combatants, proportion, etc. – 
these are the characteristic elements of purposive agapeic politics. Having already 
answered the request to ‘say something theological’ in the opening section, and 
because the piece is composed for a secular audience, he does not explicitly connect 
each of these principles and ideas to the revelation of Christ or the work of Christian 
love.
32
 But the introductory comment nonetheless serves to make his point – that 
elsewhere he has proved “in extenso” the roots of this political ethic in agape.      
 Only in light of these claims can we respond to Casey’s suggestion that 
Ramsey ‘gives no account of how the duty to love one’s neighbor relates to 
international order and politics’.
33
 That is, in point of fact, what the second section of 
the essay is about. Ramsey’s opening qualification might have been intended to meet 
such criticisms directly. His work consistently emphasizes both the conditions of 
purposive political action (esse) and the purposive actions themselves (bene esse, in 
accordance with just war criteria). The two halves of ‘A Political Ethics Context’ 
take precisely this shape. He uses the Genesis narratives to drive his understanding 
of the context of right political action and then articulates ‘the political ethics limits 
and determination of justice in war’s conduct’.
34
 It is the esse and the bene esse of 
political ethics, or, more directly, how agape relates to international order and 
politics.  
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32
 Ibid., 183.  
33
 Ibid., 185. 
34
 Ibid., 183. 
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8.1.2 Reinventing Covenant and Repentance in ‘A Political Ethics Context’ 
 What I find most striking about Ramsey’s use of the covenant of Noah and 
the Tower of Babel narratives is the way they reinvent and reintroduce several of the 
essential elements of his earlier development of covenant and repentance. I want to 
suggest two ways this takes place. First, the narratives illuminate the tension between 
divine judgment and human political judgments in a way similar to his appropriation 
of repentance from the work of H. Richard Niebuhr. The usefulness of repentance as 
a political concept centers on its ability to uphold the proper function of judgment in 
the Christian life. It calls attention to the hubris behind our moral endeavors without 
levelling the norms and principles with which we identify actions as right or wrong. 
Ramsey uses the Genesis stories to argue similarly that while human striving is 
always ‘subject to the divine overruling’, the covenant also establishes a proper 
social function for government operating under norms of justice, law and order.
35
  
 Consider these later arguments in light of his correspondence in Dialog with 
Robert Hoyer over the issue of repentance (examined in chapter three). Ramsey 
notes that Hoyer uses justification by faith in Christ to ‘level’ all earthly distinctions 
between relative (or, ostensible) justice and injustice.
36
 McKenzie interprets this 
comment, saying, ‘Hoyer has confused the horizontal with the vertical. Or better, he 
has left no room for the horizontal’.
37
 In ‘A Political Ethics Context’ Ramsey says, 
‘the verdict at Babel only suppressed man’s “vertical” aspiration to high heaven; it 
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 Paul Ramsey to Kent Knutson, May 10, 1967, Box 14, Ramsey Papers. He adds later, ‘One really 
cannot suck everything into “justification”, “faith”, “repentance”; or level everything before these 
grand moments in the Christian life’. The letter was later published as Paul Ramsey, ‘Two Extremes: 
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did nothing to allay the resulting chaos on the horizontal plane’.
38
 What did allay that 
chaos was the institution of government in the covenant of Noah: ‘To prevent that 
vertical turn upward toward unbridled expansion, the law of move and countermove 
… was established for the good of mankind always’.
39
 In both discussions his 
principal aim is to maintain the radical transcendence of “vertical” relations between 
humanity and God without erasing the significance of “horizontal” relations 
governed by the relative justice of human judgments.  
 His appropriation of Thielicke’s power vs. power interpretation of 
international politics also draws heavily on the covenant theology examined in 
chapter five. There I presented his argument that power itself cannot be the bene esse 
of politics – that would endorse the axiom that might is right.
40
 Rather, power is the 
medium by which the political agent moves the community with purpose toward the 
good. This insistence on the provisional union of power and purpose in moral 
political agency relies on a prior theological account of systemic ambiguity in human 
relations across time. While I do not want to retread ground already covered at 
length, it is significant to recall that he understands human political authority as both 
unfulfilled and provisional fulfilment because of the ambiguous way it corresponds 
to the authority of Christ.  
 Thielicke also objects to the suggestion that power is ‘with the nature of what 
is to be done, or whether it is right or wrong’, i.e., with the view that might is right.
41
 
It is instead connected ‘only with the possibility of its being done, its capacity for 
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 Thus, Ramsey’s early use of covenant theology to develop the idea 
that power is the currency of political progress enables him to envision a constructive 
political ethic grounded in Thielicke’s description of international politics as power 
vs. power. Although he omits the explicitly Christological appeal in consideration of 
his secular audience, he puts forth essentially the same argument by using the 
covenant of Noah and the Tower of Babel to describe government as both unfulfilled 
(‘subjected to the divine overruling’) and provisional fulfilment (‘commissioned’).
43
    
 Both of these observations demonstrate the way his use of the Genesis 
narratives reinvents several of the driving theological concepts behind his 
understanding of covenant and repentance. His sources have shifted from Barth to 
Thielicke and from the creation stories to the covenant of Noah and the Tower of 
Babel. The language of repentance has disappeared altogether. Nonetheless, the 
underlying emphasis on the theological significance of indeterminacy, temporality 
and judgment remain in tact.   
 
8.2 ‘No Moment More’ and the Just War as ‘Moral Anguish’ 
 The second focal point I want to examine involves two striking phrases that 
occur in Speak Up for Just War or Pacifism: “no moment more” and “moral 
anguish”. These terms mark an attempt to reformulate the perspective behind his 
earlier use of covenant and deferred repentance as political concepts. They also serve 
to reinforce his emphasis on the theological significance of contingency and 
temporality as features of political morality.   
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43
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 In the late 1970s a common topic of discussion among ethicists was the idea 
that pacifists and just war theorists share a “presumption against violence”. Although 
he calls that viewpoint ‘mistaken’, Ramsey intends Speak Up as a contribution to this 
discussion by way of a response to documents released by the United Methodist 
Bishops under the title In Defense of Creation: The Nuclear Crisis and a Just 
Peace.
44
 His principal concern is with its attempt to use the logic of a presumption 
against violence to transcend the ‘two options for Christian conscience’.
45
 Against 
this claim he proposes an alternative starting point for such an ecumenical 
discussion.  
 Ramsey suggests that ‘the one thing Christian pacifists and just warriors have 
in common is that if anything is shown to be per se a moral atrocity, or to have no 
“just cause” now, it should be given Christian endorsement no moment more’.
46
 He 
repeats this view later in the discussion, adding, ‘if deterrence is emptied of every 
possible moral justification … what then should Christians do? That would settle the 
matter for any traditional pacifist, nuclear pacifist, or just-war Christian’.
47
 He 
recognizes that no anticipation or calculation of justice or peace can justify the 
perpetration of moral atrocity. Pacifists and just war thinkers are thus united by a 
“presumption” against moral atrocity rather than violence per se.   
                                                
44




 Ibid., 52. 
47
 Ibid., 63. Ramsey voices the idea that per se immoral actions have no place in a Christian account 
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to prove his point, saying, ‘Surely, at all times and places and under whatever historical circumstances 
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 While his refusal to identify all acts of violence as moral atrocities may 
frustrate pacifists who would challenge the distinction, it reflects a common theme in 
his political writings. It is consistent with his lifelong insistence that ‘it can never be 
right to do wrong for the sake of some real or supposed good’.
48
 Yet it also maintains 
a category of violence that is morally ambiguous – i.e., that ‘risks’ a conceivable evil 
in pursuit of a more probable and achievable good.
49
 If the choice is per se between 
right and wrong, then a Christian of any ethical persuasion must choose that which is 
right. But Ramsey believes that political choices are more frequently of an 
ambiguous sort.  
 In an early essay from 1960 titled ‘The Politics of Fear’ he distinguishes 
between evil and the risk of evil in a way that illuminates the phrase “no moment 
more”.
50
 He says that we must make a moral distinction between ‘the great evil of all 
out war and the risk of such a war, and between the evil of destroying mankind by 
human action and the danger that this may happen’.
51
 His point is that the ‘possible 
effects of modern war must not reduce us to inaction’.
52
 Per se immoral effects? Yes, 
they can and may and must reduce us to inaction. But, if we eliminate a priori rule 
violations, then McKenzie is right to note that the following must also be true: 
‘Unless a proposed course of action is directly contradictory to the agapic principle, 
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then it cannot be ruled out a priori’.
53
 Contingent and unpredictable possibilities 
must not be allowed to paralyze the Christian pursuit of political good.  
 The difficulty for Christian political ethics is not that there are actions which 
are inherently wrong but must be done anyway (i.e., a kind of sinister 
consequentialism). Rather, the problem is that politics trades in a number of 
currencies which are unavoidably ambiguous in their potential for moral good or evil 
(i.e., they cannot be classified as immoral per se or unjust now). The most 
fundamental point of agreement between pacifists and just war thinkers is a promise 
to consider certainly immoral acts “no moment more”. Beyond that promise is a 
realm of uncertain, ambiguous and unpredictable actions that, in Ramsey’s mind, 
represent the true point of contention in the pacifist/just war debate.  
 The categorical limits set by the promise to consider immoral acts “no 
moment more” generates his concept of “moral anguish”. His introduction of the 
term in Speak Up follows upon an expression of frustration with the idea that just-
war criteria can coolly be applied as ‘a thoughtless, legalistic way of condemning all 
wars at one time, and any war test-by-test’.
54
 This viewpoint is particularly 
susceptible to the ‘most deplorable failure’ of omitting ‘any sense of tragedy or 
sorrow Christians have to endure, and should cultivate under the tutelage of these 
norms’.
55
 “Tragedy” does not describe the performance of immoral acts with a heavy 
heart. Rather, it describes the situation where ‘resort to violence in a palpably just 
cause cries to high heaven for us to rescue the perishing and we cannot do so because 
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in the attempt greater evil would be caused than prevented or corrected’.
56
 Tragedy is 
thus the pain of a conscience restrained by just war limitations in the face of moral 
atrocity.  
 Within this emphasis on ‘the sense of tragedy inculcated by a proper use of 
just-war political wisdom’, Ramsey describes ‘moral anguish over inevitable clashes 
between justice-reasons for going to war and disproportion-reasons prohibiting it’.
57
 
What is remarkable about this claim is that he assumes that pain of conscience in the 
face of moral atrocity is something that the Christian magistrate ‘should cultivate’ 
while under the restraints of just war criteria.
58
 What he describes is a point more 
often reserved for criticism of pacifists. The standard popular and intuitive challenge 
to a pacifist ethic is the question, ‘How can you stand by and do nothing while others 
suffer injustice?’ Ramsey takes that challenge as a litmus test for the work of just 
war principles upon the conscience of the Christian magistrate.
59
  
 This becomes evident in his claim that ‘the sounder our understanding, the 
more the moral anguish over suffering we ought to let continue unrelieved because to 
topple the oppressor would bring on as great or greater suffering’.
60
 “Moral anguish” 
requires ‘thoughtful reflection on the “just” and right thing to do’ because of the 
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‘tension among just-war teachings, by the fact that we are obliged to observe all the 
norms’.
61
 It is evidence that the moral norms prescribed by covenant fidelity are 
weighing appropriately on the (justifiable) options for purposive political action. It is 
also evidence of faithful protection of the neighbor in a world of conflicting political 
relations.  
 The tension of “moral anguish” is characterized by a proper understanding of 
obligation, justification and limitation in the political realm. Ramsey combines this 
account with the insistence that anything known to be per se morally atrocious is to 
be considered “no moment more”. Holding these two elements together brings into 
view a proper understanding of Christian political responsibility. In an unpublished 
paper from the 1970s he observes, ‘theological ethics, of course, must go as far as it 
can (and therefore only as far as it can) in clarifying the meaning of political 
responsibility’.
62
 The combination of limitations – “only as far as it can” – as well as 
justification – “as far as it can” – and obligation – “must go” – describes the balance 
that characterizes “moral anguish” and actions considered “no moment more”. 
Together they reflect the necessary elements of responsibly purposive political 
agency. 
 
8.2.1 Rethinking Covenant and Repentance in ‘No Moment More’ and ‘Moral 
Anguish’ 
 While these terms are new, the driving theological and political concepts 
appear throughout Ramsey’s earlier work. For instance, he expresses an essentially 
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similar view in the introduction to War and the Christian Conscience, saying, ‘it was 
to be expected that political vocation and participation in war, if these were justified 
and motivated by what love required the Christian to do, would at the same time be 
surrounded by very severe limits on what love permitted him to do’.
63
 Or, as he 
frequently reiterates, ‘what justified also limited!’
64
 At the same time, however, 
selected statements in his early work fail to make his sensitivity to the limits of 
political action explicitly clear.  
 David H. Smith brings to light one example of this in his parallel reading of 
Ramsey and Aquinas in ‘Paul Ramsey, Love and Killing’. He calls attention to the 
early declarations in Basic Christian Ethics that in service to the neighbor ‘all things 
are now lawful, all things are now permitted’.
65
 He says, ‘it would make sense for 
Aquinas to describe a case of a neighbor who “needed” saving, yet whom one could 
not save as an act of charity, since the saving act was sinful. For Ramsey the total 
commitment to neighbor entailed by agape makes such a limitation of the 
requirements of love a contradiction in terms’.
66
 The account of “moral anguish” 
certainly marks a departure from this view inasmuch as Ramsey explicitly describes 
the tension of obligation, justification and limitation in political endeavors. His 
definition of tragedy is based on the inability to intervene in a ‘palpably just cause’ 
from restraint by the moral limits to justified war.
67
  
 Another principal example is his suggestion that in the political realm 
‘repentance may have to be deferred’.
68
 As I observed in the first section of this 
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study, both David Little and John Hick interpret this claim to be a temporary 
suspension of moral norms governing political endeavors.
69
 Ramsey’s account of 
deferred repentance and the early distinction between the private capacity of the 
individual and the public capacity of the political official unnecessarily obscures his 
unequivocal rejection of immoral policies and actions. His later work in Speak Up 
makes this clearer by simply stating that ‘if anything is shown to be per se a moral 
atrocity … it should be given Christian endorsement no moment more’.
70
 
 This marks the first of two ways in which “moral anguish” and “no moment 
more” reformulate and reintroduce the essential elements of his discussion of 
covenant and repentance. His later work drops the problematic suggestion that moral 
norms can be temporarily suspended while retaining the proper sensitivity to the 
unpredictability and systemic contingency of the political realm. His emphasis on the 
tension of political office wrought by allegiance to just war norms is repackaged in 
“moral anguish” without the baggage of his creative (and, at times, troubling) 
reinterpretation of the theological category of repentance.  
 The second reintroduction of earlier theological concepts involves his use of 
covenant to emphasize political decision-making. In chapter six I described covenant 
as the source of temporal and interpersonal bonds that determine our moral 
responsibilities. As Marcia Sichol observes, ‘covenant fidelity’ reveals ‘the limits 
within which discretion takes place’. 
71
 This means that judgments on moral or 
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immoral actions are only possible within a sustained ethos of normative moral 
principles. Alongside these formal limitations set by covenant is the distinctive role 
of properly framed and informed choice in the Christian moral life. Ramsey’s 
sensitivity to the importance of such choice becomes most clear in his protection of 
the magistrate’s conscience from being ‘faulted’ in Who Speaks for the Church?
72
 
 These same themes run throughout his political discussion in Speak Up. The 
firm rejection of actions to be considered “no moment more” demarcates the formal 
moral limitations on political agency. At the same time, Ramsey pairs this with a 
description of ‘the moral anguish of placing oneself under obligation to all the rules 
of warfare’.
73
 Whereas his principal concern in Who Speaks is to protect the 
magistrate from the particular pronouncements of the church, the concept of “moral 
anguish” functions as a litmus test for the work of just war principles upon the 
Christian conscience. With this move “no moment more” and “moral anguish” 
reinterpret the theological impulse behind Who Speaks to offer an alternative account 
of just war limitations more explicitly directed at holding moral agents in the 
political realm accountable for Christian standards of justice.  
 
8.3 Connecting Covenant and Repentance  
 Calling attention to these two focal points in Ramsey’s later writings serves 
an important function for the argument at hand by identifying several of the enduring 
elements of his political theology. For instance, they highlight his consistent 
emphasis on the contingency of political endeavors, uncompromising insistence on 
the moral norms governing political action and appreciation for the role of judgment 
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in the proper exercise of political authority. At the same time, other elements of the 
preceding discussion recede as his audience changes. The strong emphasis on 
temporality and the movement of the political community through time recedes in 
Speak Up as he moves away from the debates on situation ethics in the sixties. 
Similarly, the secular audience of ‘A Political Ethics Context’ also drives him away 
from the explicitly Christological ground of just war limitations on political violence.  
 I want to begin drawing together these essential features in order to make 
several observations about the convergence of covenant and repentance in Ramsey’s 
political theology. As I mentioned above, there is no summative piece of writing 
from the end of his career which plainly draws together his thinking on covenant and 
repentance. However, there is one particular story that he repeats in a number of 
different settings to hone in on the essential features of his theological perspective. I 
believe it captures his most important contributions to political theology. 
 
8.3.1 Taking Counsel and Counting the Costs 
 On April 9, 1967 Ramsey delivered a sermon at the National (Episcopal) 
Cathedral in Washington, D.C. He titled it ‘Counting the Costs’ and took as his text 
the story of the builder and the king from Luke 14. Later that year it was published in 
The Vietnam War: Christian Perspectives.
74
 The following year he placed the essay 
at the conclusion of The Just War and then used the narrative in ‘Force and Political 
Responsibility’ in 1972.
75
 Again in 1973 he repeated the story in the publication of 
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‘A Political Ethics Context’ in Strategic Thinking and its Moral Implications (which 
was then placed as an appendix to Speak Up in 1988).
76
  
 Given his evident fondness of the story and appreciation for its appeal to 
widely divergent audiences, it is worth considering at length what it reveals about his 
political theology. I will first reprint the text from Luke 14 that he takes as his 
prompt in order to frame his interpretation of its wisdom: 
 For which of you, intending to build a tower, does not first sit down and 
estimate the cost, to see whether he has enough to complete it? Otherwise, 
when he has laid a foundation and is not able to finish, all who see it begin to 
mock him, saying, ‘This man began to build, and was not able to finish’. Or 
what king, going to encounter another king in war, will not sit down first and 
take counsel whether he is able with ten thousand men to meet him who 
comes against him with twenty thousand? And if not, while the other is yet a 
great way off, he sends an embassy and asks terms of peace. So therefore, 





 Ramsey initially distinguishes between disciples, on one hand, and kings and 
builders, on the other. Disciples are principally allegiant to the kingdom of God, 
which ‘is not a pearl of great price; it is a pearl of inestimable price for which one 
sells all that he has’.
78
 The kind of “calculation” required of discipleship is, in fact, 
not calculated at all. It is impassioned, reckless and in radical service to those in 
need. Against this approach is that of the kings and builders who ‘determine whether 
the costs are worth it in a world in which nothing is worth everything’.
79
 Their path 
is one defined by the need for precise calculation and management of resources in an 
imprecise (read: contingent) world.
80
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 This principal description of faithful discipleship, he indicates, is the ‘main 
point’ of the parable.
81
 Yet, he also appreciates the distinction between the tower-
builder and the king as one between ‘two sorts of worldly wisdom’.
82
 This stems 
from the fact that even within the realm of worldly pursuits there are varying degrees 
of contingency and various requirements according to one’s social role.    
 What is required of the tower-builder is a ‘comparatively simple calculation, 
and one that can be tallied up ahead of time’.
83
 He is ‘the builder of a project that he 
can control or complete’.
84
 This approach draws upon a kind of consequentialist 
logic and Ramsey speaks of the ‘ascendancy of technical reason in cost-counting’.
85
 
A builder weighs and estimates each aspect of the project before initiating 
construction. Furthermore, there is a point at which the building is complete. Thus, in 




 The wisdom of the king is composed of taking counsel rather than counting 
costs. On one hand, this stems from the fact that the king already operates within a 
world of pre-existing political relations. Even though Jesus describes the king ‘first’ 
sitting down to take counsel, Ramsey notes that, ‘a very peculiar “first” that would 
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be, while he is already going to “encounter” another king!’
87
 Thus he says that a king 
operates ‘in the midst of the interaction and forces already at play in the world’.
88
  
 On the other hand, the king also takes counsel rather than counting costs 
because statecraft lacks the control and precision of tower-building: ‘In politics there 
are no completed towers’.
89
  For this reason, ‘Jesus spoke not of measurable 
calculation, or proof or disproof of one’s ability to finish an edifice, when he 
mentioned the predicament of a king. Instead a king or statesman needs wise 
“counsel”’.
90
 While both kings and builders operate in worlds that require 
calculation, the radical indeterminacy and unpredictability of political endeavors 
means that kings can only take counsel on the course they should follow. In 
Ramsey’s words, the king ‘cannot very clearly count the costs because he cannot – 
he simply cannot – predestinate the benefits he seeks’.
91
 
 Two examples will here help demonstrate the logic behind Ramsey’s 
interpretation of the parable. First, in ‘Force and Political Responsibility’ he cites a 
line from former U.S. Secretary of State and furniture-making hobbyist Dean 
Acheson, who said, ‘a chair is made to sit in: when you’ve made it you can tell 
whether you made it right; there is no such definitive test of the rightfulness of a 
political policy-decision’.
92
 Second, he observes in ‘The Politics of Fear’, that ‘in 
prudential calculation, in balancing the good directly intended and done against the 
evil unintended and indirectly done, no greater precision can be forthcoming than the 




 Ibid. ‘A statesman must always, unlike builders of towers, posit his decision and action in a world 
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 The precision inherent in chair-making simply cannot be mapped 
upon the task of statecraft. There is no way to “sit” in a policy to see if it has been 
made rightly. At the same time, there remains a distinct place for calculation in the 
work of the magistrate. His point is that political actions can only be judged 
according to the precision appropriate to the subject. 
  
8.3.2 Politics as a Kind of Doing 
 Ramsey summarizes these observations on the nature of political morality by 
saying that ‘politics is a kind of doing. It is not a kind of making – like building a 
tower’.
94
 We can observe three fundamental truths about the political realm that he 
draws from the narrative in Luke 14 and the idea that politics is a kind of doing. 
They have also emerged in this study as essential features of his use of covenant and 
repentance.  
 First, the political realm is inescapably temporal – that is, it is characterized 
and governed by its movement through time. This explains why ‘Jesus described the 
king as already in movement’.
95
 Ramsey attempts to describe the modern version of 
this political situation, saying,  
 Our Presidents simply are not tower-builders. This is simply not the nature of 
the encounters coming upon the statesman into which he is always going, or 
the nature of an arbitrament of arms. … Instead there must be a ceaseless and 
perhaps changing appraisal of the stakes at issue and a ceaseless and perhaps 
changing appraisal of the costs proportionate to what is at stake, going on at 
the same time action is being put forth in the context of the actions coming 
upon us, itself shaping and shaped by those actions’. 
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Temporal moral relations and a continual flow of actions and reactions surround 
every new political initiative. There are also matters of timing, patience and 
expediency involved in prudential determinations of effective action. These elements 
of the biblical narrative and the modern political situation reflect what it means for 




 The temporal nature of political pursuits has been a persistent theme in this 
discussion of covenant and repentance in Ramsey’s political theology. However 
awkwardly the term may fit its appointed function, one original purpose for his 
introduction of “deferred repentance” is a desire to account for the role of timing in 
pursuit of effective action. This is why it is a practice for the “meantime” but “not 
forever”. He also inherits from H. Richard Niebuhr a distinct sensitivity to the fact 
that working for political good may require patience or calculated inactivity. The 
theological discussion in ‘The Manger, the Cross, and the Resurrection’ is precisely 
an attempt to understand repentance as an obedient response perpetually shaping our 




 Further, his use of covenant draws out the moral significance of the temporal 
bonds defining and governing political relations. There is a structure to political acts 
of judgment which relies on our movement through time. When emphasizing 
eschatology this emerges as an appreciation for ‘taking time seriously as a relation 
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among creatures and the measure of the activity of creatures’.
98
 As he moves toward 
Christology this produces a description of historical time as the good gift of God 
sustained by the Spirit of Christ until the final judgment. As I noted in chapter five, 
this gift of time witnesses to the kingdom of God and makes possible faithful 
creaturely response to that kingdom.     
 The second fundamental element to be drawn from the claim that politics is a 
kind of doing is that the political realm is characterized by radical contingency. The 
indented quotation above observes that magistrates, like kings, operate in a world 
where all action is reaction, and all responsibility is to some degree based on 
anticipation of other responses. This means that ‘statecraft is not primarily a matter 
of social engineering, of building institutions; it is rather a system of interacting 
doings’.
99
 He elaborates this point, insisting that the king will make judgments that 
are both ‘risk-filled’ and ‘unmeasurable’, yet ‘creative’ – this is what it means to live 
‘in a world of doing’.
 100
 Even when the magistrate judges rightly, there are layers of 
contingency and indeterminacy which may yet prevent that right judgment from 
leading to the desired or intended result.  
 Yet, his attention to contingency as a feature of political morality produces, 
perhaps counter-intuitively, a heightened sensitivity to the importance of political 
judgments. He is equally suspicious of those who abandon political relations to 
moral chaos or conflicts of unrestrained power as he is of those who believe they can 
be controlled by ‘technical reason’.
101
 What is most important to keep clear is that 
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when the systemic ambiguity of political relations is understood rightly, then 
‘decision and action can be what they are worth’.
102
  
 This theme also emerges continually in the discussion of covenant and 
repentance. In chapter five I highlighted the fact that political action is given 
Christian purpose only when it embraces the ambiguity of our lives by acting 
decisively in the direction of the bene esse of politics. This does not mean that all 
political judgments are right and good. Instead, it demonstrates how the 
indeterminacy of our political existence makes possible faithful obedience to a God 
who also rules with particularity in a contingent world.
103
 This builds upon the 
foundational notion that the pattern for faithful obedience to the God of covenant is 




 The notion of deferred repentance also stems from his description of politics 
as “the science of the possible”. He wrestles with David Little over what it means for 
politics to be “systematically indeterminate” and inherits Niebuhr’s insistence that 
judgments of guilt and innocence in war are always relative in light of the judgment 
of God. In the development of his just war theory, as well as in debates over the 
Vietnam conflict, this translates into a belief that the essential task of political ethics 
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is to sustain the moral criteria necessary to govern and inform those relative 
judgments.  
  Lastly, Ramsey’s interpretation of the Luke 14 narrative exhibits his 
fundamental belief that the contingency and temporality of the political realm are 
theologically significant. On one hand, he acknowledges at several points that Jesus’ 
description of the political realm is made “in passing”. He also notes that ‘these 
words uttered by the Lord of Heaven and Earth … do more than point the way 
politics should go. Those words also bring under judgment the whole of humankind 
and they reveal in one lightening flash that ours is a fallen existence’.
105
 This sustains 
the transcendence of the judgment of God and the radical depravity of all political 
communities.  
 On the other hand he believes that as Jesus reflects on the king and the 
builder he ‘in some sense and even if in passing commended their practical wisdom 
and took note of its nature’.
106
 He elaborates this point later, saying, 
 Jesus said a significant word about the nature of this political wisdom: it is 
largely a matter of correctly counting the costs in relation to the goods to be 
obtained. This is, in fact, a principal word that through all the centuries 





In making this claim he does not go back on the point of contrast between builders 
who count costs and kings who take counsel. Rather, he is reverting to the original 
distinction between disciples (for whom the kingdom of God is ‘of inestimable 
price’) and kings and builders who ‘determine whether the costs are worth it in a 
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world in which nothing is worth everything’.
108
 He takes Jesus’ commendation of the 
political wisdom of the king to “point the way” toward relative human judgments 
made in pursuit of limited political goods.  
 Ramsey reads Luke 14 as support for his belief that the nature of the political 
realm – its structure, purposes and limitations – are determined by Christ. In doing so 
he calls attention both to the transcendent judgment of God and to the role of relative 
judgments in political communities. This includes his recognition of the inescapable 
contingency and temporality of those relative judgments, as witnessed in his 
description of the king as one who “takes counsel”.  
 This theological emphasis, too, has been a persistent theme of the preceding 
discussion of Ramsey’s development as a political thinker. The rationale for the 
juxtaposition of covenant and repentance in this study takes shape here, in their 
ability to articulate the particular features of political morality which he finds 
theologically significant. Both concepts sustain his emphasis on contingency and 
temporality as inherent aspects of the structure of the political act. That structure 
gains its theological significance from the fact that it is under the judgment of God 
and simultaneously instituted by God to make possible faithful creaturely response in 
the time before the final judgment. His reading of Luke 14 reflects the way that 
Ramsey is able to harness the ambiguity and temporality of political endeavors 
within a theological account of a Christian political ethic. Covenant and repentance 
converge in the way that they illuminate the theological significance of his belief that 
the political act is not simply doing, but a kind of doing. It is a contingent and 
temporal kind of doing and in that also, a Christian kind of doing.  
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Conclusion 
 Politics is a Kind of Doing 
 
 Ramsey uses a wide variety of terms and phrases to capture his perspective 
on the political realm. As early as the 1940s he takes note of ‘the structure of the 
political moment’.
1
 He calls the just war theory ‘a study of moral decision-making’ 
in War and the Christian Conscience.
2
 He also speaks of ‘a proper political act’ in 
The Just War.
3
 I have highlighted one of these phrases – politics is a kind of doing – 
to exhibit his belief that political morality is structured by the pursuit of goods within 
a context of contingent and temporally determined relations. What his theology of 
covenant and repentance makes clear is that these features are theologically essential 
to the movement of created existence across time. Ramsey pulls back the curtain on 
political ambiguity and temporality to reveal that they have, in fact, deeply 
theological purposes.   
 To say this another way, he understands that in order for moral agency to be 
moral it must also be indeterminate and temporal. What he said so frequently of 
principles of war applies also to these features of political agency: that which 
justifies also limits!
4
 Their theological significance for the pursuit of the political 
good came most explicitly into view in his belief that political action is given 
Christian purpose only when it embraces the ambiguity of the time before the final 
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judgment by acting decisively in the direction of the bene esse of politics. As 
features of our created existence toward covenant, the contingency and temporality 
of political endeavors is itself a witness to the kingdom of God because it makes 
possible faithful obedience to that kingdom.  
 This, I believe, is what we learn from taking Ramsey seriously as a political 
theologian. It has been the aim of this study across the previous eight chapters to 
highlight the way covenant and repentance bring together these theological claims 
about the nature of the political realm. He describes the shape of political morality 
with terms and concepts inherited from Barth, H. Richard Niebuhr, Rousseau, 
Thielicke, etc. What I have tried to demonstrate, however, is the way in which he at 
the same time supplies a new and constructive direction to those themes by 
developing his own distinctive theological account of the structures governing 
political morality. The interpretive gains of this reading offer scholarship on Ramsey 
an explicit account of his contributions to political theology via an emphasis on 
constructive action and pursuit of right policy within the unique limitations of 
political agency. 
 To conclude I want to appreciate these gains by considering them in light of 
one theme that has been lurking in the background through several elements of this 
study: the relationship between Ramsey and the political theology of Hugo Grotius. 
As I noted in chapter four, he does not seem to have interacted much with Grotius, 
citing him in print only in Basic Christian Ethics in conjunction with Jean Bodin.
5
 
Yet, we do know that he was assigned to read sections from The Right of War and 
Peace in his courses at Yale with C.W. Hendel and that Hendel’s reading 
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emphasized the importance of establishing political sovereignty.
6
 While in the initial 
sections of this study I have only been able to gesture in the direction of similarities 
in their thinking, I want to conclude by probing a few key Grotian concepts for the 
significant insight they yield into the shape of Ramsey’s contributions to political 
theology. This will help both to reflect on the accomplishments of this study and to 
point the way forward to other potentially significant areas of inquiry into Ramsey as 
political theologian.   
 As a point of departure, I believe there is much to be said about his 
relationship to democracy, particularly in light of his similarities with Grotius. Recall 
that his early use of the social contract begins with an attraction to Rousseau’s ability 
to emphasize democracy as the most adequate form of government in response to 
sin. He reinforces this belief at length in an article from 1946, ‘A Theory of 
Democracy: Idealistic of Christian?’
7
 In response he receives criticisms for having a 




 Yet, as noted in chapter four, he becomes dissatisfied with Rousseau and 
warns against a wholesale embrace of democracy. He notes in unpublished materials 
from the 1940s, ‘the Hebraic-Christian tradition in political theory is not to be 
equated with democracy, because it refuses to absolutize anything human, even the 
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will of the people’.
9
 I have tried to show that his elevation of the representative 
authority of the magistrate has more to do with his reverence for the distinctive 
contingency and temporality of political deliberation and judgment than with a 
commitment to the superiority of counting every vote (though there are certainly 
statements from his early writings which may obscure this point). 
 Recognition of similarities between Ramsey and Grotius on themes of 
political representation and authority has the ability to call into question his 
allegiance to liberal democracy. This is because it highlights the fact that his 
theological perspective on politics contains relatively few explicitly democratic 
features. Said another way, does Ramsey’s magistrate have to be democratically 
elected? His emphasis on the theological significance of contingency and temporality 
applies to political authority of any legitimate kind.
10
 This is indicated in part by his 
preference for the language of political “magistrates”. Comparison with Grotius 
reveals that even his most explicit moral norms for politics – justice, proportion, 
discrimination, etc. – are not inherently tied to democratically elected political 
authority.  
 This initial set of questions regarding the supposed liberal lineage of his 
theological insights on politics, however, begs an additional and more fundamental 
set regarding his inheritance of a Grotian model of justice, political judgment and 
representative authority. In order to address these questions I want to turn, perhaps 
unexpectedly, to features of Grotius’ theological epistemology. I believe the way he 
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explains the interrelation of the intellect and the will to be an apt analogy for the way 
that Ramsey frames his theological perspective on politics.  
 
An Analogy with Hugo Grotius 
 Leonard Besselink’s essay ‘The Impious Hypothesis Revisited’ sets out to 
examine Grotius’ infamous “impious hypothesis” in light of his wider 
epistemological commitments.
11
 The hypothesis, of course, is his claim in The Right 
of War and Peace that ‘these observations would have a place even were we to 
accept the infamous premise that God did not exist’.
12
 Because this claim is so 
frequently taken to imply his rejection of ‘the analogy in the being of God and man’, 
Besselink sets out to prove that Grotius, in fact, did adhere to belief in such an 
analogy.
13
 His task leads him beyond the major legal works into Grotius’ lesser-
known writings, namely, his poetry, biblical commentaries and correspondence.
14
 
 What is important about this essay for the task at hand is that he provides a 
clear exposition of Grotius’ theological perspective on the relationship between the 
intellect and the will, as well as an account of the epistemological function of 
judgment. While I do not claim the expertise to independently interpret those more 
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obscure writings, I believe Besselink offers a number of helpful observations that we 
can employ to gain insight into Ramsey’s own latent epistemology. As mentioned 
above, Grotius’ understanding of the interrelation of the intellect and the will offers 
an apt analogy for the way that Ramsey frames his theological perspective on 
politics.   
 Besselink draws from a number of Grotius’ minor works, including one of his 
three biblical dramas, Adamus Exul, his commentary on the Gospel of John, two 
Eucharistic poems and an obscure work from Opera Theologica titled De fide et 
operibus.
15
 On the basis of insight from these writings he points to the following 
theological/epistemological structure:  
 
Father  Son  Spirit 
mind  intellect will  
cause  truth  good 
 
He observes the Augustinian shape of the analogy as a whole, though his immediate 
concern is with the final two columns which capture two spheres of relation.
16
 He 
notes that there is ‘one [sphere] of the truth which can be grasped intellectually and 
the other of the good to which the will can attain – the former being the sphere of 
speculation, the other of action within time’.
17
 This epistemological analogy with the 
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relationship of the Son and the Spirit has the effect of establishing a fundamental link 
between the intellect and the will.  
 It is worth pausing just for a moment to understand this relationship in the 
divine/human analogy. First, note that both faculties maintain their own distinct and 
proper function. The intellect cannot “attain” the good just as the will cannot “grasp” 
the truth. Rather, an understanding of the intellect-will interplay involves 
recognizing the proper structure of their relationship without collapsing the distinct 
integrity of each faculty. Besselink describes this in Grotius as ‘an (unspontaneous) 
order proper to them, the will obeying the intellect, once the intellect has been set 
and directed by the will to grasp a particular good’.
18
 This demonstrates that there is 
a proper movement from intellectual knowledge to volitional good, while at the same 
time the rightly-acting will can direct the intellect toward certain truths. This is why I 
have seized upon his term “interplay” to capture Grotius’ understanding of the 
relationship – it does not move in one direction only but rather in a kind of 
constantly fluid (yet properly ordered) interaction.
19
 
 To build upon this point notice, second, that Grotius is not positing a kind of 
efficient causal relationship whereby the intellect determines right knowledge and 
the will necessarily enacts the intellectual truth-claim in the form of right action. As 
Besselink notes, the relationship does not imply that ‘the will is always and in all 
respects under the sway of the intellect, as if all reality were an intellectual reality’.
20
 
Looking to the Trinitarian parallel helps demonstrate the error of such a necessarily 
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 Ibid. Grotius says in Eucharista I, ‘Love grants us this beatitude, that through it our intellect – 
although it cannot grasp all the essences … is unable to act by itself – become pure intellect, and 
enters into action, so that all acting be joined to the intellect’ (542). Besselink notes, ‘To conclude 
along such extremely intellectualist lines would contradict the kind of juxtaposition of intellect and 
will which (analogously to the relation between the Son and the Spirit) Grotius described in the 
paraphrase of the Gospel of John’ (542). 
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determined will: a wing-clipped account of the freedom and spontaneity of the Spirit 
as wholly and controllingly determined by the Son would subvert the lovingly free 
interplay of all three Persons in the God-head. Similarly, an intellectually restricted 
account of the will would subvert the integrity of its distinct faculty.  
 This interplay also has consequences for the determination of right action 
because the volitional pursuit of the good involves intellectual recognition of truth. 
What this means, in moral terms, is that ‘right action in reality, has, therefore, a 
foundation in the mind through the intellect’.
21
 At the same time, ‘social action is 
thus not a purely mental affair’.
22
 Both morally and epistemologically there is an 
interplay between identification of truth and right action which has particular 
consequences for ethics.  
 The term that captures this epistemological interplay in its political function 
is “judgment”. It is neither strictly the exercise of the will nor the determination of 
truth on the part of the intellect. Instead, Grotius aligns right judgment with reference 
to the character of right political action. Besselink notes that ‘Grotius stated, as we 
saw, that in order for a judgment to be right, the will needs to conform to the intellect 
and the intellect to the thing itself’.
23
 In other words, there must be a twofold 
congruence whereby the intellect must align with the truth and the will must align 
with the intellect. This is, from an epistemological perspective, a properly integrated 
moral action. Politically speaking, it is right judgment.  
 Such judgment must not only be based on a proper understanding of the 
good, it also should be the aim of the exercise of the will (i.e., it must correspond to 
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 This is why, for Grotius, ‘judgment precedes proximately the act of 
exerting authority, for exerting authority belongs to the will’.
25
 Just as right judgment 
is not simply an exercise of authority, so an integrated moral action is neither strictly 
an intellectual reality nor a volitional one. Rather right action maintains the 
juxtaposition of the intellect and the will ‘in the sense that each has its own essence 
and its own role to play in action; yet, precisely in action there is an interplay 
between the two’.
26
 To properly understand that epistemological structure (and its 
distinct theological significance via the Trinitarian analogy) is to properly understand 
the function of political judgment.  
 Consider, now, the significance of these claims in light of this study of 
political contingency and temporality. Ramsey’s political theology similarly sustains 
a proper order to the intellect and the will in his understanding of politics as a kind of 
doing. On one hand, political ethics is not merely “doing” – an act of the will or an 
exercise of political authority. That is why he insists that ‘a political action is always 
an exercise of power and an exercise of purpose’.
27
 Without purpose the political 
reality becomes a purely volitional one.  
 On the other hand, neither is it simply the intellectual determination of truth 
or the identification of principles of justice. That is why he does not believe that 
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action must be properly attuned to the political good and simultaneously the aim of any exercise of 
political authority is mirrored in the ubiquitous tension in Ramsey’s work between insisting on the 
rigidity of principles of justice and the unassailability of the magistrate’s competency as decision-
maker. 
25
 Besselink, ‘Impious Hypothesis’, 542. This passage is taken from De Imperio, V, I, 1, Opera 
Theologica III, 22 a 13-18.  
26
 Ibid., 544. What sustains the notion of interplay here is that the intellect is directed by the will in 
pursuit of truth and the will is directed by the intellect in right action. 
27
 Ramsey, The Just War, 8. I highlighted this point in chapter five. He continues, ‘power without 
purpose and purpose without power are equally nonpolitical’.  
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‘choice among alternative military policies can itself be deduced from just war 
criteria’.
28
 Instead, politics is a kind of doing whereby there is sustained active 
attention to the political good and the intellectual identification of that good (which 
precedes and attends to the pursuit of that good through social action). It is a kind of 
doing which integrates the properly ordered movement of right intellect and right 
action. In Grotian terms, it is judgment. 
 This connection between theological epistemology and political ethics 
underlies the work on covenant and repentance in this study. Ramsey’s theology of 
repentance is essentially an attempt to shield magistrates from bearing the moral 
weight of the indeterminacy of political endeavors while at the same time holding 
them accountable for the identification of some political acts as morally inexcusable 
(and the rejection of those acts in policy and practice). It is simultaneously a 
commentary on the limitations on human intellectual and volitional capacities – 
politics as the science of the possible – and a theology of moral responsibility – 
politics as constructive action under the judgment of God. “Moral anguish” as 
characteristic of a conscience limited, obligated and justified by norms of war serves 
essentially the same interpretive function.
29
 His theological perspective is grounded 
                                                
28
 Paul Ramsey to Ronald J. Sider, December 15, 1981, Box 25, Ramsey Papers. Along these lines he 
recommends at the beginning of Nine Modern Moralists, ‘The reader of this volume should therefore 
pay attention, in his own processes of making judgment and arriving at a practical conclusion, to the 
why as well as the what of Christian social action: to the reason and grounds for certain criticisms and 
recommendations he may himself make for the good of society. Nine Modern Moralists (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 3. I take his comment that judgment covers both the what and the 
why to be similar to Grotius’ observations on the intellect and the will. 
29
 For Ramsey, as for Grotius, attuning the intellect to the rightness of the thing in itself is only half of 
the political task. His principles of justice (identifying actions to be considered “no moment more”) 
and an emphasis on the distinctive features of the office of the magistrate (negotiating the tension 
between justification, obligation and limitation) was precisely an attempt to illuminate the complexity 
of, in Grotian terms, the fact that in order for a political action to be properly attentive to right the 
action ‘must have a twofold congruence: the one of the will with the intellect and the other of the 
intellect with the things in itself’. Besselink, ‘Impious Hypothesis’, 542. 
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in commitments to certain and distinct epistemological limitations to political 
agency.  
 At the same time those limitations enable (and justify) acts of political 
judgment. His theology of covenant informs an account of the esse/bene esse of 
politics that, in turn, assigns to the church the task of identifying and delimiting 
principles of justice. The church refrains from the determination of particular policy 
decisions so as not to usurp the special responsibility of the magistrate.
30
 This divide 
reflects the Grotian insistence that while political action ‘has a foundation through 
the intellect in the mind’, it is not ‘a purely mental affair’.
31
 It is the distinction 
between the determination of the good and an integrated act of judgment which 
produces social action in accordance with that good.   
 The latent epistemology behind these concepts becomes clear when 
considering that Grotius describes the intellect much like Ramsey describes the 
function of the church in relation to political authority. Grotius says, ‘But the 
intellect works on the will like the orators in a free republic through persuasion and 
does not always obtain to the requested obedience because of the liberty which is 
agnate and proper to the will’.
32
 He continues, saying, ‘hence the clearer the 
knowledge, the severer the punishment if the will not be obedient’.
33
 Ramsey’s 
church functions like those orators in a free republic. He sees the possibility of 
criticism of magistrates – i.e., holding them accountable for moral norms – to be 
                                                
30
 In chapter six I noted his tendency to use a concept of prudence to capture this divide. ‘Without 
prudence there would be no morality at all put forth into actual practice and decision-making’. Paul 
Ramsey to Byron Johnson, February 17, 1961, Box 12, Ramsey Papers. Or, ‘Prudence, or practical 
wisdom in actual exercise, is always in the service of prior insight, conviction, or principle. Its 
function is the application in living action of something prior which governs our choices’. Ramsey, 
Nine Modern Moralists, 5.  
31
 Besselink, ‘Impious Hypothesis’, 542.  
32
 Grotius, De fide et operibus, Opera Theologica III, 521 1 8-42. Cited in Besselink, ‘Impious 
Hypothesis’, 544.  
33
 Ibid.  
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reliant on prior determinations of justice. Thus, the church orients its ecumenical 
energies around the identification and clarification of moral principles while at the 
same time respecting the liberty which is “agnate and proper” to political authority.   
  
Judgment, Conscience and Theological Epistemology 
 I began this study by noting that treating Ramsey as a political theologian 
requires close attention to many of the implicit theological assumptions driving his 
casuistry. What becomes clear upon this investigation of those assumptions (and in 
light of this analogy with Grotius) is that he also leaves implicit the significance of a 
theological epistemology for his perspective on politics. If he makes it difficult for 
his readers to nail down the theological assumptions underlying his politics, he offers 
them even less by way of a theological epistemology. This observation serves at 
once to appreciate the value of the interpretive gains of this study in identifying 
Ramsey’s theological contributions, while at the same time identifying an additional 
layer of needed investigation into his thinking.  
 It must be sufficient to note at this stage that the closest Ramsey comes to 
articulating some of his latent theological epistemology is in an unpublished paper 
on conscience from a Duodecim theological society conference in May 1963. In that 
paper, titled ‘Christian Freedom and the Ethical Reality of Conscience’, he draws 
heavily upon conceptual work by Paul Tillich to argue that conscience is wrongly 
being ‘emptied of concrete behavioral meaning and power’.
34
 Instead, it is being 
                                                
34
 Ramsey, ‘Christian Freedom’, 2. His distaste for an interpretation of conscience strictly as a burden 
of guilt is quite similar to his concerns about repentance detailed in the first section of this thesis. See 
also Ramsey’s comments on similar epistemology in ‘The Status and Advancement of Theological 
Scholarship in America’, The Christian Scholar 47, no. 1 (1964), 7-23. 
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used as ‘the seat and source of guilt which paralyzes the nerve of ethical action’.
35
 
Because he speaks of conscience in a way that is remarkably similar to the role 
Grotius’ assigns to judgment in his political theology, it is worth concluding by 
taking note of a few of his argumentative moves in this paper.  
 Ramsey expresses two concerns about conscience via concepts lifted from 
Tillich’s Systematic Theology.
36
 First, the “ethical reality of conscience” may be 
overwhelmed by a doctrine of autonomy. By this he means that it has ‘identified 
man’s freedom to decide with the freedom of choice, and connected the knowledge 
of good and evil with the internally directed exercise of the will’.
37
 I take this to be 
essentially the same as Grotius’ rejection of an epistemology which collapses the 
function of the intellect into the dominant function of the will. The autonomous 
conscience lacks the proper accountability for adhering to standards of goodness or 
intellectual determinations of truth. It simply acts. 
 Second, the “ethical reality of conscience” may be overwhelmed by a 
doctrine of heteronomy. By this he means that it has ‘identified the knowledge of 
good and evil with an imposed order of stability, and connected man’s freedom to 
decide with assent and adherence to externally directed rules and regularities’.
38
 I 
take heteronomy to be essentially similar to Grotius’ dismissal of an epistemology 
which collapses the function of the will into the dominant function of the intellect. A 
heternomous view of conscience reduces volition to a simple identification of the 
moral or intellectual reality. It simply knows. In this way, both autonomy and 
                                                
35
 Ramsey, ‘Christian Freedom’, 2. The comments are clearly shaped by the line of thought driving 
his essay on guilt and Dostoevsky in Nine Modern Moralists. I discuss this essay on two occasions in 
the first section of this study.   
36
 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951).  
37




heteronomy have ‘all but rendered the conscience ethically expendable’.
39
 He refers 




 The answer to these views is what he calls a ‘theonomous’ account of 
conscience – an understanding of human nature in terms of divine nature.
41
 A 
theonomous epistemology argues that ‘the knowledge of good and evil is itself the 
very environment of man’s humanity’.
42
 This ‘would mean that the knowledge of 
good and evil is neither the reward of a properly conducted search for the good nor 
the result of a careful assessment of the powers of man’ (i.e., a theonomous approach 
would ensure that intellect and will sustain their distinct and respective faculties).
43
 
This is nearly identical to Grotius’ use of the Trinitarian/psychological analogy to 
assert that judgment is neither the exercise of the will nor the determination of the 
intellect but the interplay between the two.  
 Ramsey then provides an account of conscience based on this proper view of 
God and humanity. He says, ‘conscience is the act – both of knowing and of doing – 
which expresses and exposes the connection between the knowledge of good and 
                                                
39
 Ibid. Ramsey says later, ‘In the one case, conscience is surrendered to conformity, in the other to 
non-conformity; in the first instance to heteronomy, in the second to autonomy. But in either case, the 
conscience is dismembered from its authenticating context and becomes the instrument of ethical 
irresponsibility’ (12). 
40
 Ibid., 6.  
41
 He defines ‘theonomous’ in Nine Modern Moralists, saying, ‘God has made us for himself and not 
for mere inclusion within society. Man is a theonomous animal: this means that only God has final 
governance over him. Man is a religious animal: this means that he is built for worship and for 
fellowship with God, and not for the superiority of earthly goals over his life’. Nine Modern 
Moralists, 23-24. See also Scott Davis, ‘“Et Quod Vis Fac”: Paul Ramsey and Augustinian Ethics’, 
Journal of Religious Ethics 19, no. 2 (1991): 40. 
42
 Ramsey, ‘Christian Freedom’, 6. 
43
 Ibid. ‘Such ways of thinking about ethics cannot give reality to man’s freedom to decide for himself 
what is good and what is evil’ (6). Ramsey says elsewhere, ‘The test is how far it is from what a man 
understands to what he does and back again; how great a distance or how close the proximity between 
his understanding and his actions. … All one’s action should be Christianly understood, else it is not 
action that engages the Christian as such; while all one’s understanding should be actionable, else it is 
not the thinking that engages the Christian as such’. ‘Status and Advancement, 12.  
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evil as the environment of humanization and the obedient response to this 
environment’.
44
 This is an early epistemological statement of what it means for 
politics to be a kind of doing. The “ethical reality of conscience” is ‘the ethical act’ – 
both of knowing and of doing.
45
 It is the ‘creative link between the knowledge of 
good and evil and the freedom of decision in that knowledge’.
46
 In political terms 
this is the structure of movement toward the good.  
 What shields Ramsey from making the connection between these 
epistemological observations on conscience and the theo-political significance of 
judgment in political ethics has to do with his concern to uphold the transcendence of 
the judgment of God. He is concerned about ‘conspicuous parallelism between 
conscience and the wrath of God’ in Romans chapter nine, saying, ‘in juxtaposing 
wrath and conscience, the sensitivity of the Hebrew response “from the heart” to the 
dynamics and purposefulness of the Divine order and governance of the world 
transforms the context of conscience and thus also the meaning of conscience 
itself’.
47
 The juxtaposition of conscience and wrath means that its function is not a 
measurement of ‘the humanization of man’ by ‘the pain of conscience’.
48
 Rather, ‘an 
order is acknowledged, each element of which has its instrumental function and 
significance within the limits which concretely define the redemptive obedience of 
                                                
44
 Ramsey, ‘Christian Freedom’, 7. 
45
 Ibid., 8. ‘Obviously the kind of ethical literalism which aims at one-to-one correlation between a 
specific word of Jesus and a specific action misses the point of Jesus’ teaching. Decision-making as 
the Christian understands it goes on in quite another way. For the Christian, the environment of 
decision not the rules of decision gives to behavior its ethical significance. If God is at work in this 
world, doing what it takes to make and to keep human life human, no specific action can be said to 
express or fulfill an ethical principle in a literal way. Telling the truth is not identical with optimum 
verbal veracity. It is a matter of saying the ‘right’ word. The ‘right’ word, however, is a sign that 
human relations are going on in an environment of trust. The “grain of mustard seed” is a sign that an 
environment of trust has been established and is being sustained by the activity of God’ (4). 
46
 Ibid, 6.  
47




the creature to God the creator and redeemer’.
49
 To translate, he argues that an 
account of conscience as a guilt-inducing faculty must be replaced with one that is 
attentive to the proper order of created human relations.
50
 Because he does not want 
the account of conscience to collapse into a notion of guilt, he is eager to separate it 
from notions of judgment.  
 Of course, Ramsey is not speaking of provisional political judgments but 
eternal divine judgment. Thus, he says, ‘conscience cannot be understood as an 
internal human faculty of judgment which functions to condemn. It is not conscience 
but the Lord who judges’.
51
 Dividing conscience and judgment serves the immediate 
function in his paper of removing guilt as the principal aim of conscience. But it 
simultaneously obscures the connection between conscience as the interplay of 
knowledge and freedom and judgment as the political interplay of intellect and will.  
 This also obscures the theological significance of his epistemological account 
of conscience for his political ethics. As I mentioned earlier, the ambiguity of politics 
is itself a witness to the kingdom of God because it makes possible faithfulness to 
that kingdom. In an essentially similar manner, conscience witnesses to Jesus Christ 
by ‘the extent to which this free choice is a live and decisive option in relation to 
Jesus Christ.
52
 What he calls the ‘the witnessing function of conscience’ reveals the 
                                                
49
 Ibid. As with deferred repentance, that order is not absent in moral engagements. He says ‘this does 
not mean that ethical behavior has been carried beyond the boundaries of condemnation and 
justification, remorse and condemnation, guilt and righteousness. It means that conscience has been 
deprived of its intrinsic power to accuse or to excuse – whether the conscience of my neighbor or my 
own’ (13). 
50
 Ramsey writes here that ‘It is incumbent upon ethics to offer a description of the nature and 
function of conscience in such a way as to explain the intrinsic conjunction in the ethical act, on the 
one hand of freedom and obedience, and on the other of free obedience with the knowledge of good 
and evil’. Ibid., 7. Attention to the order of created human relations involves a balance between 
knowledge of good and evil (intellect) and human freedom (will).  
51
 Ibid., 10.  
52
 Ibid., 11.  
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divine-human relation that characterizes his theonomous view of human agency.
53
 




 I mentioned previously that I aimed to appreciate the interpretive theological 
gains of this study by probing the similarities between Ramsey and Grotius. Not only 
does Grotius’ theological epistemology shed light onto the significance of the idea 
that politics is a kind of doing, it also illuminates several of Ramsey’s own latent 
epistemological assumptions. If he seeks a theonomous epistemology – one that 
relates human nature to divine nature – he can hardly find a better example for his 
own moral and political claims than Grotius’ use of the Trinitarian analogy to 
illuminate the function of judgment as the interplay of the intellect and the will. 
While this account of conscience may be as close as we can get to an explicit 
recognition of the epistemological issues underlying his theological perspective on 
politics, it is also quite a helpful starting point for investigation of those underlying 
foundations.  
 Ramsey saw clearly that Grotius inherited the classical tradition of just war 
thinking and tried to position his own work within that intellectual heritage. He notes 
in a letter late in his career that ‘Grotius is … continuing the [just war] doctrine as it 
always was. … The growth of nation-states had multiplied the problem of attaining 
                                                
53
 Ibid. The ‘ethical usefulness’ of this account of conscience ‘is recognized not as intrinsic to itself 
but as intrinsic to the exposure by Jesus Christ of the secrets of men’ (11). He says elsewhere, ‘So 
much do theological reflection and action coinhere, that the more we know of God’s Word in Christ 
the more we comprehend His world and the forms of action appropriate in it; and the more we 
comprehendingly participate in this world’s affairs the more surely we know, and know that we know, 
Him whom we believe. In the life of coinhering love that holds reflection and action inseverably 
together, it matters not much with which side you begin’. Ramsey, ‘Status and Advancement’, 12. 
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justice in war; it had not changed its essential character as a matter of political 
decision’.
54
 Ramsey’s understanding of politics as a kind of doing explains and 
upholds the theological significance of political decision-making. The just war 
theory, for both thinkers, is about political acts of judgment.  
 Ramsey’s theological interpretation of politics illuminates contingency and 
temporality as features of created existence making possible faithful creaturely 
response. Politics as a kind of doing describes these structures of interaction and 
decision which come to fruition in the form of political judgment. What I have tried 
to demonstrate is the significance of his theology of repentance and covenant for his 
understanding of these fundamental features of political morality.  
                                                
54
 Paul Ramsey to Jean MacLachlan, April 5, 1963, Box 29, Ramsey Papers.  
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